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Complex Products and Systems (CoPS) is an established category of products that are 
recognized to be underserved in the area of innovation. CoPS tend to be highly costly 
projects that are characterized by difficult development uncertainties and low rates of 
production. As a result traditional innovation theories are not seen to be easily applicable 
particularly as manufacturers of CoPS can tend to struggle with accomplishing dominant 
designs and enjoying the downstream fruits of product maturity such as commoditization. 
To further investigate this concern, a case study is performed on the Boeing B737 
airplane which is the most successful selling commercial jet airplane series in history. 
The amazing part of the story is that it has been able to do this and maintain competitive 
parity in the face of competition from the Airbus A320 airplane which has a design origin 
close to 20 years ahead of the B737. To perform this study, a review of innovation 
theory, particularly Disruptive Innovation, is done together with the concept of product 
platforms and product families. The results show that the challenge of CoPS can in fact 
be potentially overcome by employing an appropriate strategy of product platforms and 
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Complex Products and Systems or CoPS are a category of products that are characterized 
by high costs, high customization, low production rates and high uncertainties as far as 
commercial profitability despite longevity in service due to the high costs. Typical of 
these products are flight simulators, aircraft engines, submarines, ships, nuclear power 
stations, air traffic control systems, telecommunication exchanges etc. (Miller et al, 1995; 
Hobday, 1998). 
 
Because of these characterizations, CoPS proponents tend to argue that traditional 
innovation theory that often use mass consumer products as examples and case studies do 
not necessarily apply. In particular because CoPS product types may not reach high 
production numbers, dominant designs and subsequent commoditization may not occur 
and hence a typical life cycle that would be seen on a mass consumer product may never 
be seen. The implication is that there is insufficient research into this area and CoPS 
deserves specialized theory for innovation. 
 
One could argue however that CoPS is simply at the beginning of a traditional life cycle 
and it is just a matter of time. However cases abound where products that could be 
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classified as CoPS seem to do very well commercially and enjoy high production rates as 
well as establishing dominant type design configurations. 
 
One such product is the Boeing B737 (“B737” is used instead of just “737” as the “B” 
prefix is used to signify Boeing airplanes as a convention, and to differentiate against 
Airbus airplanes that have “A” prefixes) which is the most successful commercial jet in 
history in terms of sales and continues today to be produced in large numbers. This is 
despite having its origins from the 1960s and a strong competitor in the form of the 
Airbus A320 which was introduced with designs and technologies nearly some 20 years 
later in the 1980s. When it was first introduced the A320 featured many new technologies 
such as fly-by-wire flight controls, high bypass turbofan engines, new modern cabin 
interiors and new materials. In response, Boeing did not develop an all-new model to 
compete. Instead it chose to incrementally improve the B737 and it has continued to do 
so successfully up to the present day where it is not unusual for the B737 to outsell the 
A320. 
 
Whether intentionally it did so or not, studies show that Boeing focused primarily on 
improving only the features of the B737 that needed to be developed to attain competitive 
standing with the A320. These features were those that would provide the highest values 
to the customer in terms of the customers’ businesses. In the end Boeing was so 
successful in this process that the B737 would eventually threaten Boeing’s own higher 
end products such as the B757. Hence a case study of the B737 is performed to analyze in 









Combined with this study is a review of Disruptive Innovation (Christensen, 1997; 
Christensen and Raynor, 2003) to consider the competition environment as Boeing 
sought to maintain marketability of the B737. In Disruptive Innovation new entrants can 
enter a market with lesser performance capability than existing products on the market, 
but with a lower price offering, or a different performance attribute that new markets may 
desire. The argument is that the existing product may improve beyond customer needs 
and hence the new product will eventually become more attractive as it too will improve 
in performance and eventually enter the mainstream market. 
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A new consideration is the concept of Reverse Disruptive Innovation, in the sense that the 
incumbent firm may be under attack if the new entrant’s product has in fact better 
performance attributes for the mainstream market, and the incumbent chooses to fight 
back with improvements to the old product but with just enough to satisfy the customers. 
Boeing appears to have done exactly that with the B737 when the A320 was introduce to 
the market with more advanced technology and better performance attributes such as 
lower fuel burn, higher cruise speed, and ability to climb to higher cruise altitudes. In 
improving the 737 so much though in attributes such as increased capacity to carry more 
passengers, Boeing threatened other products such as the B757 in its own product line. 
 
The extent of how Boeing developed the improvements is perhaps the most interesting. It 
did not try to match the A320 in terms of technology but primarily focused on those 
performance attributes that meant the most to its customers. By keeping many of the 
older technology features in successive upgrades, Boeing was able to use those features 
to maintain existing customers with the attraction of commonality in spare parts, training, 
and operations. In concert Boeing also employed “new” technologies or components in 
the upgrades, but often they were proven designs borrowed from other product lines. 
 
A feature of the B737 history of improvements is the concept of a product platform. From 
its inception many of the B737s features were driven by cost considerations and initial 
upgrades by chance followed the commonality strategy to minimize development costs. 
This was so successful that as an emergent strategy (Mintzberg 1978; Mintzberg and 
Waters, 1985), it was used for later upgrades. 
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 In this thesis a review is performed in Chapter 2, of the relevant literature, particularly as 
related to Disruptive Innovation and CoPS, and supplemented by some mini case 
examples such as the Lockheed Skunk Works “Have Blue” prototypes for the F-117 
Nighthawk “Stealth” fighter, the Ford Model “T” car, and the Bell AH-1 Cobra and UH-1 
Huey story. Chapter 3 covers the methodology and the decision to use the case study 
method and the B737 as the case subject. 
 
In Chapter 4, short histories of Boeing and Airbus are given primarily prior to the advent 
of the B737 and A320, followed by a detail case study on the three generations of B737s, 
the “First Generation” (B737-100, -200), “Classic Generation” (B737-300, -400, -500), 
and the “Next Generation” (B737-600, -700, -800, -900, -900ER), as well various 
executive and military variants. Details of the improvements and nature of those 
improvements, and the parts that were deliberately not improved or modified to maintain 
commonality with previous generations, are the main thrust of the study. 
 
While detailed, the writing is deliberately simplified for a wider reading audience to 
ensure that the main ideas, theoretical concepts, and findings are not lost in technical 
jargon. Appendices offer references to those familiar with aircraft technology and 
performance for further technical detail. 
 
The analysis of the case study in Chapter 5 is provided with particular reflections on the 
product Family Concept, Brian Arthur’s “The Nature of Technology”, Reverse 
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Disruptive Innovation, Performance (attributes of the product), and Product Platforms.  
Following the analysis, Chapter 6 offers a strategy formulation and discussion, including 
a review of the research questions. Finally the conclusions in Chapter 7 include the 
limitations of the research, and potential future research questions as a result. 
 
 
1.2. Purpose of the Research 
 
It would be extremely interesting to investigate in this case how the traditional and 
somewhat negative views of CoPS innovation could be challenged, and if so it could 
positively impact the huge investments that typically go into the development of CoPS 
products. By performing a case study on the development of the B737 we may gain 
insight into unexplored strategies that may thus far been difficult to view easily due to the 
technical complexity of the product. The big question would be is this just a once off 
anomaly or is there a strategy or strategies that Boeing employed that could be used by 
other CoPS manufacturers? 
 
Of particular interest is that Boeing did not invest in an all-new model. A new 
commercial jet costs billions of dollars to develop. Hence by simply continuing to adapt 
an existing 40 year old design, Boeing has saved considerable investment costs compared 
to the costs its all-new competitor must have incurred. Price parity with an all-new 
competitor with a derivative airplane also suggests high profits. 
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It is not expected that the results of this research be a one and end all to the solution of 
CoPS. However if a rough strategy can be determined from the study to improve the 
likelihood of commercial success of a CoPS product, a new theory can be developed that 




1.3. Case Study 
 
For this thesis a case study of the B737 airplane is chosen to further investigate the 
observations noted prior, particularly about reverse disruptive innovation, CoPS 
characterizations, and the concept of product platforms and families, since both Boeing 
737s and Airbus A320s possess product families of derivatives and variants. The airplane 
is particularly interesting from several viewpoints. 
 
Firstly in CoPS, frequent products mentioned are flight simulators and aircraft engines. 
Both of these are actually up-stream products of the eventual final use of an airplane. 
Hence if flight simulators or aircraft engines can be classed as CoPS, then an aircraft that 
the flight simulators simulate, or an aircraft on which the engines are used, is surely more 
complex and suitably characterized as a CoPS product. 
 
Flight simulators are typically used by airlines for simulating commercial jet aircraft 
cockpits for training by pilots. A case study on a light single engine piston powered 
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propeller aircraft such as the Cessna 152 hence may not be as suitable a candidate 
compared to a “heavy” B737 jet airplane. 
 
Secondly the B737 has undoubtedly the most impressive record of a production run in 
commercial jet history with over 8,000 orders logged as of the date of writing this thesis. 
It is incredibly still in production and in high demand with current production rates 
approximately producing one B737 a day. Boeing is currently designing yet another 
generation of the B737 by fitting a new more fuel efficient engine (Ostrower, 2011), in 
response to a re-engine effort by Airbus on the competing A320 (Reals, 2010).  
 
Hence like the Ford Model T, the B737 represents in the aircraft world an anomaly to the 
CoPS innovation question. Perhaps the way the airplane’s model development was 
managed will reveal a strategic clue to managing innovation of CoPS. Christensen (2006) 
describes well the opportunity and importance of analyzing anomalies. A purely military 
airplane would not be suitable as commercial market forces could not be relied upon 
when investigating the order rate. Some B737s have been built for military purposes but 
the number is an insignificant minority compared to the commercial orders. 
 
If the airplane had a monopoly, the production run might perhaps not be as interesting as 
the customers would not have had a choice. However the B737 has had healthy 
competition throughout most of its history. The most notable is the A320 (Airbus A320) 
family which had its first orders in 1984, just shy of 20 years later than the B737’s first 
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orders in 1965. Despite the gap in original design dates, the B737 maintains commercial 
parity in orders with the A320. 
 
Three generations of B737 families with executive and military variants make the case 
rich for analysis particularly with the longitudinal aspect and what decisions were made 
to select certain features of the aircraft to upgrade. In-between generations of families, 
Boeing also continuously added improvements to enhance the capability of the aircraft as 
well as to open more markets, such as developing cargo and “combi” (able to carry both 
passengers and cargo in combination on the fuselage main deck) versions and fitting 
gravel kits to allow the aircraft to operate to unpaved runways in remote areas of Canada 
and Africa. 
 
Figure 1.2 below illustrates the sale orders statistics of the various aircraft types in the 
Boeing B737/Airbus A320 class size of aircraft. All the aircraft types shown are twin-
engine commercial jet aircraft in the single-aisle narrow body class. Except for the 3-
engined narrow body single-aisle B727, the next bigger models for Airbus, Boeing or 
McDonnell Douglas are/were twin-aisle wide-bodied jets (A330/A340, B767, DC-
10/MD-11 respectively) with some having 3 (DC-10/MD-11) or 4 engines (A340). 
 
The blue and red lines illustrate how the B737 and A320 respectively have been a 
runaway success for both manufacturers. Notably the other competitors ceased 
production in the early 2000s including Boeing’s own 757s with the success of the 










































































































B727 Total 187 149 125 66 64 48 26 119 92 88 50 113 133 125 98 68 38 11 1
B757 Total 38 0 64 3 2 26 2 45 13 46 148 166 95 50 35 33 12 13 59 44 50 18 43 37 0 7
747-400 All 14 58 47 43 51 120 31 23 2 16 32 56 36 15 35 26
737-100 21 0 8 0 0 0 0 1
737-200 All 62 35 53 49 28 21 48 14 41 47 35 39 37 145 78 95 101 65 44 22 30 14 11
737-300 20 6 20 109 244 126 87 89 56 59 28 65 29 32 22 61 51 8 1
737-400 72 24 149 52 36 33 25 7 3 15 41 23 4 2
737-500 55 74 133 16 9 24 2 4 10 53 5 2 2
737-600 27 10 7 9 3 0 0 0 0 8 5
737-700 All 63 6 37 78 105 127 81 202 71 35 122 50 106 210 248
737-800 All 22 58 195 115 170 145 170 107 125 78 94 426 457 532
737-900 All 8 34 3 2 10 2 6 0 33 71 70
B737 Total 83 35 61 49 28 21 48 14 42 47 35 39 37 145 78 95 121 71 64 131 274 212 177 312 241 111 70 114 101 67 169 438 314 354 237 374 188 162 206 152 570 738 850
A320 14 39 146 58 116 126 183 15 72 13 33 39 128 74 195 183 158 98 78 104 180 568 312 676
A321 20 117 3 9 0 20 12 50 50 52 40 69 31 9 7 28 103 104 40
A319 42 30 57 240 190 65 120 46 148 44 67 206 253 185
A318 120 41 0 0 0 4 41 4 13
A320 Total 14 39 146 58 116 146 300 18 81 13 95 81 235 364 437 408 388 175 235 155 279 918 673 914
DC-9 All 209 159 66 88 44 34 24 28 73 41 21 35 22 41 27 6 2
MD-80 All 23 27 14 14 19 87 43 117 106 120 88 239 135 50 23 10 10 9 14 17 2 24
MD-90 All 27 0 26 0 0 39 17 3 4
717-200 42 0 0 41 0 21 3 32 8 8
DC9 Total 209 159 66 88 44 34 24 28 73 41 21 35 45 68 41 20 21 87 43 117 106 120 88 239 135 77 23 36 10 9 95 34 5 69 0 21 3 32 8 8
 
Figure 1.2 
Chronology Aircraft Orders Boeing/Airbus/McDonnell Douglas 1965-2007 





1.4. Key Research Questions 
 
Key research questions are: 
 
 How could Boeing’s strategy with the B737 be replicated for other companies and 
products? If this is a possibility, the economic impact on companies developing 
and manufacturing CoPS type products could be improved dramatically. 
 
 Did Boeing employ a strategy to improve the B737s longevity in terms of 
competition and if so how did it do it? Was it by developing a family or families 
of models in terms of product platforms, variants of basic models, platform 
derivatives? 
 
 Was the competitive edge of the B737 maintained by radical or incremental 
innovations to its design? 
 
 What were the downsides if any of its strategy? For example in its quest to 
maintain competitiveness and improve product performance, did it lose efficiency 
in certain market segments? For the same reason were other product lines in 
Boeing’s product lines affected? 
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 Was the lineage of the B737 an advantage or disadvantage? It may for example be 
that the infrastructure required to support the aircraft was common to successive 
generations and hence the user would save on training, tooling, and spare parts 
costs on a somewhat familiar product. Technology implications however could 
mean that one could be stuck with obsolete technology. 
 
The first question is really the point of the thesis.  Hopefully by analyzing this particular 
case, a company could maintain product longevity and competitiveness even on an old 
product line, without having to invest significantly in an old new design. In a CoPS 
scenario this investment savings would be greatly significant. 
 
 




While there exists an abundance of innovation literature and CoPS literature, much of the 
literature that combines both CoPS and innovation usually refer to the problem of CoPS 
being an oddity where the standard or widely accepted modes of innovation theory may 
not be applicable. This is mainly due to the high cost, low instances and low rate 
production of CoPS type products. 
 
This thesis on the other hand offers a potential solution to the problem itself. That is not 
to say that potential solutions are not already offered in existing literature. However it is 
rare to find papers that offer concrete evidence of how historically the solutions can be 
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implemented. The problem is that CoPS products by nature are complex and it is 
probably difficult for the average researcher to study a product that may require in-depth 
technical knowledge and experience to interpret the data. In fact references to these 
products such as commercial jet aircraft in published papers are typically superficial in 
nature. Prencipe (2000) and Miller et al (1995) exceptionally do offer in-depth 
observatory analysis of the technical issues (aircraft engine control issues and flight 
simulators respectively) but do not offer real solutions or strategies to respond. 
 
For example one of the solutions offered in this case study is the use of product platforms 
and the employment of product families. Ulrich and Eppinger (2012) refer to the 
development of Products Platform as well as Complex Systems but not necessarily in 
combination as both can exist independently of each other. A non-CoPS commodity type 
product such as an MP3 player can feature product platforms and families, while it is not 
necessary for a CoPS product such as a flight simulator to have a product platform or 
family. Likewise Christensen (1997), Christensen and Raynor (2003), and Christensen et 
al, (2004) offer good examples of cases for disruptive innovation but not necessarily 
CoPS type products. 
 
Thus the combination of CoPS, Reverse Disruptive Innovation and Product Platforms is 
perhaps a unique one where a deliberate strategy is proposed. The case study also offers 




A key advantage of such a strategy is to minimize investment expenditure. Hence in an 
environment of competition companies can use the strategy to assist in defending their 
product lines. Conversely companies can also use it as a method of offense to encroach 
upon CoPS type product competitors that are less prepared. 
 
Importantly the strategy proposed as a result of these findings are not proposed as a one 
and end-all solution. However it is proposed that knowledge of such a strategy and the 
reasoning behind it could assist company management, particularly those with product 
development decision making. 
 
“It is true that one cannot think a thought before it has been thought. All that must be 
asked of a theory, however, is that it helps to evaluate a technology after it has been 
conceived or to evaluate a business venture after it has been proposed or launched. The 
theory must provide the ability to predict what will happen to the incumbents and entrants 
in the future if they take different actions relative to the innovation. The earlier these 




1.6. Summary of Results 
 
The analysis and strategy formulations resulting from the case study of the three 
generations of the B737 product families show that the traditional theory of CoPS can be 
improved upon from observing characteristics of low innovation and production rates to a 
more pro-active role. Using the success of Boeing in managing the B737 product 
generations and improvements over five decades and fending off the Airbus A320 which 
has a 20 year later heritage design, a 5 point strategy is proposed. 
 
The strategy consists of taking advantage of the product’s heritage, employing product 
platforms to increase the rate of innovation and production as well as reducing 
development and manufacturing costs, planning appropriate product family variants, 
exploiting commonality benefits such as spares support and training to increase 
attractiveness to the customer, and deciding on next generations of the product platform. 
 
Designing in proven designs of sub-systems from other product lines also mean improved 
overall production rates for those parts while at the same time reducing development 
costs. A hybrid design of components to be considered is a “carry over-modified” part 
which in essence is an old design but adapted to a new requirement to enhance its 
performance. This way much of the commonality and proven design of the old part is 
maintained and obsolescence is averted. 
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Reverse Disruption Innovation is offered as a new strategy to be used for older products 
being attacked by newer technology products. In this scenario, the roles of the defending 
incumbent and the attacking new entrant are reversed from traditional Disruptive 
Innovation theory. The incumbent can defend by improving existing designs just good 
enough using the strategies outlined above to maintain customer appeal. 
 
Accordingly a contribution to CoPS theory is offered in that a product manager can use 
these strategies to develop a CoPS project or maintain an otherwise aging product line 
without the investments required for a completely new development design. 
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2. Literature Review & Interpretations 
 
2.1. Permutation as Innovation 
 
 
Innovation is often misconceived as something to do with inventions or new technology. 
While technology certainly is often part of it, it doesn’t necessarily have to be new. The 
Austrian Economist Josef Schumpeter (1947) presented a distinction between an inventor 
and entrepreneur. “The inventor produces ideas, the entrepreneur ‘gets things done’, 
which may but need not embody anything that is scientifically new”. The term 
entrepreneur implies commercialization of the technology, which may or may not 
necessarily be recent. “Getting things done” also implies a whole slew of activities from 
development and manufacturing to sales and support. 
 
Similarly Freeman (2004) notes “An invention is an idea, a sketch or model for a new or 
improved device, product, process or system. Such inventions may often (not always) be 
patented but they do not necessarily lead to technical innovations. In fact the majority do 
not. An innovation in the economic sense is accomplished only with the first commercial 
transaction involving the new product, process system or device, although the word is 
used also to describe the whole process.” 
 
This helps set a model that includes the notion of combining a technology with 
commercialization. Higgins (1995) confirms by saying “Innovation is the process of 
something new that has significant value to an individual, a group, an organization, an 
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Polaroid Invention and Innovation Research Project 
(Buckler, 1997) 
 
Rothwell (1986) includes the “market” factor as a necessity in his definitions of 
innovation, noting for example that increased R&D rates alone do not necessarily 
increase innovation rates. Schumpeter observed that a characteristic of entrepreneurship 
can be “the doing of things that are already being done in a new way (innovation)” 
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(Schumpeter, 1991). This is also a key point towards recognizing that the 
commercialization aspect depends on the application of that technology. Hence a simple 
model of innovation can be visualized as below. While simplistic, the model does 








Basic Innovation Model 
 
 
Notably Schumpeter observed that “the ‘new thing’ need not be spectacular or of historic 
importance”. This simple observation gives a realization that the model above can be 
permutated without a date stamp to develop what could be called a new innovation. In 
other words an old technology can be used with a different application (also not 
necessarily new), to develop a new market. 
 
As an example, a relatively old technology light bulb normally used to produce light, can 
be also used in a different application to give warmth to baby chicks from the heat it 
gives out. Similarly a laser beam can be used in a myriad of applications and markets 
from tool alignment to eye surgery. 
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Levinthal (1998) quotes “A key element of innovative activity is the identification of 
promising domains of application for existing technologies”. Hence we see that it is the 
new permutation commercialized that is the innovation, rather than the individual 
newness of any of the components of Technology, Application, or Market. This 
implication is crucial towards understanding how seemingly “old” products such as the 
Boeing 737 can be maintained in a competitive environment. 
 
Figure 2.3 illustrates these permutation possibilities. Scenario ‘I’ shows a singular 
technology, application, and market. Scenario ‘II’ gives an example where a new 
technology ‘B” is introduced but is used with the same application and market. Scenario 
‘III’ offers a new application ‘B’, and subsequently a new market ‘B’ for technology ‘B’. 
 
This does not prevent the ‘old’ technology ‘A’ to be used for a completely different 
application ‘C’ in a new market ‘C’ in Scenario ‘IV’. Nor does it prevent any of the 
previous combinations, say technology ‘B’ with application ‘A’ to be applied to yet 
another different market ‘D’ as in Scenario ‘V’. Hence the permutations provide the 
expansion of possible innovations as illustrated by the diverging dashed lines in scenario 
‘V’. Notably the notion of ‘new’ or ‘old’ technology is not an issue. It is the newness of 
the permutation combining the components of technology, application, and market, that 
determines the newness of the innovation. 
 
Arthur (2009) describes similarly that novel technologies are made possible by a 
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2.2. Types of  Innovation 
 
There are different interpretation variations of innovation, depending on the nature of the 
study. For example Zawislak et al (2008) suggest a slightly different model to include 
entrepreneurship, institutions, capabilities, and capital. Damanpour (1991) and Higgins 
(1995) refer to innovation characteristics that refer to the organization rather than just a 
product. Howells (2000) describes innovation with reference to services provided. 
 
The Oslo Manual (OECD-Eurostat, 2005) states that “The minimum requirement for an 
innovation is that the product, process, marketing method or organizational method must 
be new (or significantly improved) to the firm. This includes products, processes and 
methods that firms are the first to develop and those that have been adopted from other 
firms or organizations” and defines four types of innovations; product innovations, 
process innovations, organizational innovations, and marketing innovations. 
 
“Product innovations involve significant changes in the capabilities of goods or services.” 
Importantly, “Both entirely new goods and services and significant improvements to 
existing products are included.” Meanwhile “Process innovations represent significant 
changes in production and delivery methods.” Also “Organizational innovations refer to 
the implementation of new organizational methods. These can be changes in business 
practices, in workplace organization or in the firm’s external relations.” While 
“Marketing innovations involve the implementation of new marketing methods. These 
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can include changes in product design and packaging, in product promotion and 
placement, and in methods for pricing goods and services.” 
 
In this thesis the focus will be more on the product type of innovation. However the 
separation between product and process innovations is not mutually distinct. “Indeed 
process innovation may often result in subsequent product innovation and vice versa” 
(Neely et al, 2001). Similarly market innovation is somewhat intertwined in this thesis 
since the study is on how to develop existing product designs for evolving markets. Johne 
(1999) for example notes that a customer may be served with essentially the same core 
product but differentiated slightly to extract different revenues, e.g. between first and 
economy class travel on an airplane. “Each usage need presents a potential market 
opportunity” (Johne, 1999). 
 
Beyond a basic model, successful innovations can also have different effects on an 
industry.  Small changes can be deemed as incremental with minor effect, while others 
can be significant, resulting in closures of businesses and meteoric improvements of 
others. The latter reflects Schumpeter’s theory of “Creative Destruction” where he 
postulates that new ways of doing things can destroy existing firms and infrastructures 
based on old knowledge and distribution channels (Schumpeter, 1942; Schumpeter, 
1991). Hence considering the issues of existing knowledge and experience can assist 
understanding the distinction between radical versus incremental innovation. 
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Incremental innovations take the form of simple and minor changes to the product or 
application. Zirger (1997) describes well the advantages of incremental innovations that 
take advantage of an organization’s existing know-how and furthermore promotes the 
benefits of experience via “Building on experience provides competitive advantages in 
three areas: strengthening core competencies, reducing product costs and improving time 
to market for new products.”  
 
Radical innovation is not simple to define however. Dewar and Dutton (1986) for 
example note two significant differences between radical and incremental innovation are 
the impacts to knowledge and risk. In radical innovations, often the knowledge base is 
different and in doing so the risk can be higher. Using a different knowledge base means 
that companies have to change completely their core competencies to adapt to the new 
innovation. However the context here is mostly technological and the relation to the basic 
model described earlier which includes the ability to permute technologies, applications 
and markets is not clear. 
 
Alternatively the radical component can mean a significant jump in product performance, 
leading a customer’s perception of a greatly improved product that could mean like 
significant changes and associated benefits in the way they use the product. Anderson and 
Tushman (1990) termed “Technological Discontinuities” as innovations that dramatically 
advance an industry's price vs. performance frontier. Ehrnberg (1995) quotes “The lower 
the price and the costs of switching over to the new substitute and the higher its technical 
performance, the higher is the new product's relative advantage”. 
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Types of Radical Innovation Model 
(Murmann et al, 2006) 
 
Murmann et al (2006) combines both knowledge and performance concepts as above. In 
fact they coin an innovation that has both a significant performance gain and a 
requirement for new knowledge as radical-square (r2) innovation. 
 
A more sophisticated model is given by Abernathy and Clark (1985) who include the 
notion of preserving or replacing linkages as well as competencies. “Architectural 
Innovation” as they define, disrupts the technological knowledge bases as well as the 
linkages for suppliers, distributors, markets together with supporting and downstream 
industries. However such innovations revert to “regular” innovations after awhile when a 
dominant design appears as relative new knowledge and experience accumulate with 
time. 
 
Utterback and Abernathy (1975), Utterback and Suárez (1993), Anderson  and Tushman 
(1990), Murmann et al (2006), all discuss dominant design but a common theme is that 
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the firm with that dominant design can have a more monopolistic run in the beginning, 
while the activity of firms adopting similar design configurations peak shortly after.  
 
Following this standardization occurs and this then creates an industry in both the supply 
and demand side that can handle the production of this design configuration. With time, 
the industry continues to improve the process and product in incremental type 
innovations and thus matures the design. A “mature” design however does not mean 
radical innovations are not possible, keeping in mind again that innovation is not just 
about technology or a design. 
 
What is interesting about the Abernathy and Clark’s 1985 paper is that they look for a 
“de-maturity” events, i.e. changes that can afford new innovations with existing product-
application-market environments. This is quite exciting theory for a company with a 
product and market that may perhaps be quite mature with expectations of an eventual 
decline in business. The three changes quoted are: 
 
a) Technical options that open up possibilities in performance or new applications 
that the existing design concepts could meet only with great difficulty or not at 
all. 
b) Changes in customer demands that may impose requirements best met with new 
design approaches. 
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c) Regulatory changes that may set technical requirements or demand performance 
standards that favour revolutionary or architectural strategic development. De-
regulation may have the same effect. 
 
It will be seen later that all three of these points affected the Boeing 737’s evolution 
towards de-maturity to maintain competitiveness. 
 
Henderson and Clark (1990) summarize four types of innovation neatly as shown in the 
figure below. They describe Modular Innovation briefly as one where the product can 






(Henderson and Clark, 1990) 
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In practice innovations are not so neatly categorized and maybe aberrations of several 
categories. One could argue for example that the mobile or cellular telephone is a 
modular innovation since initially it still used the same utility companies and could dial 
to and from existing landline telephones. However the advent of cheaper mobile 
telephones, SMS Text messaging, and international roaming facilities would hint that the 
industry evolution has moved to an architectural innovation where new linkages have 
been developed and traditional distribution channels are somewhat challenged. 
 
Ulrich (1995) alludes further into types of product architecture and in particular discusses 
issues with intermixing singular function components to become products with more 
integration. Figure 2.6 for example shows a design with components that have singular 
functions, whereas Figure 2.7 demonstrates how a design could potentially utilize 
components that could support more than one function. 
 
Note for example that “The upper and lower halves of the trailer have slots cut in them. 
The strip of material remaining between two slots acts as a leaf spring. The cargo is hung 
by straps from the two springs in the upper half. The axle is attached to the spring in the 
lower half. Covers, shown shaded, are attached over the slots. The nose piece is the 
component containing the trailer hitch.” A functional element can also be supported by 







A modular trailer architecture exhibiting a one-to-one mapping from functional elements 








An integral trailer architecture exhibiting a complex mapping from functional elements to 
physical components.  
(Ulrich 1995) 
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Ulrich also illustrates interesting examples of system architecture as per below, between 
“Integral” and “Sectional” types. In the “Integral” design, all components and functions 
are combined into one. It makes for a much neater and compact design and can be more 
efficient in terms of infrastructure (boxes, cables, power supplies etc.). Should a single 
component should fail or become obsolete however, the risk is that the whole product can 
be at similar risk. 
 
The “Sectional” design on the other hand may be less tidy but offers more modularity and 
allows changing or upgrade of any component without requiring a re-design of the whole 
system. For this particular example, standards such as the USB or Universal Serial Bus 
connector system accentuate this advantage further. 
 









Baldwin and Clark (2006) go even further into this by describing how architectural 
innovation can be utilized where a smaller technological footprint of the firm of the 
overall system allows a strategy to outsource the other parts for faster development by 
specialist firms but development of the key components are maintained by the incumbent 
firm.  That way the firm can maintain its competitive edge as well as develop and bring to 
market products faster than competitors. 
 
 
2.3. Product Life Cycle 
 
Complex products may not necessarily follow a simple pattern of innovation. Rothwell 
and Gardiner (1985a) for example extract the figure below of an innovation model that 
reflects development, feedback, re-development, and eventual maturity. Rothwell (1986) 
quotes that innovation should not be mistaken as a clearly bounded process that somehow 
“terminates once the original new product reaches the marketplace. 
 
In practice, technological innovation is a dynamic, iterative process rather than a one-off 
event”. Carlsson and Stankiewicz (1991) note that innovation tends to be an interactive 
process, sometimes between producers and users, sometimes between producers, and 






Model of the evolution of a successful invention 
(Rothwell and Gardiner, 1985a) 
 
 
What is interesting is the inclusion of time (re-development, maturity etc.). Products 
evolve, and so do markets. Lynn et al (1996) describe how complex products need to go 
through a “Probe and Learn” process where several market failures can occur before the 
successful dominant design is established. In the process the company improves the 
product and tries to match the market. Often the market itself may not be ready for such a 
product and does not yet know how to adapt. 
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In the case of Lynn et al’s (1996) examples of Motorola’s cellular phone, Searle’s 
Nutrasweet, GE’s CT scanner, and Corning’s optical fiber, the industry beyond 
manufacturing also changed. The term “architectural” innovation becomes more 
appropriate as obviously the linkages with suppliers and distributors all had to adapt 
somewhat. 
 
For a complex product or system, this time factor can be relatively large to the point 
where perhaps the technologies themselves can be obsolete before the project is 
completed. Even worse the production quantities may be very small or singular. As a 
result the linkages with suppliers and manufacturing can also face premature 
obsolescence and a vicious cycle develops that inevitably drives up technical difficulties 
and costs up. More importantly the feedback cycle necessary to fully mature a product 
may not be attained due to the low rate of production. 
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2.4. Disruptive Innovation 
 
 
Particularly with respect to technological changes, Utterback and Brown (1972) 
highlighted the importance of monitoring for changes in the environment. In their study 
of the supply of silver for the photographic industry, even non-technological “signs” such 
as the demand being greater than supply of silver in the 1970s can be an indicator for an 
impetus to improve technology to reduce the consumption or find alternatives altogether. 
More significantly, the rate of technological change should be monitored just as 
importantly as technology itself.  Combined, these issues can be threats or opportunities 
for a business. 
 
In their paper “Strategic Responses to Technological Threats”, Cooper and Schendel 
(1976) with a study of several firms faced with new competition with new technologies 
and innovations describe quite well what could be the foundations of “Disruptive 
Innovation”. They note that the new technologies at first could be quite crude to the point 
of being ignored but the incumbent firms. 
 
However, often the new technologies would improve at a rate that eventually caught up 
and supersede the capabilities and costs of the older technologies. Secondly despite being 
crude, the new technologies would get a beach head by certain submarkets where they 
might have an advantage such as cost where the existing technologies might never be 
applied. 
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 In response many of the incumbent firms could reduce their dependence on submarkets 
and/or try to compete by improving the old technologies. Notably the old technology, 
such as vacuum tubes used in electronics, “reached its highest stage of technical 
development after the new technology was introduced” (Cooper & Schendel, 1976). 
Notably the decision to commit resources to new and, or old technology can be difficult, 
as often the old technology markets indicated significant financial return while new and 
immature technologies pose a degree of risk and uncertainty. 
 
Cooper and Smith (1992) indicated that even if a firm decided to try the new technology, 
the likelihood of failure was high and the commitment was very much just a token effort 
with the company pulling out shortly after. Recognition and possible re-entry was only 
considered after other firms had succeeded and a ‘dominant design’ was established. The 
disadvantage of this is that a late entry into the market can mean a loss of profit margin as 
prices can begin falling with commoditization of the product. The R&D effort will also 
be behind other firms that have already a head start in the technology. 
 
Timex was an example when despite having entered electronic watch manufacturing 
early, preferred to concentrate on mechanical watches. By the time it decided to commit 
to electronic watches, prices for electronic watches had begin to fall and other producers 
could produce superior models at lower costs. 
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“While most of the firms examined made substantial commitments over time, these 
investments were made only after the potential of the new product had become apparent. 
Such firms seemed to harbor the expectation (initially) that the new product would not 
penetrate the core markets of the traditional business. In several cases, there were also 
concerns that the new product's early imperfections could tarnish the firm's reputation; as 
such, there was a reluctance to make a full commitment until the product was "proven." 
In virtually every case, however, these companies appeared to underestimate the ability 
of firms from outside the established industry to overcome important technological 
obstacles, to gain market acceptance for the new product, and to establish a defensible 
competitive position. Only after the miscalculation became apparent did these firms begin 
to mount a more vigorous effort” (Cooper and Smith, 1992). 
 
Finally Cooper and Smith also note that incumbent firms adopting new technologies are 
also faced with the challenge of integrating supply, manufacturing, distribution and 
support for the products in organizations designed for the old technologies. Even if 
separate divisions are created, rivalries and different corporate values can give 
management headaches in the transition period. 
 
In 1997 Clayton Christensen published his best selling book “The Innovator’s Dilemma”. 
Using examples of excavators, computer disk drives, and steel mills, the basis of Clayton 
Christiansen’s disruptive innovation theory is that established companies are often though 
subtly disrupted by entrants with new types of products that have less performance 
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capabilities than the established products, but which may be cheaper and still meet 
customers’ needs. 
 
In many cases the customers are new ones for which the established companies products 
are too high end as they develop and improve along a technological rate that is often 
faster than the customers ability to absorb those technologies. As with Utterback and 
Brown (1972) the rate of change is a key issue. As the new entrants gain a foothold at the 
low end of the market, they grow stronger and eventually improve their products so as to 









Introduced was a concept that “Good Management” is in fact responsible for subsequent 
failures of otherwise successful firms faced with disruptive competition. This occurs 
when incumbent firms may choose to give up low end low profit margin markets to the 
entrants and are rewarded by higher profit margins with the remaining higher end 
markets. However this cycle keeps going higher and higher end until the incumbent firms 
run out of high margin markets to sustain their business. 
 
The book encompasses the work of Bower and Christensen (1995) and Bower and 
Christensen (1996). Bower and Christensen (1996) highlight the difficulty of decision 
making towards resource allocation between existing proven and new but risky 
technologies, as did Cooper & Schendel (1976). Bower and Christensen (1995), as with 
Cooper & Schendel (1976), stresses the possible need to place new disruptive 
technologies in separate divisions or organizations of an incumbent company that already 
has a successful operation with the old technology. As an addition  Lansiti, McFarlan and 
Westerman (2003) note that autonomous divisions to promote the new technology should 
at some point be re-integrated to the main company to realize the long term benefit of the 
then recognized product.  
 
Aside from cost, new products can also enter via new markets where the different 
characteristics of the new products may be valued differently to the existing products. But 
upon entering, eventual improvements can make them better such that they threaten and 
possibly supersede the existing technologies as in Fig 2.11. This matches Cooper & 





Disruptive Technology S-Curve 
(Christensen, 1997) 
 
The use of “S-curves” however is somewhat vague as not all products may follow that 
shape. Christensen and Raynor (2003) clarified the distinction between Low-End and 
New-Market Disruptions which is better illustrated in Figure 2.12. Daneels (2004) 
amongst discussing many possible interpretations of aspects of the theory prefer the latter 
definition of Disruptive Technology using different product attributes as the 






The Third Dimension of the Disruptive Innovation Model 
(Christensen and Raynor, 2003) 
 
Christensen and Raynor (2003) also begin to use the term “Disruptive Innovation” rather 
than “Disruptive Technology” as Christensen (2006) notes that he eventually understood 
that it was the business model and not the technology itself that was the key issue. 
 
“In 1997 just after The Innovator’s Dilemma was published, in a personal 
conversation Andy Grove surfaced an anomaly that helped me see I had defined it 
wrong, as he recounted how Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC) was disrupted 
by makers of microprocessor-based computers. He said, ‘It wasn’t a technology 
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problem. Digital’s engineers could design a PC with their eyes shut. It was a 
business model problem, and that’s what made the PC so difficult for DEC.’ 
 
He noted that in the early 1980s proposals to make PCs promised 40% gross 
margins on machines that could be sold for $2,000. What is more, none of DEC’s 
customers could use them. These proposals were competing for resources against 
proposals to make more powerful computers than DEC had ever made before. 
These promised gross margins of 60% on machines that could sell for $500,000. 
It was the attractiveness of the opportunity relative to the company’s business 
model that made the sustaining path attractive and the disruptive path 
unattractive” (Christensen and Raynor, 2003; Christensen, 2006). 
 
Walsh, Kirchhoff, and Newbert (2002) in their study of time-to-market of disruptive 
innovations observed significantly that as existing incumbents tended to follow sustaining 
type product innovations, these equated to “Market-Pull” strategies whereas a new 
company with disruptive technology would tend towards “Technology-Push” strategy. 
 
The major difference would be that while the Market-Pull would simply mean a 
replacement or substitute event using existing organizational channels, the Technology-
Push scenario meant a destructive type effect requiring new forms of distribution and 
support. On the other hand, when incumbents tried to perform a Technology-Push, it 
tended to be sold as an improvement type technology, again emphasizing existing 
channels. This inflexibility allows new firms to be faster in innovating. 
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“Surprisingly, the lack of an established customer base is an advantage for the new firms 
attempting to market their new technology. Unfettered by demands from existing 
customers for improvements on existing products based upon evolutionary technologies, 
new firms can be flexible about to whom they chose to sell and what applications can be 
profitably produced and sold. It is this flexibility that probably underlies the much 
smaller cycle time in ‘prototype to first sale’ ” (Walsh, et al, 2002) 
 
While Christensen, Suarez, and Utterback (1998) stressed the implications of recognizing 
the emergence of a dominant design for entry into a new technology arena, Christensen 
and Raynor (2003) provide an excellence reference for product architecture at which 
points an integrated or modular design is best optimized. 
 
When the technology is still in its infancy, an integrated design may be best to optimize 
the performance which is still not up to the expectations of the customer. However once 
the technology is working and well and subsequent improvements start towards 
exceeding customer performance requirements, then a modularized architecture allows an 
organization to compete better with optimized processes such as in sales, marketing and 
support. 
 
Hence in Figure 2.13, an integrated architecture type design is optimal on the left hand 
side while a modular architecture type design is optimal on the right hand side. The 
important parameter for the company is to monitor where the product is relative to 




Product Architecture and Integration 
(Christensen and Raynor 2003) 
 
 
While Christensen, Johnson, and Rigby (2002) describe how to grow disruptive 
businesses, what then does one do if one is the incumbent being attacked? Charitou and 
Markides (2003) offer, though non-conclusive, a variety of response strategies. Perhaps 
the most interesting strategy is to “develop a third game, attacking the innovators by 




Traditional airline Air Canada for example, when confronted by the emergence of low 
cost carrier Westjet, fought back by emphasizing Aeroplan, its frequent flyer program 
which Westjet did not have. Furthermore Aeroplan provided the ability to earn free 
flights on overseas destinations, again an attribute that domestic carrier Westjet could not 
offer. 
 
Tellis (2006) emphasizes that while case examples such as that used by Christensen and 
colleagues can illustrate a phenomena, the reaction or pro-action towards a disruptive 
innovation can be affected by “Visionary Leadership”. That is, the strategists of firms can 
positively and actively try to foresee future events and be part of a new strategy either 
offensively or defensively. It is not a helpless situation. 
 
No matter which strategy is taken however incumbents often fail to see that a disruptive 
technology, particularly those that seek entry via new attributes, actually open up new 
markets. In the event the new technology is successful, that market can grow to a 
significant size. If the strategy chosen was to take advantage of this new market, then 
even if the old market is replaced or reduced to a minority by the new market, the 
incumbent then will be in a strong position long term. 
 
In the defense of its business, incumbents typically have time to strategize and action as 
new technologies can in fact take years to mature, especially since incumbents would be 
financially and organizationally stronger than new entrants initially. The key is in 




Disruption as an Opportunity for Growth 
(Gilbert, 2003) 
 
In fact Paap and Katz (2004) endorse a “dualism” whereby incumbents should in fact by 
focusing on the needs of customers to manage both continuing sustaining actions, while 
at the same time incorporating potential disruptive innovations to enable future 
competitiveness. In effect this means a monitoring function of the technological 
environment as Utterback and Brown (1972) mentioned in 1972. 
 
Danneels (2004) points out an important aspect that Christensen’s findings about firms 
listening too much to major current customers are often miss-interpreted to be against 
customer orientation. Instead the interpretation is “that firms should not be focused 
narrowly on serving current customers and should not allocate all their resources to 
serving current customers”. Thus both current and potential future customers should be 
considered. 
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 Schmidt (2004), Utterback and Acee (2005), Schmidt and Druehl (2008), Sood and Tellis 
(2011), offer an enlightening twist that disruptive innovations can also occur from 
products that come in with higher price and higher performance with a similar procession 
of events where the new technology eventually takes over the old. Utterback and Acee 
give the example of audio compact discs and digital cameras that subsequently took over 






A Map of Possibilities of Competitive Advantage due to Technological Change 
(Utterback and Acee, 2005). 
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 Markides (2006) further argues that in the description of Disruptive Innovation, there 
should be a separate category of Business-Model Innovations which are quite different 
from Technological Innovations. As the name suggests, Business-Model Innovations are 
those that do not discover new products or services, but redefine the existing product or 
service and how it is provided to the customer. Such innovations, such as Low-Cost 
airlines or internet book sellers, are different from technological innovations in that they 
can be largely successful in attaining market share, but only in the sense that it is just a 
segment of the market. They never replace the old business model completely as would a 
technological innovation such as audio compact discs versus cassette tapes. 
 
However one could argue the converse also. Some new technologies might never replace 
old technologies entirely either if the old value attribute is still in demand by certain 
sectors of the market. For example electronic laser measurement devices could replace 
plain old rulers and tape measures but the market for the latter products still exists for e.g. 
students and carpenters. Similarly there may be cases where business model innovations 
are winning a complete market takeover such as electronic airline tickets which are 
making paper tickets obsolete. Perhaps the important issue is to simply recognize the 
existence of different markets as per Gilbert (2003). 
 
Using ‘good tasting’ chocolate bars (“conventional confectionery”) versus ‘healthy’ 
energy bars as an example, Henderson (2006) offers an illustration of this as shown in 
Figure 2.16 where the different performance attribute dimensions are used as axes on a 
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chart. This helps to differentiation of the target markets and provides a decision tool if the 
manufacturers wished to use one product to attack the market of the other, e.g. by making 






A Simple Market Map for Chocolate Confectionary 
Henderson (2006) 
 
A similar chart is offered by Sood and Tellis (2011) as in Figure 2.17 where the “Niche” 
product eventually improves to participate in the “Mainstream Customers” market at a 
later time (t2), whereas the dominant technology (Tdominant) by that time has improved to a 







Dynamics of Competition 
(Sood and Tellis, 2011) 
 
Sood and Tellis (2011) attempt to develop a model for predicting Disruptive 
Technologies and their findings indicate that technologies that attack from a lower 
performance point are frequently introduced by incumbents as new entrants rather than 
from completely new entrants, and are not necessarily cheaper than old technologies. 
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They claim that their results apply to platform technologies but offer little evidence why. 
However they do admit limitations due to the size of the study. 
 
As a good reference, Christensen (2002) quotes four rules of innovation: 
 
 Take Root in Disruption 
Disruptive companies aim at low end market segments with products that are not 
as good but the incumbent companies are motivated not to compete and may even 
exit those markets as the low end markets have low margins. The new entrant 
products may not have all the functionality of the incumbent’s more developed 
product but with a lower price point they offer a convenient alternative to 
consumers who might otherwise not be able to afford the incumbent’s product. 
 
 Pick the Scope Needed to Succeed 
The scope of success depends on the stage at which the product development is at. 
If further improvements are still needed to meet customers’ basic needs, then an 
integrated company could effect those improvements to stay ahead with 
proprietary type product architectures across different components that are 
difficult to imitate. However if those basic needs are already met then modularity 
with standardized interfaces would be the environment and the focus should then 
be on improving the components of the product as well as the processes of 
sourcing, manufacturing, and distribution (e.g. Dell). 
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 Leverage the Right Capabilities 
Perhaps a fallacy is that good entities with proven track records of production 
would be good at introducing new products. Christensen argues that a free-
standing value network may be better, i.e. with a separate entity free of existing 
process that could motivate imitation of existing processes within a company. The 
motivation of the new entity should be impatience for profits rather than company 
size as a new successful entity, given the corporate freedom, could be quite 
different to what existing or incumbent entities would be. Hence these processes 
include everything from resource planning, sales, marketing, distribution, and 
even the supplier chain. 
 
 Disrupt Competitors, Not Customers 
The emphasis should be on improving customers’ lives or work processes. If it is 
more difficult, then obviously the chances of success are much less. A fair amount 
of good judgment is hence needed to ensure that a new product will actually do 
that and be appreciated by the customer, keeping in mind the previous points that 
a low end customer may be in a position of having the alternative of no product at 
all. Hence using consumer reviews of existing products or copying other 
companies with already successful products can be quite misleading. A disruptive 




These four rules are particularly relevant here since in the B737’s case it went through 
several product life cycles as the models and derivatives were developed over time. The 
question to be asked would be if these rules were met at each re-incarnation of the 
product with revised models.  An oddity in the case of the B737, is that it is actually the 
incumbent product and the A320 is the new entrant as the A320 is actually the more up-
to-date modern design with more bells and whistles than the B737. Thus it will be 
interesting to see if Boeing used the B737 as a “basic” design and improved it just 




2.5. Complex Products and Systems (CoPS), Have Blue, and the Model T 
 
 
The subject of Complex Products and Systems or “CoPS” is a relatively new 
classification in the study of innovation. In their study of flight simulators, electro-
mechanical machines that can reproduce the cockpit, feel and motion of flying an 
airplane for training purposes, Miller et al (1995) observed that CoPS appear to go 
through a different process of innovation that are quite different to the “'conventional', 
market contest Schumpeterian model” typified by mass consumer products. “Typically, 
CSs (Complex Systems) industries are bilateral oligopolies with a few large buyers facing 
a few large users. Buyers are not single individuals or families, as in the case of mass 
market durables, but large organizations with their own complex technical needs, as in 
the aircraft, military systems, telecommunications and FS (Flight Simulator) industries” 
Miller et al (1995). 
 
Because CoPS may be high cost, low rate or even one-off productions, involve long lead 
times, and significant amount of customization, they may not necessarily ever have a 
chance to mature in the “normal” product life cycle. This normal life cycle is well 
described by Miller et al (1995) as “the standardization process whereby a particular 
product configuration (or dominant design) emerges to galvanize an entire market and to 
give direction to subsequent evolutionary trajectories (Utterback and Abernathy, 1975). 
At the early stage, the rate of product innovation is high, stimulated by market needs and 
a wave of new competing entrants. Product markets are ill defined, products are un-
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standardized, processes are uncoordinated and user-supplier interactions shape the pattern 
of innovation. 
 
Eventually a dominant design is selected by the market, signaling an industrial shakeout. 
Small uncompetitive firms exit or are acquired by large companies. Eventually, a small 
number of firms come to dominate the industry by exploiting scale-intensive, incremental 
process improvements. As Utterback and Suarez (1993, pp. 2-3) put it, 'Eventually, we 
believe that the market reaches a point of stability in which there are only a few large 
firms having standardized or slightly differentiated products and relatively stable sales 
and market shares, until a major technological discontinuity occurs and starts a new cycle 
again' “ (Miller et al,1995). 
 
While Miller et al (1995) use the term Complex Systems or CS, Hobday (1998) 
eventually coins the term CoPS. Other than flight simulators, examples of CoPS can be 
nuclear power stations, aircraft engines, telecommunication exchanges, air traffic control 
systems, etc. Military programs such as in dedicated mission type aircraft, submarines, 
weapon systems, are good examples. 
 
Notably high cost projects such as roadworks which may involve large costs are not 
necessarily classed as CoPS “as they involve a narrow range of knowledge and skills and 
utilise mostly standard components and materials” (Hobday, 1998). Development and 
production of CoPS on the other hand usually involves a high degree of advanced 
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technology linked with risk and uncertainty requiring wide ranging specialist skills and 
tacit knowledge of the industry. 
 
Characteristics of CoPS described, including Hansen & Rush’s (1998) case studies and 
Hobday et al (2000), can be determined as: 
 
 High cost and complexity involving hierarchical and multiple layers of interacting 
systems and sub-systems (and hence potentially multiple projects and related 
organizations). 
 Low production rates (Learning is not necessarily at a low rate but is mostly at an 
early product stage type and less on refining the product). 
 High involvement of the customer in selecting the design before the order and 
accordingly a high degree of customization which may slow the process towards a 
dominant design. 
 High degree of risk and uncertainty due to the low production rate and learning 
cycle. 
 High product life longevity.  An aircraft model may last 20-40 years, compared to 
a cellular phone that may not even last one year. 
 CoPS industries tend to be oligopolies with high barriers to entry. 







CoPS vs Mass Production Industries 
(Hobday, 1998) 
 
An analysis of the technological profiles of aircraft engine manufacturers by Prencipe 
(2000) also showed “that engine makers do not focus their technological capabilities only 
on the architecture of the control system, but they also maintain knowledge related to its 
components”. Tapping often into sub-systems suppliers’ knowledge and developing their 
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own technical capabilities, the uncertainty of the technology indicates a motivation to 
have control and risk reduction on the part of the manufacturer. 
 
Hobday (1998) notes in his implications for management deliberate strategies are needed 
for innovation with CoPS including a capability to coordinate amongst producers, 
suppliers, users, and regulators. Hobday et al (2000) provides a good reference and 
summary of CoPS characteristics and joins Miller et al (1995) to argue that CoPS need to 
be treated as a different category with respect to the “conventional” Schumpeterian 
model, particularly in the sense that radical discontinuities in the CoPS world do not 
usually mean the end of incumbent firms, as illustrated by Bonaccorsi and Giuri (2000). 
 
Magnusson et al (2005) provide an interesting case study where manufacturers of large 
power plants are faced by a disruptive innovation type scenario of being challenged by 
smaller mass produced distributed generators. Hardstone (2004), similar to Bonaccorsi 
and Giuri (2000), discovered in a range of case studies that when faced with 
technological and competition challenges, incumbent CoPS firms tended to have a 
diversity of response strategies. This replicates the notion that a deliberate strategy can be 
considered rather than an automatic typical reaction. 
 
Hence while subsequent CoPS papers constantly repeat these previously mentioned 
characteristics, one has to wonder if these characteristics are simply a result of a lack of 
strategy which by chance permeates the majority of the industry. Or is it simply the early 
stage of innovation where multitudes of varying designs exist before the dominant design 
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emerges? That is the seeming so endless early stage being exaggerated by high product 
life longevity and low production rates caused by high costs of a complex project. This 
seems quite plausible and the relative differences to say a mass produced consumer 
product causes these “unique” characterizations, which in fact may not be so unique. 
 
“While repeatable mass production learning processes are not so important to CoPS, 
there may well be scope for learning economies between product generations and at the 
component level, where demand may be very high e.g. in aircraft and high technology 
buildings. CoPS suppliers often gain strategic advantage by modifying design 
architectures to increase the scope for using high volume components” (Hobday et al, 
2000). This has interesting connotations. Quite simply, just because a product is complex, 
it does not mean that every component has to be complex or novel. “Complexity” is a 
relative term. Proven parts or sub-systems from other products can be employed in the 
design of a new complex part. 
 
This strategy can be seen in some prototype efforts which particularly under budget 
constraints will beg, borrow, and steal from other designs. Probably the most famous 
prototype house in aviation history is the Lockheed “Skunk Works”. Led by the infamous 
aircraft designer Clarence “Kelly” L. Johnson, the Skunk Works was established in 1943 
in response to U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF) interest in obtaining a jet fighter 
(Aronstein and Piccirillo, 1997). The XP-80 was designed and built in only 143 days, an 
incredible feat considering jet airplane technology was very new at the time. 
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“What allowed Kelly to operate the Skunk Works so effectively and efficiently was his 
unconventional organizational approach. He broke the rules, challenging the current 
bureaucratic system that stifled innovation and hindered progress” 
(http://www.lockheedmartin.com/aeronautics/skunkworks/). Other often secret but 
successful projects followed. “The XF-104, U-2, and Agena are all examples of Skunk 
Works projects that were successful because they were simple, elegant designs that 
deliberately did not push every aspect of technology” (Aronstein and Piccirillo, 1997). 
 
One notable Skunk Works project was the “Have Blue” project which was the 
prototyping of what was to become the radar avoiding F-117 Nighthawk (or Stealth 
fighter as more commonly known), used in the Gulf War. In 1977 the US government 
recognized breakthroughs in VLO or Very Low Observable technology and 
commissioned development of an aircraft to take advantage of this technology. 
 
“To reduce time, costs, and risk in this revolutionary project, a Tactical Air Command 
major named Jack Twigg was cleared into the program and became the system program 
officer (SPO) whose remit was to procure wherever possible "tried and tested," "off-the-
shelf" pieces of equipment that would then be delivered into Building 82, via circuitous, 
covert routes in order to retain tight security. 
 
The two Have Blue aircraft were single-seat, subsonic machines, each powered by two 
2,950-pound-thrust, General Electric J85-GE-4A nonafterburning engines. the power 
units were government-furnished equipment (GFE), and Twigg acquired six for the 
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program from the U.S. Navy's North American T-2B Buckeye trainer stores. The only 
engine modification made was a coating applied to the spinners. 
 
Have Blue was 47.25 feet long, 7.54 feet high, and had a span of 22.5 feet. Its modified 
delta wing planform, with a sweep of 72.5 degrees, created a wing area of 386 square 
feet. No flap, speed brakes, or high lift devices were incorporated into the structure, 
which was built mainly from an aluminium alloy, using steel and titanium in the hot 
areas. Aerodynamic control was achieved by ailerons, located inboard on the wings, and 
by two all-moveable fins at the tail. The fins had a leading-edge sweepback of some 35 
degrees and were canted inboard about 30 degrees. Flight control actuators were the same 
as those used on the F-111. A small side stick controller (YF-16 stock) and conventional 
rudder pedals enabled the pilot to operate the control surfaces. 
 
The external shape evolved from VLO and controllability considerations, the fallout from 
which is a relaxed static stability (RSS) aircraft that required a quadruple redundant fly-
by-wire (FBW) flight control system to provide normal handling qualities throughout the 
flight envelope. The FBW system provided stability augmentation and was made by 
Lear-Seigler (also F-16 stock). Indeed the aircraft was so dependent on this system that 
mechanical backup was not possible” (Crickmore and Crickmore, 2003). 
 
Hence we see that despite the novel stealth features of this aircraft, many of the 
components were taken from existing aircraft such as the F-111, F-16, and T-2B. Even 
the landing gear was borrowed from existing aircraft (Different references quote the 
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Northrop F-5 Freedom Fighter per Crickmore and Crickmore [2003] or the A-10 per 







Using the F-16 FBW system was genius since the computerized flight control system 
could be re-programmed for the new aircraft’s unique flying characteristics due to the 
unusual shape designed to deflect radar waves. Two Have Blue prototypes were known to 
have been built and flew in 1977 or 1978. As per Figures 2.19 and 2.20, it can be seen 
that except for the tailplanes, the F-117 which was larger than the Have Blue aircraft, 
inherited much of the latter external shape characteristics. The program ultimately was 









F-117 Nighthawk “Stealth Fighter” Features 
(Bailey & Richardson, 1990) 
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This echoes many of the features that Brian Arthur writes about in his 2009 book “The 
Nature of Technology”. Arthur questions literally the nature of technology, how it 
evolves, and the origins of so-called innovative processes. An important foundation is the 
idea of a central concept or principle. The concept for example, to use a laser to print 
images for a laser printer, is the key that drives the building of these technologies. 
 
Once the concept is established, technologies are developed or grouped together to 
provide function for the objective. These technologies are inevitable structured by layers 
or functionalities. Hence a layer or sub-component technology could in fact be changed, 
improved, or replaced, provided the overall concept is maintained to provide the overall 
functionality and output that is desired. 
 
By looking at other products that could in fact be characterized as CoPS, there are 
obvious examples that do not fit the typical CoPS mould. For example cars are mass 
produced today. They have a dominant design layout. Cars may not seem complicated 
today as they are almost accepted as a mass produced consumer good. However in the 
1900s, surely they would be considered an extremely complex product worthy of CoPS 
classification. 
 
In 1908 Ford launched the now famous Model T. The production run lasted 19 years until 
1927 during which 15 million Model T cars were produced (Alizon et al, 2009). 
Definitely this was not a low production rate. But does that mean that the Model T should 
not be classified as a CoPS product or is it in fact a CoPS product that defied the odds 
 63
due to Henry Ford’s outside-the-box thinking? For sure, while the fame of the Model T 
may be the moving assembly line and this would have reduced unit costs to assist sales, 
prices alone cannot have been the only factor for consumers to buy what was then a fairly 
complex product. 
 
At first glance 15 million cars reeks of a mass produced product with very little 
customization, a non-characteristic of CoPS. Yet any car enthusiast magazine and papers 
including Alizon et al (2009) show that the car was in fact refined over several years. 
Furthermore many different versions as shown in Figure 2.22 were produced with an 
average of five different models a year. Even highly customized models were developed 
as can be seen in Figure 2.23. Ford even offered up to around 5000 gadgets that the 
customer could buy as options to customize as their own. 
 
What was interesting was that the highly customized models were outsourced to other 
specialized companies. That way Ford could maintain focus on their core production 
models. What was provided to the specialist companies was essentially a basic car 
without the external body. This basic car was a platform that had the basic underbody 







Types of Model Ts in Ford’s catalogue built and produced from 1908 to 1927 





Sample of Customized Model Ts 





Model T Platform 
(Alizon et al, 2009) 
 
In retrospect we should consider that with the time factor, many products are, or were in 
fact CoPS products. A simple pencil was a complicated item to manufacture if we go 
back several centuries. A laptop or tablet computer encompasses many different 
technologies such as microprocessors and liquid crystal display screens that we now take 
for granted but have been developed only recently and would have been an impossibly 
complex piece of machinery to produce as recently as in the 1930s. The closest thing at 
the time would have been the computers at Bletchley Park (famous for use in breaking 
secret military transmission codes) which were enormous by today’s standards. Those 
computers in 1939 would have been classified as CoPS. 
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2.6. Families and Platforms 
 
It could be argued that by developing a product platform, Ford had developed in essence 
a part dominant design. The platform allowed Ford to build model derivatives to satisfy 
different market segments. Hence although externally the products might look a little 
different, a major part of the product was always the same. This part of the product could 
then be considered ripe for incremental improvements as per the traditional dominant 
design life cycle theory. 
 
And in fact this is exactly what happened with the Model T. Small continuous 
improvements were made to the platform until the end of the Model T’s production 
where other competing cars had performance improvements that the Model T platform 
could not keep up with. 
 
Until that point however, it is interesting to note the key fact that allows the basic model 
to be stretched into variants of the first basic model that can satisfy different market 
segments. With the Model T, the highly customized models (Figure 2.23) only accounted 
for 5% of the production. Since we are mainly interested in the large production run that 
seems to contradict CoPS characteristics, we consider the remaining 95% which are 
shown in Figure 2.22. Just visually we see primarily variants for the application of 
carrying human passengers, including 2-seat and 4-seat versions. 
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The latter is a simple but important observation. Supposedly there were different market 
segments for 2-seat cars and 4-seat cars respectively. By shrinking or stretching the car 
body length, Ford could accommodate both markets. But by doing so the structure would 
decrease or increase respectively. Obviously a heavier car would have relatively less 
power to weight ratio and for the same engine and drive-train, perhaps go not as fast as a 
lighter 2-seat car. It would also use more gasoline per kilometer although cost of gasoline 
was probably not a significant factor in that era. 
 
Hence variants of a basic model involve simple modifications of some basic part of an 
initial model that can satisfy a different market, but usually at the expense of some other 
performance factor. Other than cosmetic type modifications, the implication is a 
significant trade-off where the customer is willing to pay for more of one factor than 
another to suit the particular market requirement. 
 
Meyer (1997) and Simpson (2004) both discuss this factor and the figure below is a good 
illustration of the various ways a platform can be derived. In this study it is perhaps 
important to make some definitions to prevent confusion amongst terms that may seem 
similar. In Alizon et al (2009)’s paper they refer to the platform (under-body) requiring 
common mating interfaces to the upper-body. This refers to modularity which is not 
necessarily a requirement of a product platform, especially when we discuss an integrated 






Platform Leveraging Strategies 
(Simpson, 2004, adapted from Meyer, 1997) 
 
However this is just the physical aspect of it. The architecture itself can lend itself to be 
somewhat modular even if the physical interfaces may not be standardized and 
engineering work is required to incorporate pre-designed sub-assemblies. The 
engineering incorporation capability of the company in effect creates the “standardized 
mating interfaces” required for modularity and hence increases the capability of the 
company to create combinations using pre-existing designs. 
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A distinct advantage of modular type architectural thinking is the ability to group work 
teams to work concurrently and hence learn as well as develop faster as in Figure 2.27, 
compared to a sequential type work process as in Figure 2.26. 
 
Having this capability gives the company an important source of strategic flexibility for 
'mixing and matching' of components to develop large variations of products to meet 
different requirements and market segments (Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996). Kogut and 
Zander (1992) describe this ability to leverage product variations from existing designs as 
the company’s “combinative capability”. They even describe this capability and 





Sequential Organization of Product Development Processes 







Modular Organization of Product Development Processes 
(Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996) 
 
In the same vein it is notable that a platform may be a grouping or collection of 
components used from the first basic model but they do not necessarily have to be 
physically connected to each other in a derivative or variant design. Going back to 
Abernathy and Clark (1985), and Henderson and Clark (1990), it is the product 
architecture and the knowledge behind it that is the critical factor. Meyer (1997) notes 
this stating that the platform as a whole does not have to be used in adjacent segments, 
but rather key sub-systems. 
 
“A product platform is the set of parts, sub-systems, interfaces, and manufacturing 
processes that are shared among a set of products, and allow the development of 
derivative products with cost and time savings” (Meyer and Lehnard, 1997). To achieve 
“mass customization” (Pine, 1992), the platform approach allows higher volumes as well 
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as permitting “highly differentiated products to be delivered to the market without 
consuming excessive resources” (Robertson and Ulrich, 1998). 
 
Conversely, each part of this platform can also be viewed and utilized independently as a 
product of its own. In doing so it can be freely applied by a firm to different product lines 
and hence creates its own market without having to allocate different resources for that 
sub-component function each time a new product is developed. Meyer (2008) proposes 
that a fast way to develop new products is to leverage a firm’s current capabilities to 
produce new products or services for new users and new uses. Furthermore these 









In the aircraft world, the major manufacturers such as Airbus and Boeing have typically 
developed “different” models of different lengths and passenger/freight capacities by 
simply changing the fuselage lengths (Sabbagh, 1996). “Stretching” using additional 
fuselage plugs, or “shrinking” by removal of fuselage sections, but at the same time using 
common wing, nose, and tail components as well as interiors and other sub-systems 
(Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996). 
 
Simpson (2004) describes this method as a “scale-based product platform”, “…wherein 
one or more scaling variables are used to “stretch” or “shrink” the platform in one or 
more dimensions to satisfy a variety of market niches.” Fujita (2002) describes such 
aircraft design strategy similarly as “stretch-based design deployment”. 
 
Aircraft jet engines tend to follow this pattern as well using improved parts of the engines 
to either increase or lower thrust (such as adapting new fans to the same hot section core), 
and reduce fuel burn with new technologies. 
 
One of the subtle advantages of a product platform is that the company enjoys a better 
concentration of efforts and resources. “Large savings can be made in design costs and in 
the tooling of equipment” (Bonaccorsi and Giuri, 2000). As Rothwell and Gardiner 
(1984) show in Figure 2.30, over a span of more than twenty years, Ford consistently had 
an advantage over the resident car company in the United Kingdom, British Leyland, by 
simply having half the number of basic models (Cortina, Capri, Escort) but twice as many 





Design families: High powered aero engines RB211, JT9D and CF6  






Ford and British Leyland Family Cars 
(Rothwell and Gardiner, 1984) 
 
“As a consequence, Ford was able to achieve considerably wider market coverage while 
maintaining a highly disciplined production base. With half the number of basic models, 
Ford almost halved its production problems while at the same time greatly simplifying its 
parts and servicing operations.” (Rothwell and Gardiner, 1984). 
 
Sanderson and Uzumeri (1995) likewise demonstrate this with their case study of the 
Sony Walkman. The Sony Walkman enjoyed fantastic product longevity but 
accomplished it with just a few product platforms. The large variety of models marketed 
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consisted in fact of minor and cosmetic changes to a few otherwise standard mechanism 
platforms. 
 
One of Sony’s strategies was to study lifestyles in different parts of the world so that they 
could customize the products accordingly but it would have been difficult to individually 
develop all these different models without using the basic product platform concept. 
“85% of Sony's models were produced from minor rearrangements of existing features 
and cosmetic redesigns of the external case. Sony generated these designs much as a 
child would build with Lego.” (Sanderson and Uzumeri, 1995) 
 
Probably the product most famous for ultimate modularity is the Lego brick toy. Lego in 
itself is not a complex product or toy. However its feature is that the Lego bricks can be 
combined in an endless variety of ways to make further more complex configurations. 
Hence it is useful to review the Lego “system” as an introduction to product families and 
platforms. 
 
Six eight-stud Lego bricks can be combined in 915,103,765 ways (Lipkowitz, 2009). But 
while the eight-stud brick is almost the front line representative of the Lego toy range, 
there are many variations of the theme as in Figure 2.31. The common part is the 
interlocking feature that allows Lego to develop multiple different types of bricks that 












Lego Brick Patent & Interlocking System 
(Lipkowitz, 2009) 
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One well-known Lego product line is the Minifigure series that is a series of miniature 
toy people but deploying different themes such as Star Wars or Indiana Jones. While 
there are infinite variations, the basic platform is always the same as in Figure 2.33 
employing just one stud of the Lego interlocking system in each part. For the user, any 
part can be intermixed, for example the hat of a policeman could be fitted to the head of a 
nurse and a hand accessory for a mechanic could be fitted to a cowboy. Yet the basic 
“platform” is recognizable. They may be aesthetically different parts, but having enough 





Lego Minifigures Sample 
(Martell, 2009) 
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Once a variant of a basic model is developed, a family is born since there are now more 
than one model. However what if the platform is improved or changed significantly? 
Perhaps just a sub-assembly of the platform is used to develop a new line of products. 
Engines of cars are common candidates of such sub-assemblies. Hence to differentiate, a 
family can be termed to belong to one basic model and its relative variants, and separate 
families would be termed as derivatives of the platform. 
 
The term “derivative” could be easily used to term a variant or a change in platform, so 
for simplicity and to differentiate against a variant, it will be used only to define a new 
basic model that has a significant platform change. 
 
While some may define a platform as a physical major sub-assembly of a product, it is 
perhaps more useful to consider that the platform is a combination of a concept and a 
design or collection of designs that is or are somewhat proven. Obviously if the platform 
is based on a somewhat proven design that is used over and over again to develop new 
iterations of a product, then the platform tends to fall into a category of where only 
incremental innovations would apply to it, as long as that generation of product family 
exists. 
 
Should the platform be changed radically due to some major part or component being 
redesign or replaced by newer technology, then a convenient thought would be that a new 






The Product Family Approach to New Product Development 
(Meyer and Utterback, 1993) 
 
If the concept is maintained, then one could argue that the product architecture is not 
changed. However it is probably more useful to debate that a concept can be used to steer 
re-designs towards the desired path of improvement. The concept could also be used to 
design other products to maintain compatibility with the original product. 
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 To illustrate this point, we first consider three other product lines that are similar to the 
original Lego brick. 
 
Megabloks is a Lego copy and it has a range larger than Duplo for young children. Duplo 
was developed also by Lego in 1969 for children 1-1/2 to 6 years old. The shape is 
essentially the same, with the main difference being the size, a Duplo brick being twice 
as tall, twice as long, and twice as wide as a normal Lego brick (Lipkowitz, 2009). 
 
Nanoblock is a Japanese product that looks like Lego and works in a similar way except 
the bricks are smaller than Lego. The attachment system is similar to Lego using studs, 
but the under part is slightly different, lacking the Lego tubes which allows variation in 
positioning (www.diablock.co.jp/nanoblock). Nanoblock is in fact designed for adults to 
create desktop type displays. 
 
Hence between four product lines of Megabloks, Duplo, Lego, and Nanoblock, the 
physical designs are different, and even the target market segments are different (age of 
consumers), but the platform concept of interlocking bricks is the same. Even the product 







Megablok, Duplo, Lego, Nanoblock bricks (Largest to smallest) 
 
In Lego the concept part goes even further. Lego bricks were designed so that the 
strength of a 3-year old could put them together as well as pull them apart. This same 
concept is applied to other Lego non-brick parts and accessories such as wheels, tires, 
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propellers, doors, hinges, etc. In doing so, these other parts can be included in the same 

















Lego non-brick parts that can be put together or pulled apart 
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The first model of a product Family – where the platform is 
derived from. 
Platform 
A common concept using a collection of the components of the 
basic model which are used to develop variants of the Basic 
Model. Design changes to platform components are kept 
minimal. 
Variant 
A new product model developed using a Platform, where one or 
more performance factors can be traded off against others to 
meet particular market segment requirements. 
Family The group of Variants derived from one Basic Model. 
Derivative 
A new Basic Model having high commonality with the original 
Basic Model, but with design and component changes that 
improve performance for a majority of factors. The Platform is 
thus significantly improved and hence the tradeoff performance 
factors of the Variants of this Derivative can all gain. Variants 
of a new Basic Model belong to a new Family. 
 
Figure 2.37 
Product Platform Convention Terms 
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With Rothwell and Gardiner (1989), they discuss even non-physical variants or 
derivatives using the performance of aircraft engines that can be rated at different levels 
of thrust. Hence an airframe manufacturer or aircraft customer can select different 
“models” of what would be essentially the same physical engine to suit their needs. The 
pricing presumably would also reflect the thrust level chosen, but the cost savings to the 
engine manufacturer of not having to develop physically different engines is obvious. 
 
This is shown in the figure below where after the designs are composed (merging of 
different component designs) and consolidated, a convenient option (Phase III) would be 
to “stretch” the design by rating or minor adjustments to meet different market segment 
requirements. 
 
Today these artificial thrust ratings are done via electronic controls for commercial 
aircraft jet engines. By doing so it may be that “up-rated” or “de-rated” engines are not as 
optimized as would be the nominal basic model, but at the same time the product line 
would enjoy maintenance and spares commonality. The basic platform design meanwhile 
would enjoy the benefit of continuous incremental improvements over its basic life that 
would be more concentrated than where the engine manufacturer would have to split its 
research and development budget over different engine basic models. 
 
There is also a marketing advantage should the engine be redeployed on a different 
aircraft model (e.g. the engines of the B747-400 and B767-300 can be interchangeable) 





The Evolution of Robust Designs 
(Rothwell and Gardiner, 1989). 
 
Hence we see that product platforms are a strategic way of subverting the CoPS 
stereotype inhibited by low production volumes and high costs. Obviously the higher the 
production volume, the lower the costs would be. Hence it appears that deliberate 
strategies can be developed to manage this desirable outcome. 
 
“Product families do not have to emerge one product at a time. In fact, they are planned 
so that a number of derivative products can be efficiently created from the foundation of 
common core technology. This foundation of core technology is called the ‘product 
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platform.’ It is a set of subsystems and interfaces that form a common structure from 
which a stream of derivative products can be efficiently developed and produced. A 
platform approach to product development dramatically reduces manufacturing costs and 
provides significant economics in the procurement of components and materials because 
so many of these are shared between individual products. Perhaps as important, the 
building blocks of product platforms can be integrated with new components to rapidly 
address new market opportunities” (Meyer, 1997). 
 
What of derivatives, i.e. development of the product platform itself? Is it acceptable just 
to depend on variants of a basic model? It would appear that once new designs or 
configurations or technologies that appear that could significantly affect the performance 
of product platforms as a whole (rather than trade-offs that are a characteristic of 
variants), then this would be the time to develop derivatives. 
 
“Product families must be managed.... if a platform is not rejuvenated, its derivative 
products will become dated and will fail customers in terms of function and value; 
however if a company's platforms are renewed periodically - re-designed to incorporate 
new functions, components and materials - the product family will remain robust through 
successive generation…..Robust platforms do not appear by accident. They are the result 
of methods and strategies for designing, developing and revitalizing them over time as an 
essential element of business strategy to dominate markets” (Meyer, 1997). 
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Gonzalez-Zugasti et al (2000) for example note that with the known advantages of 
product platforms, a company may choose to do this as a strategy to lower developments 





Platform-Based Product Family Design Implementation Approach 
(Gonzalez-Zugasti et al, 2000) 
 
Krishnan and Gupta (2001) note that product platforms have another disadvantage 
particularly when the market range is diverse such that the variant designated for the low 
end may have parts common to the product platform that are overdesigned for the high 




Hence if there is a time lag between developments of models, it may be advantageous to 
leave development of the high end models last so that they can absorb the maximum 
benefits of experience with the basic design. Once a basic model is in service surely the 
manufacturer would gain experience as to which parts of the design can be refined to for 
example save structural weight (in the case of aircraft) or reduce the size, number, or 
complexity of components and systems that may have excessive performance or be even 
redundant. The resultant increase in performance would assist development of the high 
end model without penalizing the low end model. 
 
For the aircraft scenario, if a larger variant is developed after the basic model and a 
shrunk model, it would have the benefit of a re-analysis of the structural and aerodynamic 
loads on the smaller variants, further improving the manufacturer’s knowledge of the 
design. 
 
As an alternative, Suh et al (2007) suggest that product platforms have an effective 
bandwidth beyond which the ability to maintain a common product platform becomes 
undesirable to meet different markets. Fujita (2002) also demonstrates this as in Figure 







Sensitivity and Robustness in Product Variety Optimality 
(Fujita, 2002) 
 
Hence an option could be to stretch the platform into separate basic platforms to ensure 
efficient performance coverage. 
 
With the Model T car series, Ford in fact effectively did this when the Model T platform 
chassis was stretched into the Model TT chassis to obtain a 1-ton light truck at the same 




Ford Model TT Platform 
(Alizon et al 2009) 
 
In the aviation world at least one aircraft manufacturer has done that. Embraer’s E-Jet 
family is actually made of two platforms. The E170, E175, E190, and E195 (the model 
number indicating roughly the passenger capacity of each model), like the B737 families, 
all share common cockpits, fuselages. 
 
But the family has two different sets of wings and engines, one set being shared by the 
E170 and E175, and the other by the E190 and E195. That way the degree of 
optimization loss by having a family of variants is minimized, albeit at the expense of 


































Embraer E-Jet Family 
 
We also keep in mind that the product platform itself need not necessarily be static in 
design, and can be the subject of continuous development. Meyer (1997) advocates that 
product lines should be revitalized through continuous platform renewal. As an option he 
suggests that vertical scaling particularly from the low end side. While it is rare to see a 
deliberate strategy by a company to build the basic model at the low end and then 
develop other variants based on only stretches and no shrinks, if we consider the case of 
the B737, successive generations have grown larger and larger to get close to its former 
larger cousins the B707, B727 and B757. 
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On the B787, Boeing has chosen to develop first the smallest model, the B787-8 with the 
larger B787-9 following later. What is interesting is that Boeing now indicates that the 
entry into service B787-9 airframes may have relatively better range performance than 
the initial B787-8 airframes despite being larger, due to planned product improvements 
from development and design experience on the B787-8. 
 
What is more important than the design itself is the product architecture as per Henderson 
and Clark (1990). Christensen et al (1998), note that firms that focus more on 
architectural innovations rather than component innovations tend to survive longer. 
Simply put a component is just part of a product’s architecture. No matter how new a 
component may be, if the architecture becomes obsolete, then the component would also 
become obsolete. The architecture itself however has the possibility of being ahead even 
if the components being used are not new in technology. 
 
Hofer and Halman (2004) also note that “the striking advantage of layout platforms is 
that for a complex product it is comparably easier to standardize the arrangement of its 
subsystems than to standardize these subsystems. A layout platform seems especially 
suitable for redesigning product architectures of existing products by supporting the reuse 






Modes of Learning in Product Creation Processes  
(Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996) 
 
 
Sanchez and Mahoney (1996) for example speak of the concept of an “evolving product 
architecture” and this would seem an extremely healthy way to maintain competitiveness 
of products. The focus is less of the product components themselves but more to do with 







The Segment-Specific Variety of Product Architecture Layers 
(Hofer and Halman, 2004) 
 
Hofer and Halman (2004) in fact argue similarly that the adoption of Product Platforms, 
though more a layout platform of sub-systems catering to different segments of 
individual, customized or standard markets, is an effective strategic solution to the CoPS 
problem of low production rates. Other than enabling market segmentation, it also 
enforces at least a proportion of commonality in sub-systems that offer scope towards a 
dominant design (Hofer and Halman 2005). This in turn accelerates the transition from 
CoPS to a traditional product innovation cycle as per Abernathy and Clark (1985). 
 
Investing in shared sub-systems hence can assist in improvements across several product 
lines as with Honda’s VTEC Power Train which is shared across multiple product lines 
as shown below. Honda’s sports utility vehicle (SUV), the Element, utilized many 
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common systems and parts from other Honda products not only saving costs, but also 
improving development time as well as ensuring proven reliabilities from proven sub-





Honda VTEC Power Train Roadmap 
(Meyer, 2008) 
 
Alizon et al (2007) also propose methods of balancing between commonality and 
diversity when re-designing, i.e. a way of determining which parts could remain different 
or benefit from re-design to have commonality or vice versa. In practice as we see from 
the B737 example, it may be development and production costs as well as customer 
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preferences that drive the manufacturer to adopt minimal and only significantly beneficial 
changes for derivatives and variants. 
 
Interestingly while many papers discuss the ability of product platforms to differentiate, 
e.g. Robertson and Ulrich (1998), the B737 example is one where the manufacturer 
strives to maintain commonality. Perhaps the difference is in that the purpose of 
differentiation in the prior type of cases (e.g. cars) was largely for cosmetic and 





Trade-off between Distinctiveness and Commonality 
(Robertson and Ulrich, 1998) 
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Certainly the platform approach allows large variations of “soft” cosmetic type changes 
while the “hard” engineering parts remain constant. However in the case of aircraft, and 
perhaps many CoPS cases since these would typically be non-consumer type extremely 
high cost items, the prevailing requirement would be cost reduction in operability that 
could be gained by use of common parts, training, and operating crews and procedures. 
 
Hence we see that the objective is different, albeit with the same platform idea. The 
consumer type product chases differentiation, whereas the CoPS scenario chases 
commonality. In the former, the objective is to create mass models with minimum 
engineering effort with little performance implications, while in the latter the objective is 
to maintain maximum commonality while creating new models, which in turn are created 
to minimize de-optimization of performance at different ends of a market. 
 
Conversely, the hint is that a CoPS product could be expanded into a family by simply 
stretching or shrinking a few key component parts (such as the fuselage on the B737) to 
alter its performance to serve different market segments and hence enjoy the benefits of a 
product platform. 
 
In the case of Boeing, it is interesting to note that while wartime refined the design of the 
extremely successful B-17 Flying Fortress bomber aircraft, it was in a catch-up position 
to develop civilian transport aircraft during that time as Douglas had produced the 21-
passenger DC-3 that was more popular than Boeing’s 10-passenger B-247. Boeing’s 
response was the 33-passenger B-307 Stratoliner. 
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 While this was not a huge commercial success, what is interesting of the design is that it 
used the wings, engines, and undercarriage (landing gear) from the B-17 (Hill, 2002; 
Yenne 2005). Had the B-307 been more of a success with later versions, then the B-17 
components would have been seen as a platform with which Boeing saved design and 
development costs using wartime proven designs. 
 
The concept however was repeated when Boeing postwar developed the Model 367/KC-
97 military transport and the Model 377 Stratocruiser commercial transport aircraft. The 
two airframes were primarily the same, but used the wartime developed B-29 
Superfortress bomber aircraft wing and other components. The similarities between the 



























We will see later that Boeing’s ability to transpose designs from one product line to 
another is a common theme. 
 
“Since the entry into service of Boeing’s first jet airliner design, the medium/long-range 
Boeing 707 in 1958, the company had been working towards offering a ‘family’ of 
designs. Each different member of the ‘family’ was to be able to serve the airline’s needs 
in different operational markets, but with enough of a degree of commonality in design so 
as to reduce production costs to the maker and significantly decrease operating costs to 
the customer” (Hill, 2002). 
 
Further, a flight simulator for example may need the cockpit dimensions and controls to 
be close to identical to the aircraft type it is simulating and hence be quite customized. 
But the visual display systems, motion mechanisms, hydraulic and/or electrical systems, 
air conditioning systems, fire extinguishing systems, and computer systems that drive the 
motion and simulation imagery do not necessarily have to be different for simulators that 
simulate different aircraft types. The computer hardware in particular can be the same, 
the difference only being in the software and databases that are loaded. 
 
With the CoPS scenario, a purposely driven strategy to use a product platform can have 
drawbacks if the drive to maintain commonality is too rigid. Halman, Hofer and van 
Vuuren (2003) note four types of platform related effects – Process Platform, Customer 
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Platform, Brand Platform, and Global Platform. The names speak for themselves and the 
epths to which the platforms can be created can be quite deep. 
form can lock in how products are produced, the Customer 
latform as to which market segments are targeted, the Brand Platform as to what type of 
d
 
For example the Process Plat
P
sub-brands can be created, and the Global Platform as to how the offerings of a globally-
rolled out product has to be standardized. This lock-in of a multitude of different aspects 
can create rigidity when the product platform reaches a point when in fact it should be 
updated. 
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2.7. Emergent Strategy and the AH-1/UH-1 
ne definition by Mintzberg (1978, 1987) of strategy is that it can be a “pattern in a 
 
O
stream of decisions”. He notes that “emergent strategies” can occur depending on 
circumstances as in the figure below. Changes in the environment elicit reactions that can 










With respect to CoPS, the aspects of time and learning can be utilized for improvement. 
“While normal production process learning may be difficult in CoPS, there may well be 
scope for learning economies between product generations and at the components level, 
where demand may be very high. From a strategic viewpoint, CoPS suppliers may be 
able to gain advantage by altering design architectures to increase the scope for high 
volume component use in CoPS. 
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For efficiency in CoPS projects, it is likely that a responsive, step-by-step, crafted 
anagement is needed to deal with uncertainty and feedback loops” (Hobday, 1998). 
As in Figure 2.51, Mintzberg and Waters (1985) suggest that through feedback learning, 









(Mintzb , 1985)erg & Waters  
 
 
An interesting example of this is the Bell AH-1 Cobra attack helicopter developed by 
Bell in the 1960s for the Vietnam War. Using the engines, rotor blades and transmission 
dynamic systems of the UH-1 “Huey”, it represented a marked improvement as a 
dedicated gunship over the Huey that was much slower as the less aerodynamic fuselage 
was designed for carrying troops (Lambert, 1967). With the obvious advantage in 
commonality in spare parts and training for the operator, Bell also saved considerably in 
development costs by using major components from the Huey. 
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Over the years however the AH-1 Cobra and UH-1 Huey were improved but on separate 
programs. For example the AH-l's original Lycoming T53 turboshaft powerplant was 
placed by dual General Electric T700s, while the UH-l's T53 was replaced by Pratt & 
Whitney Canada's twin-turbine T400.  As a result much of the commonality advantage 
was lost. This was particularly felt on missions where both types were operated together 
in joint light/attack helicopter squadrons. 
 
In 1995 the USMC (United States Marine Corps) received US Department of Defense 
approval to upgrade its AH-1s and UH-1s with four-blade rotors and other improvements. 
Interestingly the upgrade was approved as an alternative to buying more modern 
McDonnell Douglas (MDC) AH-64 attack and Sikorsky UH-60 assault helicopters. 
 
“Capt Steven Fahrenkrog, head of t pgrade programme, emphasises the 
ommonality benefits within the HMLAs (Marine Light Attack Helicopter squadron) 
hich will result from the 4BW/4BN (4 bladed rotor, the “W” and “N” refer to the latest 
re
he Marine H-1 u
c
w
AH-1 and UH-1 models) upgrade. Not since the 1960s, he says, have Marine Corps 
Cobras and Hueys shared the same dynamic system … Using the same dynamic system - 
rotors, engines and transmission - on AH-1 s and UH-ls flown by the same squadrons will 
reduce spares, maintenance and training, Fahrenkrog says. Few HMLA pilots are now 
cleared to fly both types, but similar handling qualities resulting from common dynamics 
should make cross-training easier, he believes. 
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The 4BW/4BN upgrade is centered on a derivative of Bell's Model 480 four-blade 
bearingless, hingeless main rotor. This all-composite rotor is used on Bell's latest Model 
430 commercial helicopter, and features a flexible composite hub which allows pitch, 
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 The upgraded dynam both aircraft consists of the four-b a 
l,960kW (2,625shp)-capacity transmission, T700 engines with infra-red suppressors, a 
new 90° gearbox in the tail and a four-blade pusher tail-rotor (replacing the present two-
blade tractor tail-rotor). Both aircraft will receive auxiliary power units, and the uprated 
tail-rotor will be mounted on a strengthened tailboom with a more-effective elevator” 
(Warwick, 1996). 
 
 AH-1”Z” and UH-1”Y” with 85% identical major components as 
seen in Figure 2.52. Even though the cockpits feature different seating arrangements, 
tandem (forward and aft) in the AH-1 and side--by-side in the UH-1, even the displays 
and controls are common by sim  seen in Figure 2.53. 
 
, H-1 upg me manager for the US Naval Air Systems 
Command, argues that the US separate studies - some as recent as 2006 - had 
concluded the UH-1Y/AH-1Z combination is the most cost-effective means to meet the 
service's unique operational requ
 
Because a single squadro achines, commonality between the two 
airframes during USMC expeditionary operations is far more important than usually 
across the Department of Defense. 
 
ic system for lade main rotor, 
The final product is the
ply re-arranging their locations as
“Col Harry Hewson rades program
MC, in nine 
irements. 
n type operates both m
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‘Eighty-four percent of the components are identical. The same part number can be used 
creased commonality means that personnel costs can also be reduced, he argues. ‘Now 
he reduced number of support troops and associated facilities helps to lower the 
perating and support costs as the result of the 
creased commonality between the upgraded helicopters (Warwick, 2002). 
0 assault helicopters, Bell managed to review old 
esigns from the 1950s-60s (the AH-1 first flew on in 1965 as the Model 209, while the 
UH-1 first flew in 1956), by developing commonality advantages and in essence using 
on one or the other. That's really one of the strong selling points for this programme,’ 
Hewson says. "The Marine Corps exists to operate in an expeditionary environment, 
being able to pack up and go some place and operate without a lot of support machines 




you only have to train one flavour of avionics guy, or one flavour of rotor and powerplant 
guy. The skills sets focus down much more, which means when you go on some extended 
operation at some remote site, you can take fewer people.’ 
 
T
operating cost of the aircraft over the course of its service life” (Majumdar, 2010). 
 
The program has not been trouble free. However despite delays and cost overruns, the 
USMC still expects to save $3 billion in o
in
 
Hence in the face of more modern alternatives such as the McDonnell Douglas (MDC) 
AH-64 attack and Sikorsky UH-6
d
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the those common parts as a platform. Having a common platform allowed Bell to add 
other improvements such as the auxiliary power units and tail rotor and booms to both 
types. Training and logistics support are also powerful but positive side effects of this 
theme. This platform strategy had its origins from when the AH-1 was first developed 
using parts from the UH-1, but after both types had experienced a history of divergent 
upgrades, re-emerged as a sound strategy for upgrading both helicopter types. 
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3.1. The Need for Context 
 
The research questions that have been posed in the previous chapter indicate a
3. Research Methodology 
 
 need for a 
research methodology that can deal with contextual complexity. In searching for an 
innovation process, the search is towards determining longitudinal processes that can 
occur not necessarily as general phenomena but in specific cases that could be affected by 
deliberate human intervention. 
 
Hence in each of this type of specific phenomenon, it is important that the context behind 
these decisions should be understood, particularly with the technical detail of changes of 
complex products and systems that happen over time. Some of this context may be the 
background behind why changes are made, for example due to competition or technology 
obsolescence. With the B737, a real mix of old, new, and old modified to new, designs 
are evident and it is of interest to review the features of these as each new generation of 
B737 is developed. 
 
The CoPS general theory assumes that the innovation process follows a similar general 
trend for all CoPS products but this very assumption is that which is being debated. 
Hence the specificity of the research tends to dictate one towards a case study qualitative 
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type approach rather than a quantitative one with statistical surveys that can show trends 
from general observations. 
ely with his comment “What, for example, is wrong 
ith samples of one?”, that in-depth study of a few cases can be far more effective than 
 but "thin" generalization?” He notes that “qualitative data 
re attractive for many reasons: they are rich, full, earthy, holistic, "real"; their face 
 how decisions were made in the product development process. 
relevant terms, allow for all conceivable possibilities and bundle up our understandings 
 
Mintzberg (1979) argues effectiv
w
superficial data on many thousands of cases. Theory building he argues comes from a 
richness of description that is derived largely from anecdotal data. Miles (1979) indicates 
similarly so highlighting the contextually rich nature of specific case studies versus 
generalizing across a large number of studies by saying “Must we trade close-up 
descriptive validity for accurate
a
validity seems unimpeachable; they preserve chronological flow where that is important, 
and suffer minimally from retrospective distortion…”. (Christensen, 2006) notes 
“researchers who derive a theory from statistics about a population still need to establish 
external validity through circumstance-based categorization”  
 
 Hence it is this type of context that is pursued and is followed for the study to preserve 
the reasons why and
 
"Theorists are lost because they are blind to what words in context can teach them . . .  
 
Formal rationality, when carried into theory, is the idea that we can define decisively all 
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such that our meaning will be perfectly clear. Practical rationality emphasizes context 
and, when carried into theory, suggests that ambiguity is always and necessarily present." 
an Maanen, 1995) 
3.2. The Case for the Case Study 
he fact that CoPS stands for Complex Products and Systems makes it even more 
odel 
nd present in an appropriate way without oversimplification and loss of context. Hence 
se 





Based on the previous chapters, the nature for an exploratory type research is obvious. 
“Scientific” methods using conventional equations, hypotheses or constructs may not 
seem appropriate as in this case we are looking to see why in certain conditions CoPS 
type products can better succeed with higher production lives in an evolutionary manner 
than other. The understanding of these phenomena surely lies in the stories behind the 




difficult in terms of trying to measure these sorts of issues in a codified way. Quite 
simply the variables would be too numerous and the relationships too complex to m
a
it would appear to be more wholesome and realistic to investigate the issue via a ca
st
should not and then investigate the reasons of why. 
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Yin (2002) particularly notes that “who”, “what, “where” type questions are more 
appropriately answered by survey type strategies or analysis of archival records. As such 
these often statistical type analysis forms a predictive type nature when the analysis 
sults are confirmed. “How” and “why” type questions on the other hand are more 
xplanatory in form and this is where case studies are preferred research strategies. This 
is particularly so when relationships between factors occur over different periods of time 
nd the conditions could be different each time. This variance in conditions would make 
eveloping such theory through case study is reinforced by Meredith (1998) and Sutton 




a statistical type study difficult as the assumptions could not be held constant. 
 
In this study the answers to the research questions being asked would assist in creating a 
management or business strategy going forward rather than a predictive theory based on 
past activities. Hence in part it is the theory from why things were done well (or not) in a 
particular case or cases and if well, then how to do it for future projects. 
 
D
and Staw (1995). Sutton and Staw (1995) note that common academic paper categories 
such as references, data, variables, constructs, diagrams, or hypotheses are not by 
themselves pure representations of theory. While these may be helpful and supportive, 
they instead say “ … theory is the answer to queries of why. Theory is about the 
connections among phenomena, a story about why acts, events, structure, and thoughts 
occur. Theory emphasizes the nature of causal relationships, identifying what comes first 
as well as the timing of such events. Strong theory
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processes so as to understand the systematic reasons for a particular occurrence or 
nonoccurrence.” 
 
Weick (1995) argues that “data, variables, constructs, diagrams etc.” should be at least 
considered supportive but condones Sutton and Staw’s basic view that there should be a 
“why” to explain relationships. Dimaggio (1995) goes further in proposing theory as 
“enlightenment” and/or “narrative”. In theory as enlightenment, Dimaggio proposes an 
important point that theory should not be to generalize, but to clear away “conventional 
otions to make room for artful and exciting insights.” In theory as narrative, he 
factory form. To 
me extent, the quality of a theory is a function of the quality of the people who employ 
theory-building research by taking advantage of serendipitous findings and quotes “. . .  
n
highlights the actions of humans that theory could describe. He also notes “Theories are 
not just constructed, they are socially constructed after they are written. Theoretical ideas 
take on a life of their own. In some cases, sophisticated ideas are degraded. In other 




These issues can be debated at length, but the important recognition is the human aspect 
to it all. To describe human intervention, decisions, the “how” and “why” cannot be 
simply reduced to a set of numbers. A suitably descriptive narration to a case study may 
be more appropriate in this case. 
 
Eisenhardt (1989) notes that some researchers have converted theory-testing research into 
 117
most importantly, theory-building research is begun as close as possible to the ideal of no 
theory under consideration and no hypotheses to test. Admittedly, it is impossible to 
chieve this ideal of a clean theoretical slate. Nonetheless, attempting to approach this 
edith (1998) is particularly helpful as he highlights how case studies can assist in 
nderstanding phenomena rather than simply explaining what happens. Again the 
modeling, survey methodology, and (less frequently in 
perations management) laboratory experiments. 
a
ideal is important because preordained theoretical perspectives or propositions may bias 
and limit the findings. Thus, investigators should formulate a research problem and 
possibly specify some potentially important variables, with some reference to extant 
literature. However, they should avoid thinking about specific relationships between 
variables and theories as much as possible, especially at the outset of the process.” 
 
This is an important statement as it hints that in the type if research intended, i.e. to 
explore and determine new theory, one should be careful not to pre-empt that theory 
finding by pre-building theoretical models of what is expected. Rather an open mind 




emphasis is on “why”. “Rationalism, an epistemological paradigm that includes the 
beliefs of positivism and some forms of empiricism, generally employs quantitative 
methodologies to describe or explain phenomena and here specifically includes 




Rationalism is concerned with explaining what happens and how, so as to achieve some 
goal or end such as predicting production system characteristics, or perhaps the effect of 
some change in managerial policy on plant measures. Case/field study is one example of 
an alternative research paradigm known as interpretivism and uses both quantitative and 
qualitative methodologies to help understand phenomena. It is more process- or means-
oriented and helps the researcher comprehend why certain characteristics or effects occur, 
or do not occur.” (Meredith, 1998) 
 
Like Yin (2002), Meredith also emphasizes the advantages of the case study when it 
list methods may be more appropriate for testing or verifying 
xisting theory, while methods such as case studies are best for generating or extending 
comes to exploratory type research investigating the “why” type questions. In his 
arguments he notes that to develop theory, a rationalist must still make the “leap” from 








Theory development under rationalist and case research methods. 
(Meredith, 1998) 
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 One advantage of the case study for exploratory type research is its flexibility. “… the 
research scope can be expanded as necessary, the focus shifted, or other sources sought as 
the study progresses” (McCutcheon and Meredith, 1993). This way while research 
questions should be kept in focus, the findings don’t have to follow a rigid structure 
which may not necessarily be appropriate as the research progresses. Instead an iterative 
approach can be used. 
 
An issue against a quantitative type study which is of a specialist industry may be that the 
understanding of the numbers are really only understood by specialists in the field and the 
assumption is that the readers understand in a qualitative sense. This is particularly so in 
Complex Products and Systems and more so in the aviation field where this case study is 
performed. 
 
A non-specialist may not understand for example that aircraft weight is often traded for 
range or the distance it can fly and thes plicated 
relationships to other variables such as cruising speed and altitude. Hence a descriptive 
narrative highlighting the main points of the research may be more helpful than 





e factors are also affected by com
 120
3.3. Single versus Multiple Case Studies 
 
Beyond agreement to do a case study in search of theory building, there comes the 
inevitable question of whether to perform a study on a single case or a multiple cases, and 
with the latter, how many cases would actually be the suitable number? 
Yin (2002) illustrates this below in describing different possibilities, depending if there 
are single (holistic) or multiple (embedded) units of analysis. For the single case study, 
Yin justifies this if the case is a critical type case, an extreme or unique case, a 
representative or typical case, a revelatory case, or a longitudinal one. The revelatory case 
where others may not. 
 
In the study of CoPS innovation, cases are complex by definition and correspondingly 
rare. A study of the Boeing 737 would reveal several generations of product families and 
decision making. Hence the longitudinal case is certainly true, while the rarity of CoPS 
suitable cases would match the unique case. The revelatory case is partially true in this 
case as the author has an aeronautical engineering background, work experience in the 
aviation business, and has knowledge of access means to potential data sources. Though 
not exclusive it is an advantage that perhaps the general researcher may not have. Hence 
while it would be vague to justify the extreme/unique or representative/typical cases, the 
other classifications certainly provide strong argument for a single case study. 
 
 
is described as one where the researcher may have unique access to the subject of study 
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If a CoPS case of suitable longitudinal study (say over a few decades) and there are 
generations of product families, derivatives, and variants, then the “embedded” case is 
inevitable as each derivative or variant can also become a subject of analysis (This is 
certainly true of the Boeing 737 history since it has many model derivatives and 
variants). This assists in supporting reliability and validity (at least internally) desires. 
External reliability needs are somewhat questionable in this particular case since it would 
be a largely exploratory research and the nature of CoPS does not lend itself to simple 






Basic Types of Designs for Case Studies  
(Yin, 2002) 
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Replication needs as would be assisted by a multiple case study is somewhat mitigated if 
the single case was an embedded one. In fact an advantage would be the similar settings 
of context, whereas it would be difficult to compare apples to apples if the multiple case 
settings were all different which would be highly likely with CoPS scenarios. Texier 
(2000) for example provides a rich source of multiple cases of aircraft development 
projects in France (Dassault Falcon), Sweden (Saab 340), and Korea (Daewoo KTX-1 
“Woong-Bee”). However Texier also describes quite clearly that in each case the 
political, economic, and technical conditions and motivations were quite different. 
 valuable point that March et al (1991) point in their paper on “Learning from Samples 
of One or Fewer” is that organizations can also be learning as they go along events. 
Hence multiple events within the same case may see an effect on the later cases following 
learning from the earlier cases. That learning could be negative after bad experiences or 
positive after a positive experience. March et al quote a case where a firm may not even 
wait for the outcome of an event because the experience from just actioning the event 
gave them a positive experience and the confidence to repeat. Even “near-histories” i.e. 
events that may had a different outcome pending a minor factor offer learning 
experiences. 
 
Hence just the act of doing or trying to do something creates a foundation for future 
decisions in terms of understanding capabilities and developing confidence in possible 
outcomes. In the case of aircraft developmen ong expensive drawn out 
process over many yea take into account and 
 
A
t which is often a l
rs, these are fairly significant factors to 
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exploit. It would be much more difficult to extract this kind of analysis from lesser events 
spread across multiple cases that may not even have the same institution involved. 
 
Admittedly Yin (2002) also notes that a two-case study could be selected to show 
contrasting cases, i.e. where the cases selected would be deliberately different. However 
again in the CoPS scenario this is almost impossible to select exactly. A “different” case 
is not necessarily an “opposite” case. Perhaps this may be so with certain parameters but 
near impossible for all parameters in a complex case. 
 
No pairs in the very different cases in Texier’s study could be considered “opposite” or 
easily contrasting. They were just different. The Dassault Falcon was a business jet, the 
Saab 340 was a commercial turboprop, and the Daewoo KTX-1 a military trainer. 
Probably more theory building possibilities could be gained from multiple different cases 
and contexts, but the fear would be that one loses the focus of the stated “why” research 
question in the first place. 
 
While Eisenhardt (1989) confirms that novel theory building is a strength of case studies, 
she complicates the issue by saying “. . . while there is no ideal number of cases, a 
umber between 4 and 10 cases usually works well. With fewer than 4 cases, it is often n
difficult to generate theory with much complexity, and its empirical grounding is likely to 
be unconvincing, unless the case has several mini-cases within it . . .” Just as context has 
been explained to be important to a case study, one should probably interpret the context 
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of Eisenhardt’s comments that it was a general comment and not specifically referring to 
special cases such as CoPS. 
 
This view is similar to Dyer and Wilkins’s (1991) critique that Eisenhardt considered 
only general constructs to amplify the case for multiple cases, whilst ignoring the 
opportunities to go deep in context for single case studies. They stress the narrative or 
story telling part to develop theory by saying “. . . we hope that many scholars will 
continue to try to tell good stories that have theoretical import. If researchers apply the 
aradigm of hypothesis testing to case study work without the goal of telling good 
 up writing interesting stories, but creating little in the way of 
eneralizable theory.”). However the case study in this research is specific and 
could be applicable to a nuclear submarine project would be similarly applicable to a 
p
stories, they are likely to miss both the caliber and the quantity of theory we have seen 
result from classic story- telling through case studies of the past.” 
 
It should be noted that this paper incited a response by Eisenhardt (1991) to re-stress the 
main points she was trying to make on developing theory (“. . . if we take the advice too 




This applies to her comment also about generalization which can be a common theme on 
case study papers for reliability and validity or even why one should use multiple case 
studies. With the CoPS study, generalization is not the main objective. A specific theory 
is sufficient, especially in an exploratory context. It is not expected that a theory that 
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mass consumer good such as a portable MP3 music player. Even if we compare complex 
products with complex products, the best the theory could be is potentially useful as it is 
possible to consider all contexts of a complex scenario. 
le’ evidence.” There is 
o particular wrong or right, but it offers a guideline towards the choices to make 
im
 
Finally Meredith (1998) provides and interesting trade-off in the figure below between 
the rationalist statistical methodology and the interpretivist case/field research method. 
Interestingly he notes that the curves “are convex for the two types of studies for different 
reasons. For case and field studies, the mental confusion as more sites are added grows 
exponentially rather than linearly. For statistical studies, the use of small sample statistics 
and the acceptability of higher levels of the significance criterion for studies of ‘new’ 
phenomena provide what is generally considered to be ‘acceptab
n








Methodological applicability relative to number of units 
(Meredith, 1998) 
 
Obviously at the bottom the single case study may be deemed the least appropriate for a 
statistical methodology approach but offers the most applicable method for “extensive 






3.4. Research Structure 
 
Yin (1981) quotes “The typical case study report is a lengthy narrative that follows no 
predictable structure and is hard to write and hard to read. This pitfall may be avoided if a 
study is built on a clear conceptual framework. Furthermore, a case study narrative may 
be replaced by a series of answers to a set of open-ended questions. . .” 
 
Loosely this is the model that this research paper follows. The previous chapter provides 
the theoretical grounding, framework and most importantly the research questions for 
case study. While this thesis is largely a “single” case study the case itself is rather large 
and offers a longitudinal depth of span that provides some replication of events. In the 
ent of the theoretical grounding, other cases are also referred to support, 
such as the Have Blue Stealth Fighter prototype aircraft, the Ford Model ‘T’ car, and Bell 
AH-1/UH-1 heli
 
In the development of the case study of the Boeing 737, it was recognized early on that it 
would be easy to get lost in heavy technical discussions and jargon. Much effort was 
hence put into attempting to simplify the final reporting so that the essence (on 
innovation processes) is still evident without confusing a non-aviation specialist. 
However the narratives on “why” decisions were made were given high priority while 
keeping the sequence of events in the first part (the history of the Boeing 737) in a 
sequential structure as per Pentland (1999). 
 
prior developm
copter programs and history. 
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Thus development of each generation of the Boeing 737 is described in time ordered 
sequence. However and in keeping with the theme for an exploratory type case study to 
possibly generate theory, the analysis parts were left open until the respective histories 
were completed. This kept open the door for new discussions on topics that might be 
discovered in the research. 
 
In keeping with the original research objective, a strategy formulation proposal is 





3.5. Selecting the Case Subject (The Boeing 737) 
ge amount of success commercially. 
ten and a multitude of literature 
bounds available for research. A case study with a desire for narration also typically 
emands time consuming and difficult to get personal interviews. Again for a CoPS 
roject that may have been done several years ago and possibly in a far away location, 
resources would be stretched to achieve all this and possibly it may be difficult to track 
down the designers or engineers behind such a project that may have occurred many 
years ago. 
 
The B737 however, because of its commercial success has plenty of material in books, 
magazines and journals with which to research. Being the smallest aircraft in the Boeing 
lineup, it however does suffer from a less glamorous image and historical narrative of its 
development generally needs to be sourced from more specialized books as its larger 
cousins get more detail in books that cover Boeing and its competition in general. 
Fortunately although it was first produced in the 1960s, the latest models are actually still 
in production. Hence the Boeing Company and current employees are still available as 
resources of data.  
 
The Boeing B737 airplane is a particularly suitable candidate for a number of reasons. As 
outlined before, it is a CoPS candidate but also conversely as an anomaly to the CoPS 
stereotype, has enjoyed a hu
 
As case subjects, CoPS do not typically have the advantage of mass consumer goods, 





 dvantageous also is the availability of data on its competitors such as the Airbus A320 
y changes since the first 
odel was introduced. It has gone through many generations of development and many 
r even make it the case study. The A320 was developed under perhaps more 
olitical motivations than the B737 with a conglomeration of European nations trying to 
B737. 
A
series of aircraft, which are also still in production. 
 
Though it is still in production, today’s B737 however sports man
m
different versions including specialty use ones were produced. These variations in the 
product line offer richness in data for the research questions being asked. That the B737 
also thrives in a commercial environment is helpful compared to say a military or state 
enforced product, where political motives to maintain production over-ride commercial 
reasons. 
 
In the B737 versus A320 battle, one could also argue why not also make a case study of 
the A320, o
p
provide some competition to an otherwise American producer (McIntyre, 1992; 
Thornton, 1995; McGuire, 1997; Aris, 2002). The existence of possible government 
subsidies in the development of the A320 and political intervention of sales could 
potentially interfere with the type of case study here since it is the commercial success of 
a product and how it stayed commercially successful in the long term which is being 
explored. Aside from this, the B737 is the product with the longer and richer history. 
Hence for the purpose of this study the A320 is used mainly as a reference to its status as 
a competitor to the 
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3.6. Research Practice 
 
The research process was very much an iterative one collecting technical and historical 
data on the innovation literature and case study subjects. On innovation, particular 
journals such as the Journal of Product Innovation Management and Research Policy 
Commerce and Flight International magazines were very good references, particularly 
since many articles are now accessible via the internet. Aviation history books were 
helpful and data was cross-checked between various sources for validity. 
 
re difficult to obtain product related technical data, not only for the Boeing 737 
families, but also on the Airbus A320 family and their respective manufacturers. Boeing 
personnel however were particularly helpful and assisted in providing interviews as well 
as providing material on the various Boeing products. Some data is available publicly 
such as sales figures, but some available only though manufacturer links or aircraft 
operator/airline access. 
 
Much time was spent collecting hard to find out-of-print documents for out-of production 
aircraft. Surprisingly a good data source was student material obtained from airline 
personnel that had attended aviation courses, some from many years ago. Documents 
such as the “Boeing Advanced 737-200 Systems” D6-24014A-R2 and aircraft-specific 
training material were extremely helpful in explaining aircraft features, systems and their 
functions. 
were a treasure trove of relevant articles. For product related historical data, Aircraft 
It was mo
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4. History of the Boeing 737 
 
4.1. Background of Boeing prior to the B737 
 
nd Westervelt”, 
is aircraft’s first customer was a New Zealand flying school which bought two of the 
 
Boeing was founded in 1916 by William “Bill” Edward Boeing, a lumber company 
owner in Seattle, Washington, U.S.A. Together with a George Conrad Westervelt, a naval 
officer and engineer who had studied aeronautics at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT), they developed the first Boeing Model 1, a two seat floatplane 
powered by a 125 hp engine. Also known as the “B&W” for “Boeing a
th
airplanes. Later model designs were also fitted for land use and Boeing enjoyed contracts 





Boeing Model 1 “B&W” 
(Yenne, 2005) 
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While developing the next design after the B&W, the “Model C”, one of Boeing’s 
ngineers T. Wong, also a graduate of MIT, applied ideas from Gustave Eiffel, builder of 
 on surfaces. Wong subsequently 
gured out how to make aircraft laterally stable by using dihedral or titling the wings up 
towards the tips. He also figured out how to improve horizontal stability by positioning 
the top wing forward of the lower wing on a biplane (Mansfield, 1966). 
e





Boeing TB-1 Torpedo Bomber 
(Yenne, 2005) 
 
In-between the two World Wars, Boeing went on to develop military aircraft including 
trainers, fighters and bombers, some of which could operate on aircraft carriers. The US 
Post Office department gave impetus via mail contracts for commercial transports which 
Boeing competed for using the single engine Model 40. Boeing in the process eventually 
created a new airline, Boeing Air Transport (BAT), using Boeing airplanes. Later designs 
such as the trimotor (three engine) M fered an enclosed heated cabin with odel 80 of
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individual reading lamps, leather seats, and running water. Nurses were employed as 
flight attendants and served boxed meals (Yenne, 2005). 
 
Figure 4.3 





Boeing Model 80 
(Yenne, 2005) 
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United Aircraft & Transport Corporation (UATC) was the holding company that 
eventually held in its portfolio BAT, the Boeing Airplane Company and other companies 
including Pratt & Whitney, an aircraft engine manufacturer. On 12 June 1934 however 
the Airmail Act of 1934 forbade the same company from both owning airlines and 
manufacturing companies which resulted in UATC being broken up. The airline portions 
became United Air Lines, and the Boeing Airplane Company was on its own again. 




Boeing Model 247A 
(Yenne, 2005) 
 
While Boeing designed and built a large variety of aircraft, three models developed by 
Boeing in this era are worthy of mention. The Model 247 was the first all-metal twin 
engine airliner that preceded the famous Douglas DC-3. Four engine all-metal designs 
followed in the form of the Model 307  (Wingspan 107 feet 3 inches) with a 
pressurized cabin allowing the aircraft to fly at 20,000 feet (faster and above turbulence), 
 Stratoliner
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and the Model 314 Clipper (Wingspan 152 feet), a flying boat. Both were known as 
comfortable airliners and gave Boeing valuable experience in designing large multi-





Boeing Model 314 Clipper 
(Yenne, 2005) 
 
The two most famous Boeing aircraft of World War II were the B-17 Flying Fortress (or 
Model 299, with a wingspan of 103 fee  and the B-29 Superfortress (or Model 
345, with a wingspan of 141 fe ere all metal four engine heavy 
bombers. 12,731 B-17s and 3,627 B-29s were ered 
 
The first B-17 first flew on 28 July 1935. Interestingly as the war went on, the aircraft 
was upgraded continuously resulting in the several models from the original B-17A to the 
B-17G. Performance of the aircraft nearly doubled in the process, the B-17A having a 
bomb load 0f 4,880 pounds and a range of 3,101 miles, while the B-17G had a bomb load 
t 9 inches),
et 3 inches). Both w
built. Another 5,000 B-29s were ord
but cancelled at the end of the war. 
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of 9,600 pounds and a range of 3,750 miles. Engine power increased from 750 hp in the 
B-17A to 1,200 hp in the B-17G. Gross weight and cruising ceiling also increased 
dramatically from 32,432 pounds and 24,620 feet in the B-17A to 65,000 pounds and 
5,600 feet in the B-17G. These improvements over 8 years (The B-17G was introduced 







Boeing B-29A Superfortress 
(Yenne, 2005) 
 
Unlike the B-17, the B-29 had pressurized cabins for its crew and could fly higher than 
0,000 feet with a range of 5,830 miles. First flown in 1942, its bomb load of 20,000 3
pounds was double that of the B-17 and represented a quantum leap in capability. After 
the war the B-29 was kept as maintained as a bomber with nuclear strike capability, while 
200 were converted into aerial refueling tankers with a Boeing designed “flying boom” 
which is still a method used today. The B-29 design was subsequently evolved into the B-
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50 Super Superfortress bomber (which kept the Boeing designation of Model 345), of 
which 370 were built with a larger vertical fin and engines some thirty percent more 





Boeing Model 377 Stratocruiser 
 (Yenne, 2005) 
 
Passing the end of the war Boeing dev el 367 KC-97 Stratofreighter military 
transport and Model 377 Stra . What was unique was that 
t used the Model 345 (B-50) wings and engines. The two airframes were 




similar excepting features for their different uses. 
 
provision for passenger in the upper deck, and a cargo hold below. This configuration has 
since been used on most Boeing commercial jet airplanes to date. The Model 377 was 
Boeing’s last piston-engine airliner and production ended in 1950. As a result of the 
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Korean War, KC-97s were still ordered from 1951-1953 and these were a combination of 





Boeing Model 367/377 Double-Bubble Fuselage Cross-Section 
 (Yenne, 2005) 
 
Boeing’s entry to the jet era came with the Model 450 or B-47 Stratojet bomber. The B-
47 featured six jet engines and a swept wing using ideas taken from the World War II 
German Messerschmitt ME262 fighter bomber, to increase speed capability (von Karman 
& Edson, 1967). The first flight was on 17 December 1947 and orders from the US Air 
Force increased dramatically due to the onset of the Korean War. The last B-47 was 





Boeing B-47 Stratojet 
 (Yenne, 2005) 
 
In 1952, Boeing flew yet another swept wing bomber, the B-52 or Model 462, powered 
by eight jet e ies eclipsed 
the B-47 with the latest versions hav ,000 miles compared to the B-47’s 
4,000 miles. The last was delivered in 1963 with the model like the B-17, enjoying design 
 
engines mounted under the wings which provided for a very complex combination of 
ntially used this 
ngines. Like the B-29 and the B-17 before, the B-52’s capabilit
ing a range of 10
improvements from the B52A to the B52H. 
Importantly with the B-47 and B-52, Boeing learnt how to design swept wings with 
structures, aerodynamics, and aero-elastic dynamics. These would provide the 
foundations of future commercial jet aircraft designs that esse
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Boeing B-52 Stratofortress 
 (Yenne, 2005) 
ts such as missiles). The prelude to these 
ircraft was the “Dash Eighty”, prototype to the B707. To maintain secrecy, Boeing 
 
From 1952 onwards until present day, Boeing’ main commercial jet developments would 
focus on the Model 700 series jet airplanes (model 500 and 600 series model numbers 
hade been reserved for non-aircraft projec
a
chose to name the jet airplane project as a derivative of the propeller driven Model 367 






Boeing Model 367-80 “Dash Eighty” 
 (Yenne, 2005) 
 
The Dash Eighty first flew in 1954 and was a jet powered pressurized airplane with four 
engines mounted under swept wings,  bay under the main deck. As a jet it 
could go twice as fast as previou ts and became essentially the 
dominant design” configuration of current jet airplanes (Yenne, 2005). 
space and military equipment. 
 
with a cargo
s propeller driven transpor
“
 
Boeing later merged with other aircraft companies, notably McDonnell Douglas, 
manufacturer of the DC and MD series jet aircraft none of which are in production today. 
As of writing the Boeing commercial jet transports currently, and still in production are 
the B737, B767, B747, B777, and B787. Boeing is also the manufacturer of helicopters, 
missiles, rockets, and other 
 
 143
4.2. The Arrival of Airbus 
 
 
Airbus was officially started in 1967 when the British, French, and German (West) 
governments signed a government memorandum to work together to meet a 200-250 seat 
airplane for the requirements of Air France, Lufthansa, and BEA (British European 
Airways). Importantly it was formed with the intent to learn from the lessons of 
Concorde, the world’s first supersonic jetliner, which was a technological success but a
commercial failure. Two key failures were the unwillingness to build aircraft with 
customer needs in mind,  which cost reductions 
could be gained by product commona
 
r to develop and 
uild the wings (Aris, 2002; McGuire, 1997; Kemp, 2006). 
would focus on designing and 
uilding major sub-components (McGuire, 1997). 
 
and the lack of a product family from
lity. 
These points were a significant change in strategy from past efforts of European aircraft 
development efforts which had largely been driven by nationalistic aspirations rather than 
commercial. Britain left the cooperation in 1969 while Spain joined in 1971. Hawker 
Siddeley as a British company however stayed on as a prime contracto
b
 
Because of the governments’ involvement, Airbus would also enjoy a partnership 
whereby it could concentrate on making a commercial product but with the financial and 
political support of the governments. While Airbus as an entity marketed and performed 






Airbus A300 First Flight 
(Laming and Hewson, 2000) 
ed by technical director Roger Béteille, the first Airbus design was the A300, a 270-320 
t that did away with the need 
r a Flight Engineer by using automation in the cockpit with ten cathode ray screens 




seat twin jet engine airliner that first flew in 1972. The A300 had subsequent variants 
such as the short range A300B2 and the medium range A300-B4. In later years Lufthansa 
and Swissair wanted a somewhat smaller aircraft. The result was the A310 which had a 
shorter but similar fuselage and new wings and tail. What was significantly new with the 
A310 which first flew in 1982, was a two-man crew cockpi
fo
marking the beginning of a digital cockpit (Laming and Hewson, 2000). 
 
This technology was re-applied back to the A300 in the A300-600 variant which had 
more capacity than the A300. With the A310’s shorter fuselage tail, the A300-600 could 
















(Laming and Hewson, 2000) 
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Between the end of the Second World War and 1978, the CAB (Civil Aeronautics Board) 
 the USA controlled which airline would be allowed to operate which route and 
importantly even the price of tickets. With fixed prices, the main marketing power that 
could be employed by the airlines were new types of aircraft, especially jet-engined ones 
that were seen as glamorous by customers who were typically wealthy to pay the high 
ticket prices at the time. The CAB controlled ticket prices also encouraged the 
development of longer range aircraft as the prices were higher with range. 
 
In 1978 however the CAB was aboli lines were free to compete on ticket 
prices. However this meant that lon e expensive to operate and the 
impetus was to develop hub-and-spoke type operations to improve network connections 
and efficiency rather than point to point routes. Hence the demand for smaller aircraft 
expanded with the need to service a greater p oportion of regional type routes to feed and 
distribute the hubs (McGuire, 1997). 
 
This factor assisted in the motivation for Airbus’s next project, the A320.  Following 
various European studies on a 130-170 seat jet airliner, a Memorandum of Understanding 
was signed between Airbus participants but this time including British Aerospace, MBB, 
and VFW-Fokker. This aircraft would be a replacement for older designs in service such 
as the BAC 1-11, Trident, Caravelle, and be a direct competitor to the Boeing B737 and 
Douglas DC-9. While these were European designs, some of the design requirements 
came from Delta, a US airline, who was looking for a 150-seat airliner with half the fuel 
burn of a Boeing B727. 
in
shed and air






us A320 CockpitAirb  
(Laming and Hewson, 2000) 
ing design owed its origins to the British BAC 3-11 project that 
never materialized. 
 
The narrow body single aisle A320 first flew in 1987 and inherited much of the two man 
cockpit automation heritage from the A310 with the addition of FBW (fly-by-wire) 
technology that replaced the pilots control wheels with joysticks. FBW offered the Airbus 
engineers the ability to program flight handling abilities transparent to the pilot including 
low speed and high speed stall protection. A side benefit was that later Airbus models 
with similar cockpits could be programmed to feel the same to the pilots, simplifying 





Airbus A319, A320, A321 
(Laming and Hewson, 2000) 
 
From the A320, Airbus further expanded the family into the larger A321 (first flight 
(1993), smaller A319 (first flight 1995), and even smaller A318 (first flight 2002) 
(Laming and Hewson, 2000). These models together with Airbus’s later wide body 
developments, the A330, A340, and A380 (the world’s largest commercial jetliner), are 
still in production today. All share similar cockpit and FBW technology. 
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4.3. Prelude to the Boeing 737 
 
The Boeing B737 was developed by Boeing in the early 1960s as the smallest stable mate 
to the already existing long range 4-engine Boeing B707 and medium range 3-engine 
Boeing B727 (B707 and B727 respectively). 
 
It was an era when commercial jet aircraft were being introduced and slowly replacing 
propeller driven aircraft starting with the British built De Havilland Comet in 1952 and 
then the American built Boeing B707 in 1958. Oddly at this time the introduction of jet 
aircraft started with larger passenger capacity long range models which then permeated to 
smaller models as the prospect of quantity replacements for propeller driven aircraft was 









The B707 itself was a derivative of the Dash 80 prototype first flown in 1954 and 
y Boeing with the prospects of not just civilian passenger jetliners but also 
slower cruise speeds did not match during 
fueling operations. 
developed b
that for military tankers to refuel long range bomber missions. Jet bombers such as the B-
47 were already in operation but the only suitable tankers at the time were propeller 
driven aircraft such as the KC-97 where the 
re
 
Boeing eventually developed both the civilian B707 and the military cargo carrying C-
135 Stratolifter and refueling tanker KC-135 Stratotanker series with a similar platform 
of cockpit, wings and engines. The main difference in the airframe was in the fuselage 












KC-135R Stratotanker re-engined with CFM56 engines 
(Yenne 2005) 
 
Boeing eventually developed shorter smaller capacity (B707-120) and longer range 
707-320) versions of the B707 using the same basic platform, as well as various 
military variants of both the C-135/KC-135 and B707 itself. Many of these military 
variants are still in service today, many of which have been updated with modern 
avionics and re-engined with the more fuel efficient CFM56 engine (see Figure 4.21). 
 
While the B707 was designed to fly transcontinental and transatlantic, the B727 was 
designed for shorter range routes to connect intercontinental cities. The B727 had a 
unique configuration of three Pratt & Whitney JT8D turbofan engines positioned in the 
rear with a high “T”-Tail. However it had the same cockpit and fuselage cross-sections as













The B727 first flew in 1963 but it had design enhancements that included short field 
(runway length) capability using new leading edge slats and triple slotted trailing edge 
flaps. This enabled it to operate from smaller cities that tended to have shorter runways 
and increased its marketability. 
 
In line with increasing market reach for the operator, it also incorporated built-in airstairs 
and an Auxiliary Power Unit or APU (Sharpe & Shaw, 2001). The airstairs allowed it to 
operate into remote airfields where conventional stairs or air bridges might not be 
available The APU, in essence a small jet engine with a generator and air compressor, 
allowed it to provide it’s own power to start its engines and provide electrical power and 








In 1965 Boeing made two major announcements, that it was developing a convertible 
freighter version 727-100C, as well as a longer fuselage version, the 727-200 that could 
carry as many as 189 passengers in Economy Class. The 727-100C also later featured a 
727-100QC or “Quick Change” version that allowed the interior to be quickly converted 
between cargo and passenger configuration using pallet mounted seats and galleys. This 
provided the capability of operators to increase aircraft utilization by for example using 
the aircraft in passenger mode in the daytime, and cargo mode in the night time when 
passengers preferred less to travel. 
 
As with the B707, many design iterations followed, but the above features are important 
to mention as it will be noted that many of these design features would also be 
implemented on the B737, increasing its marketing potential. 
 
hile the B727 helped to service routes that were too small for the larger B707, it was 
itself too large for many short to medium range routes that were still serviced by 
propeller driven aircraft. 
 
 
4.4. Boeing 737 First Generation (B737-100, -200) 
 
Hence Boeing launched the smaller B737 in 1965 amazingly in two versions for two 
orders that received simultaneous certification in 1967, and were delivered and entered 
service in the same year 1968. The B Lufthansa with 96 seats 6-abreast in 




Economy Class. The B737-200 was 76 inches longer than the B737-100 through the use 
of fuselage plugs but was in all other dimensions identical (737 Airplane Characteristics 
for Airport Planning D6-58325-6, Boeing 2005). 
 
One attractive point of the B737 for Lufthansa was that not only was it able to replace 
propeller driven Convair 440 Metropolitans, Vickers Viscounts, and Lockheed Super 
Constellations and go with an all-jet fleet throughout its network, the other jet aircraft 
already in Lufthansa’s fleet were B707s, B720s, and B727s. Hence it enjoyed the benefits 
f a high degree of commonality and familiarity with the new “family” of Boeing jets. 
 rudder, leading edge slats 
nd Krueger flaps. Even the B707’s dual electric motor-driven variable incidence 
tailplane trim system with a manual backup was adapted (Hill, 2002). Tires for example 
between the B707 and B737 were interchangeable leading to a reduction in spare parts 
inventory. Similarly the engine type was the same between B727 and B737. 
 
Meantime other manufacturers’ jet aircraft in that smaller size class had been introduced 
C 1-11, and Sud Aviation 
Caravelle. These 3 aircraft types had similar features such as twin rear-mounted engines, 
a high “T”-tail (except the Caravelle), and 5-abreast Economy Class passenger seating. 
The B737 was different in that it featured 6-abreast Economy Class seating and engines 
o
 
The Boeing 737 had sixty percent commonality in design with the B727 including 
adaptation of the hydraulically-powered ailerons, elevator and
a
such as the Douglas DC-9, British Aircraft Corporation BA
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mounted under the wings with a conventional tailplane positioned at the rear of the 
fuselage. 
 
The 6-abreast seating was result of Boeing’s Vice President Jack Steiner insisting that the 
lage and had 
e engines been mounted at the rear as with the other competitors, then the engine 
 
B737 use the same upper fuselage as earlier jets in the Boeing family to improve 
marketing and ease of manufacture (Yenne, 2005). While this incurred higher 
aerodynamic drag and a slight speed cruising penalty compared to it’s 5-abreast 
competitors, it afforded better economics, commonality with the B707 and B727, and 
was a better configuration for future stretches of the fuselage in later models. 
 
The commonality benefits were not limited to the airframe. Seats and galleys were also 
interchangeable between B727 and B737, easing maintenance and inventory 
requirements for the operator and making the aircraft attractive to existing B727 
operators (Sharpe & Shaw, 2001). 
 
Using the wider fuselage however meant a relatively shorter and wider fuse
th
intakes would have been too close to the wing with potentially disturbed airflow. 
Mounting the engines under and forward of the wings using conventional pylons like on 
the B707 was not as easy as the first B737-100 had a much shorter fuselage and the 
engines would have blocked access for boarding stairs to the front passenger door (Later 





Model 737-100/200/C/QC Sectional Breakdown 
(Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, 1982) 
 158
Using pylons would also mean taller landing gear and a subsequent requirement for 
ladders by maintenance people. Even the cargo hold was considered important to be at 
standing height level so that airline employees could throw in last minute luggage. So the 
design iterated to a location directly under the wing, but where the turbine area would be 
behind the rear spar to meet certification requirements that the wing area used for fuel 
tanks not be exposed in the event of a turbine explosive type failure (Sutter and Spenser, 
2006). Mounting the engines below the wings also permitted an easier center of gravity 
control especially when longer derivatives and variants were developed compared to its 
rear-mounted engined and relatively longer 5-abreast fuselage competitors. 
 
As with the B727, the B737 also featured an APU and internal airstairs option, though 
not of the same design as the B727’s ventral airstairs. The airstairs option was available 
on front and/or rear doors. These airstair units were also removable to save weight should 
the operator operate where conventional airstairs or air bridges were readily available. 
Both features again increased the attractiveness of the aircraft for operations into remote 
airfields where support equipment might not be available. Significantly the B737 also 
incorporated high lift devices on its wing such as Krueger flaps and triple slotted flaps, to 
provide high lift & low drag configurations for take-off and high lift & high drag 
configurations for landing, for operations into short runways. Spoilers that could quickly 
destroy lift and increase braking also assisted in the operations into short runways. Other 
aircraft types also incorporated similar features but not to the same degree and 
sophistication that the Boeing aircraft had, giving the B737 an operating as well as 





B737 Forward Airstairs 








B737-200 Flight Controls (Above), Triple Slotted Flaps & Configurations (Below) 





B737-200 Spoilers Deployed 
(Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, 1984) 
 
In the “737 Airplane Characteristics for Airport Planning” D6-58325-6 document 
published by Boeing, they advertise this fact along with the other features: 
 
“The 737 is a twin-engine airplane designed to operate over short to medium 
ranges from sea level runways of less than 6,000 ft (1,830 m) in length. 
 
Significant features of interest to airport planners are described below: 
 
 Underwing-mounted engines provide eye-level accessability. Nearly all 
system maintenance may be performed at eye level. 
 
 Optional airstairs allow operation at airports where no passengers loading 
bridges or stairs are available. 
 
 Auxiliary power unit can s  for engine starting, air conditioning, 





Boeing did not stop there. In order to attract operators seeking to provide service in 
remote Alaskan and northern Canada communities, Boeing decided to certify the aircraft 
for rough or unpaved runways. This involved modifying the aircraft landing gear to add 
gravel deflectors on the landing gear and vortex dissipators to protect the engine intakes. 
 
These modifications made their way onto Indonesian Air Force B737s that were used as 
transports but were also modified with side looking surveillance radar fitted in two pods 
at the rear of the fuselage. This was just one of many military derivatives of the B737 
platform. The United States Air Force bought 19 of the aircraft with the designation T-
43A and used them as advanced navigation trainers. The wider cabin helped to beat the 
DC-9 competitor to fit multip s (Nicholls, 2003). 
 
 should be noted that through the 1970s Boeing continually improved the aircraft’s take-




production model (Nicholls, 2003; Shaw, 1999). 
le student and instructor station
It
off and landing performance including later certifying the different degrees of flap vastly 
improving short field performance. It further redesigned the leading edge f
im ed braking and anti-skid systems and added the more powerful Pratt & Whitney 
 engines. 5
Incorporating as well new use of graphite composite material to reduce weight, this 




             




      Vortex Dissipator 
Figure 4.27 
B737 Gravel Runway Equipment 
(Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, 1984) 
fairing 
E Vortex dissipator 
F DME 
A VHF Comm 
B Metal edge band on elephant ear 
C Inboard flap protection, right and left 
D Main gear deflector 
G Abrasion resistant finish 
H ATC 




Indonesian Air force 737MP Surveiller 
(Note the vortex dissipators mounted below the engine inlets) 
(Nicholls, 2003) 
 
Eventually, emulating the B727 again, Boeing offered a B737-200C convertible 
passenger/cargo version that came with a main deck cargo door. Quick Change (QC) 
models were offered similar to the B727 assenger seats and galleys were fitted to 
argo pallets. Interestingly unlike its competitors who had smaller cross-section cabins, 
the B737-200C could utilize standard cargo containers that were used on larger B707 or 
Douglas DC-8 aircraft allowing easy inter-lining of the cargo (Nicholls, 2003). 
 
The B727 cargo door design eventually made its way to all generations of the B737, 
particularly military applications, and even to the larger Boeing 757PF (Package 
Freighter) for UPS (United Parcel Service), certainly demonstrating the advantage of a 









B737 Main Deck Cargo Door & Cargo Loading 




4.5. Boeing 737 Classic Generation (B737-300, -400, -500) 
 
Deregulation of the United States airline industry in 1978 and rising fuel costs were the 
impetus for a re-design of the B737. Unlike the B727 which was replaced by a new 
design the Boeing 757 or B757, Boeing sought to update the existing B737-200 design. 
 
There were several possible factors in this decision but probably the most significant was 
the engine selection. Probably by default having a limited choice of engines at the time of 
its design, the B727 had three engines, one less than the B707 to scale its size down. Its 
replacement, the B757, had two engin yce RB211-535 or Pratt & Whitney 
PW2000) wi bility. 
o fit those two new engines to the B727 would have involved a major re-design of the 
aircraft not to mention severe weight and balance (center of gravity) issues were the 
engines to be mounted at the rear as the existing B727 engine locations. The B727 has a 
center engine with an S-duct air inlet that is integrated into the rear fuselage. 
 
The B737 had fewer issues to fit a new engine but to meet new fuel and noise 
requirements, a high bypass turbofan engine was required. In a turbojet engine, air is 
compressed to improve combustive efficiency when mixed with fuel. However typically 
80% of the compressed air is used for cooling rather than combustion due to the low heat 
tolerance of the combustor material and this represents a loss of energy. 
 
es (Rolls Ro




By adding a fan in the front of the engine driven by the core turbine, a larger proportion 
f energy is used for propulsion and allows engine designers to improve overall fuel burn 
 
ngine was a turbofan but had a low bypass ratio. 
r all 
e aircraft’s maintenance points, which was a marketing advantage of the B737. A 
y SNECMA 
f France and GE (General Electric) of the United States. The core of the engine was 
o
efficiency relative to thrust. With the fan, only a small portion of the air goes into the 
compressor and a large portion bypasses the core, hence the term “bypass”. The larger the 
proportion of bypass air, the higher the overall propulsive efficiency. The existing JT8D
e
 
High bypass turbofan engines have higher fuel burn efficiency and were just being 
introduced at the time. However this meant a bigger fan which meant clearance problems 
between the wing and the ground. Extending the landing gear of the B737 would have 
been one solution but would mean a heavier gear as well as higher to reach access fo
th
longer gear would also mean a major re-design of the wing mounting and wing structure 
itself. 
 
The engine chosen for the re-engine was the CFM56-3, jointly developed b
o
derived from the GE F101 engine used to power the B-1 bomber. Earlier versions of the 
CFM56 were used to re-engine Douglas DC-8s (CFM56-1), military KC-135/B707s 
(CFM56-2). While bidding with a new smaller fanned version for a new 150/160 seat jet 
airplane proposed by Dutch manufacturer Fokker (which never materialized), CFM sent 
the same design to Boeing unsolicited. 
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Surprisingly Boeing took the design and matched it to its studies for a new B737, which 
eventually became the B737-300. The resulting CFM56-3 fan used scaled down versions 
of the recently developed GE CF6-80A fan rather than clipped CFM56-2 fan blades and 
hence incorporated the latest technology (Flight International, 1999). 
 
To fit this larger fan under the wing, Boeing and CFM first relocated the engine 
ccessory drive gearbox and transfer gearbox from the bottom to the side of the engine. 
rm” and all the corresponding benefits of maintaining the original design, such as 
asy maintenance access and a relatively short and lightweight landing gear. 
a
The inlet was also flattened at the bottom to improve ground clearance. And finally the 
engine was hung from a pylon so that it was positioned forward of the wing rather than 
under it (Flight International, 1999; Shaw 1999). 
 
This was really a masterpiece of engineering that enabled the existing wing and landing 












CFM56 Engine mounted on B737-300 
(Flight International, 1999; Shaw, 1999) 
 
The CFM56-3 offered up to 22-23,000 lb of thrust compared to the 15,000 lb of the 
JT8D-15 of the 737-200 Advanced. With this increased thrust, Boeing could increase the 
size of the aircraft for increased payload rgo). The wingspan was 
increased by 1ft 9 in while the fusela d by 9 ft 5 in to seat an increase of 




 In developing the B737-300, Boeing was careful to improve only what was necessary and 
keep as much commonality as possible with the B737-200. The figure below gives an 
example of how Boeing preserved much of the original wing design configuration but 
managed to get increased lift to manage increased operating weights by increasing the 





B737-300 Leading Edge Slat Revision 
(Taylor, 1983) 
 









Some of these improvements were bo . One 
was the interior which f lighting, and passenger 
mergency chemical oxygen generators (which reduced maintenance considerably 
 System 
r FMS and the Inertial Reference System or IRS, both of which were identical to the 
B757 and B767 aircraft systems. 
rrowed from the B757 development program
eatured large overhead bins, recessed 
e









and B767 aircraft were also introduced on the B737-300 to obtain weight savings. 
evident that Boeing was taking full advantage 
Advanced composite materials which were making a significant introduction on the B757 
 
With the fit of the B757 and B767 FMS, IRS, interiors, and composite materials, it was 
of the latest applications that could be 





Use of Advanced in the B737-300 Composites  
(Taylor, 1983) 
 
The 737-300 first flew in 1984 and the pr totype was the 1,001st B737 built (Shaw, 
 
o
1999). The B737-300 was a commercial success with orders received for 18 years 
running from 1981 up until 1999. 
 
Notably the payload or passenger and cargo carrying capacity as well as the range of the 
aircraft were increasing. The B737-300 was now capable of carrying nearly 50% more 




igure 4.36F  
Boeing 737-200 & 737-300 Advertisement 
(Flight International, 24 April 1982) 
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Hence it was unsurprising that orders continued for the B737-200 from operators that 
wanted the smaller size (and presumably operating costs). Existing operators of B737-
200s also preferred to keep the same model with their expansion plans. With a large 
degree of commonality between the two generations of aircraft, Boeing even marketed 
them side by side as can be seen in the advertisement below. This amazing co-existence 
of new and old generation orders lasted 7 years between 1981 and 1987. 
 
A review of the performance charts (see Figure 4.37) reveals perhaps why. The B737-300 
can fly further and carry more and burn about 20% less fuel per seat than the 737-200 
(Chart C & E). However this assumes the need to fly further as well as carry a greater 
amount of passengers. 
 
If the operator did not fill the aircraft up, the savings in fuel burn per seat would be much 
reduced and the increased complexity of flying a new aircraft version might not be 
worthwhile. 
 
In Chart D, we see also that the big gain in block fuel (total fuel burnt from taxi out to 
taxi in) is greatest at long distances up to 1,600 nautical miles (2,963 kilometers). 
However if an operator were to fly short distances say 300 nautical miles (556 
kilometers), then the B737-300 advantage over a B737-200 would be just over 1%, while 




A. Principal Characteristics                           B. Range capability 
 
  




       E. Fuel Burn per Seat                 F. Direct Operating Cost per Seat Mile 
 
Figure 4.37 




While the 737-300 was selling well, in 1984 Boeing observed the first orders for a new 
competitor across the Atlantic, the Airbus A320. Airbus was a European aircraft 
manufacturer’s consortium made up of then British Aircraft Corporation (BAC), Hawker 
Siddeley, Aerospatiale, Dornier, MBB, VFW-Fokker, and Dassault-Breguet. 
 
The A320 had some similarity to the B737-300. It was a single-aisle passenger aircraft 
capable of seating 6-abreast in E
engines, but otherwise incorporated some significant differences. The engines were 
CFM56-5s with better fuel burn than the CFM56-3s and had higher thrust range of 
22,000-26,000 lb (Flight International, 1999). 
 
histicated 
Fly-By-Wire (FBW) technology which used computers to translate pilot joystick controls 
into flight control movements to control the aircraft instead of traditional mechanical 
cables and pulleys. FBW also allowed Airbus to program through software the cockpits 
of their different aircraft to feel the same to pilots in terms of handling (Lynn, 1997). 
 
The A320 was also faster, cruising at Mach 0.78 (0.78 times the speed of sound) 
compared to the B737-300’s cruising speed of Mach 0.74 (0.74 times the speed of 
sound), and had a maximum cruising altitude of 39,000 ft compared to 37,000 ft for the 
B737-300 (Yenne, 2005). 
 
conomy Class. It also had two wing mounted CFM56 
The A320 carried more passengers, up to 180 in all Economy Class. It had a sop
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Ironically the A320 was built with the original intention of competing with the B727 
rather than the B737 (Kemp, 2006), hence its larger size. However last orders for the 
B727 were taken in 1983 while first orders for the A320 were taken in 1984. 
 
Boeing at the time was working on a new 7J7 design project which would also feature 
he fuselage was extended by some 10ft to give an increased seating capacity of up to 
type 
07/KC-135 (Hill, 2002). 
 of conventional mechanical instruments) incorporating EFIS 
lectronic Flight Instrument System) displays, similar to those on the B757 and B767. 
The B737-400 was as popular as the B737-300 and orders ran from 1986 until 1999. 
FBW technology and propfan engines. Neither technology was warmly greeted by the 
airlines, and eventually pressure on Boeing was instead to produce a larger capacity 




170 passengers in all Economy Class or even up to 189 in a high density configuration. 
This put it in the capacity class of the A320 and offered a stop-gap product for those that 
preferred the familiarity of the B737 systems. It also filled the capacity gap between the 
B737-300 and the larger B757 which could only be filled with the A320 (Shaw 1999). 
Interestingly the increased length put it just 5in shy of the Dash 80, the proto
7
 
Other main differences were a tail bumper to protect the rear fuselage during take-off 
rotation due to the increased length, a strengthened wing spar, and a glass cockpit (using 





Figure 4.38  
B737-300 Original Cockpit (without EFIS) 
(Taylor, 1983) 
 
Eventually the need for a B737-200 replacement came about due to noise regulations 
ing into force. To meet this Boeing launched the B737-500, this time a 94in 
ade 
up of B737-300s, B737-400s, and B737-500s.  
com
shortened version of the B737-300 incorporating all the improvements with that 
generation (Hill, 2002). It was just about 1ft 7in longer than the B737-200 and offered 
existing operators a direct replacement in terms of capacity. 
 
The family was thus complete for what is now called the 737 “Classic” generation m
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 Like the B727s and B737-200s prior, B737-300 and B737-400s were also offered with a 
main deck cargo door to provide cargo or QC (Quick Change) versions. 
 
 
4.6. Boeing 737 Next Generation (B737-600, -700, -800, -900, BBJ) 
 
From the late 1980s through the 1990s, Airbus began to create its own family of aircraft 
using the A320 as the basis. The A321 had a stretched fuselage version that could carry 
up to 220 passengers putting it in direct competition with Boeing’s B757. The A319 on 
the other hand had a shortened fuselage that could carry 145 passengers, putting it in 
direct competition with the 737-300. Another shrink of the fuselage produced the A318
with 136 seats that put it in competition with the B737-500. 
 
When the A320 was alone it had th ter fuel burn, higher cruising speed 
 not being part of a family like the B737 
me up with a new product to compete not so much 
 
e benefits of bet
and altitude but suffered the disadvantage of
which could span varying market segments of capacity and range and enjoy the benefits 
of operating commonality. Once the A320 started growing its own family, the Classic 
generation of B737 began to suffer as more and more sales went to the A320 family. In 
1990, orders for the A320 family exceeded that of the B737 family for the first time. 
 
Hence Boeing was compelled to co
with the A320, but with the A320 family. This was particularly important to key existing 
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B737 customers such as Southwest Airlines that really wanted to stay with the B737 
“Southwest uses only one type of aircraft – the Boeing 737. 
 
Flying one type of aircraft has a strong impact on the bottom line. First of all, 
le flight crews, or transfer 
mechanics quickly and efficiently. With only one type of aircraft, the company can 
ious 
enerations, keeping the aircraft simple, and asking for design changes to minimize 
family. Even when it was expanding, it sought to acquire other airlines such as Morris air 
in 1993 because Morris Air only flew B737s. 
 
training requirements are simplified. Pilots, flight attendants, mechanics, and 
provisioners concentrate their time and energy on knowing the 737 - inside and 
out. Thus all Southwest pilots are qualified to fly, all flight attendants are 
qualified to serve in, all maintenance people are qualified to work on, and all 
provisioning crews are qualified to stock every plane in the fleet. This make it 
easy for Southwest to substitute aircraft, reschedu
reduce its parts inventory and simplify its record keeping, which also results in 
savings.” (Freiberg & Freiberg, 1996) 
 
Southwest would in fact be the launch customer for the B737-700, ordering some 63 of 
the aircraft in 1993. With that in hand, Southwest had a considerable influence in the 
aircraft design nudging Boeing to keep changes compatible with the prev
g
aircraft turnaround times. 
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A look into main new features of the B737 next or B737NG was given in the article in 
Figure 4.39 from Flight International in early 1993. Importantly it highlights an increase 
in the “family” capacity to range between 100 and 185 seats, meeting the A318 to A321 












such as  it, per the comments from Stephen Ford 
f Boeing in the article below. 
c
ew of the manufacturers’ performance data also indicates that the B737NG 
ns this cruising speed for even lighter weight operations, whereas the A320 
s cruising speed tends to go down with operating weight. Maximum cruising 
 also increased to 41,000 ft, greater than the A320’s 39,000 ft capability. 
ieve these aerodynamic improvements the two significant changes are a new 
-7 engine, with yet better fuel burn and higher thrust range, and a new wing that 
ovided 25 percent greater wing area and a 30 percent increase in fuel capacity. 
ably, the wing was not all new but a modification of the old wing, keeping parts 
 the rear spar and high lift devices behind
o
 
Upgraded avionics and a B777 style interior further made the new B737 a formidable 
competitor (See Appendix E for summary). 
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(Flight International, 14-20 April 1993) 
 
The family concept occurred faster on the B737NG family as test flying of the B737-700 
included the even larger B737-800 and smaller B737-600 in the same program. Hence an 




As with previous B737 generations, iterations of the basic platform ensued and a variety 
of versions were developed as shown below including freighter versions and executive jet 
as well as semi-executive jets. On the BBJ (Boeing Business Jet), an interesting 
development is the mating of the B737-700 body with the higher strength B737-800 wing 
allowing it to operate at higher take-off weights and longer ranges. Auxiliary fuel tanks 
are available to increase ranges even further. 
 
737-700 737-900737-800
Boeing Business Jet 737-700ER 737-700 Convertible BBJ 2 737-900ER




 48 passengers over 
5,600 nmi





 18 tonne (40,000 lb) 
main deck cargo 
capability
 Up to 3,335 gallons 
auxiliary fuel
 737-800 body and 
wings
 Increased MTOW
 Higher passenger 
counts





 Addi nal exit doors






prime difference between the B737-900 and B737-900ER is the use of a flat 
 
The largest family member developed was the B737-900 which has since been 
supplanted by the B737-900ER with a potential of up to 215 passengers using additional 
exit doors. A 
 185
aft cabin pressure bulkhead rather than a conventional rounded one to increase cabin 
space for seating. This option is now available on the other models. 
 
Winglets developed by Aviation Partners Boeing, a jointly owned company of which 
Boeing has a share, were first introduced on the BBJs to improve fuel burn and hence 
increase operating ranges. These winglets are now a standard option on all B737NGs and 
perators use them not only to save fuel but also to increase speeds to improve aircraft 
utilization. 
 
Hence we see here an interesting but rich mish mash of design and technology 
combinations. It would appear that the product “platform” is one that is continually 
evolving. 
 
Significantly, despite FBW (Fly By Wire) being a selling feature on the competing A320 
series, airlines asked Boeing not to include the technology in the new B737NG although 
oeing was fully capable of it having developed the FBW B777. Southwest Airlines in 
particular wanted to maintain the existi sic simplicity as well as commonality 
with previous models. Here we see ision not to adopt technology that 
id not have a significant economic benefit for the consumer, with the preference instead 




 a very shrewd dec
d
to have commonality (Hill, 2002). 
 
Probably the engineering masterpiece this time was the addition of fully electronic 
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customers wanted the latest which was a B777 type display, Southwest Airlines wanted 
an EFIS (Electronic Flight Instrument System) type display common to their B737-300s, 
hile some even wanted the old analogue instruments. Any of these options could have 
 Boeing used the B777 type Honeywell multifunction liquid crystal displays 
ut incorporating a CDS (Common Display System) where electronically the primary 
ower display is more common to the B777. These displays are switchable by a 
mple software update. This way the airplane hardware stayed the same and each 
w
been taken but would have meant difficulty for pilot training or transitioning between 
different models. This could also complicate aircraft values and integration into 




flight and navigation displays could be easily re-configured to whichever display the 
customer wanted. In Figure 4.42, the upper screen shows a B737-300 style EFIS display 
while the l
si
operator had a choice of customizing their display. 
 
The three figures below illustrates the three generations of cockpits. Notably the 
mechanical parts such as the control wheel, rudder pedals, throttles, flap lever, spoiler 
levers, trim wheels have stayed in the same configuration, maintaining that part of the 
product architecture, through all generations greatly simplifying flight training. 
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 Spoiler Lever Throttles 
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B737-100 Cockpit (First Generation) 
 
 
B737-300 Cockpit (Classic Generation) 
 
 
B737NG Cockpit (Next Generation) 
 













B737NG Common Display System 
(Adamson, 2010) 
 
Similarly the cabins have gone three generations of makeover as in Figure 4.26. In the 
First generation, one can even see open overhead bins with very little capacity. These 
would not be able to store the roller bags common today for hand carry luggage. The 
B737NG interior uses many of the same materials as used in the B777 to give weight 
savings, fire protection, albeit to give a more roomy feel and space as demonstrated by 
the Boeing employees in the overhead bins. 
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 The extreme would be a Boeing Business Jet luxury interior as below, though often 









B737-100 Cabin (First Generation) 
 
 
B737-300 Cabin (Classic Generation) 
 
 
B737NG Cabin (Next Generation) 
 
Figure 4.44 B737 Cabins (Nicholls, 2003) 
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Military versions on the B737NG also exist with at least 3 known versions as follows. 
 
 C-40A Navy Airlift Aircraft 
The C-40A is essentially a B737-700 that was ordered by the U.S. Naval Reserve to 
replace its fleet of aging C-9 Skytrains (DC-9s). With a main deck cargo door, the 
C-40A is certified to operate in three configurations: an all-passenger (121 
passengers) configuration; an all-cargo configuration of up to eight pallets; or a 
combination, or “co odate up to three cargo 
pallets and 70 passengers (http://www.boeing.com/defense-space/military/c40). 
 
 737 Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C)
mbi” configuration that will accomm
 
The B737 AEW&C or Airborne Early Warning and Control provides airborne 
surveillance, communications and battle management. Using a B737-700 increased 
gross weight (IGW) airframe, it incorporates a Northrop Grumman electronically 
scanned array rad  and maritime targets
simultaneously  and an integrated identification friend or foe (IFF) function that 
shares the primary radar arrays to reduce weight, improve reliability, and simplify 
target correlation (http://www.boeing.com/defense-space/ic/aewc). 
 
 P-8A Poseidon
ar system that can track airborne  
 
The P-8A Poseidon is a long-range anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare, 
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft capable of broad-area, 
maritime and littoral to purchase 117 P-8As to
replace its fleet sed on the B737-800 
 operations. The U.S. Navy plans  
of P-3C aircraft. Interestingly the aircraft is ba
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airframe but uses the stronger B737-900ER wing. Accordingly Maximum Take-off 








differ 00 airframe) as 
ell as outside the B737NG line (such as the raked wingtips). There is precedence from 




The aircraft will have aerial refueling capability and hard points on the wing to 
carry missiles and a weapons bay to carry torpedoes and mines (Croft 2010). 
Interestingly the wingtips will feature raked wingtips similar to the B777-
300ER/200LR or B767-400ER instead of the usual blended wingtips from Aviation 
Partners Boeing. This was primarily because of concerns of icing buildup if the 
aircraft flew at 10,000-15,000ft for maritime operations (Warwick, 2005). 
The latter two applications are particularly interesting. 
ing the B737-700 commercial airplane as its platform, the B737 AEW&C is almost 
ory repetition of the Indonesian air Force B737MP Surveiller which used the First 
ration B737 airframe to fit side looking radars. 
-8 Poseidon is a great example as it uses different designs and technologies from 
ent model B737NGs (mating the B737-900 wing onto the B737-8
w













Hence it can be observed the “platform” is not necessarily one of design components 
attached to each other by of technologies and concepts that can be adapted from various 
models. 
 
Notably with these military versions, the CFM56 engine is returning to a military role, 
considering its origins from the B-1 Bomber. It is ironic that it will again (the CFM56 
was used to re-engine KC-135s and other B707 based military aircraft) be used in 
significant numbers with the United States Military as the U.S. government originally did 
not want to give approval to the joint venture between GE and the French company 
SNECMA to develop the CFM56 due to secur
technology from th
 
Boeing is also proposing to replace a B707 based surveillance aircraft the Northrop 
Grumman E-8C Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System with a modified version 
of the P-8 (Trimble, 2010). If successful, the B737 will have done a full circle in 
replacing an airframe of its origin. 
 
ity concerns and release of proprietary 
e F101 engine (Flight International, 1999). 
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4.7. Boeing 737 Continuous Improvement 
 
 be too much to clutter up the history with all the smaller improvements that 
oeing continued to add in each generation. Hence a separate section is added here to 
 Increased Flap Selection including Flap Track Strengthening (First Generation) 
 Performance Management System (First Generation) 
 Head-Up Flight Guidance System 
 Enlarged Leading Edge Slats and redesigned Krueger Flaps 
 Nosewheel Braking System 
 Modified Anti-Skid System 





note some of those improvements that were added later in each program to show that 
Boeing did not stagnate the product in-between generations of aircraft. 
 
 Improved Thrust Reverser (First Generation) 
 Gravel Kit (First Generation) 
 Improved Aerodynamic Nacelle/Wing Fairings (First Generation) 
 Rear Fuselage Vortex Generators (First Generation) 

 Increased Thrust Engines 
 Cabin lighting and aesthetics 
 Digital Autothrottle (First Generation) 
 Colour Radar (First Generation) 
 196
 EFIS and Digital Engine Indicating System (Classic Generation) 
 Auxiliary Fuel Tank (s) 
 Carbon Brakes (Next Generation) 
d-range Twin-engine Operational Performance  
ability (Next Generation) 
igational Performance) capability from 0.11 to 0.1 
Generation) 
ility 
ynamic Improvement Kit (Next Generation) 
 Main Deck Cargo Door and Cargo capability 
 Quick Change Cargo-Passenger Conversion Kits 
 CFM56-7B Tech Insertion (Next Generation) 
 In-Seat Video System 

 Flat Aft Bulkhead (Next Generation) 
 180-Minutes ETOPS (Extende
Standards) (Next Generation) 
 Blended Winglets (Next Generation) 
 BigBins (Next Generation) 
 Category IIIB Landing Cap
 Improved RNP (Reduced Nav
nautical miles (Next Generation) 
 Vertical Situation Display (Next 
 Flight Deck Noise Reduction Kit 
 GPS Landing System 
 Eyebrow Window Deletion 
 High Altitude Airport Capab
 Short Field Performance Kit 





5.1. Family Concept 
 
As we can see the B737 family eventually developed into 3 distinct generations of B737 
families. However it was not intended so from the beginning. In fact the “family” that 
Boeing wanted was for a small B737 (even smaller than the B737-100) to be a stable 
mate to the B707 and B727, i.e. a Boeing commercial jet family rather than a B737 
family. 
For the First Generation, the main reason there were two different sized models was 
d Lufthansa and Boeing really wanted a 
uce the risk to the program. United Airlines wanted a 
oping both B737-100 and B737-
tly developed because of the new CFM56 
ise reduction. However the increased thrust that also 
ed Boeing to increase the size of the aircraft. And for a time the 
on and the B737-300 was in fact the marketed “family”. 
s a result of competition from the A320 and as a stop gap 




because the first customer was Germany base
United States based customer to red
larger B737 than Lufthansa so Boeing ended up devel
200 variants simultaneously. 
 
In the Classic generation, the B737-700 was par
offering more fuel economy and no
came along also permitt
B737-200 of the First Generati
 
The B737-400 was developed a
to the B7J7 program th
noise and fuel motivations that was making the B737
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Only in the Next generation series was there a conscious effort to develop a complete 
family, primarily to compete with the Airbus A320 family of aircraft. However although 
e first two family developments were not completely intentional, Boeing at each step 
areful to maintain as much commonality as possible while all the time 
th
was very c
inserting new technologies and improvements, often from other Boeing aircraft models. 
 









3 seat row shrink
Revised design 
weights
6 seat row stretch
Revised design
weights




flat aft pressure bulkhead















3 seat row stretch
New HBR engines
3 seat row stretch
737-200
Classic Generation family







B737 Family Generations 
Derived from Chart provided by Boeing (Adamson, 2010) 
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 Each family was and has been a commercial success and is a testament to the family 
product concept. Between the Classic and Next Generation product families, Boeing has 
also maintained competitive parity against the much later lineage of the A320 family. 
 
In terms of CoPS (Complex Products and Systems), there is no denying that a 
nd intention, the B737 history demonstrates that a CoPS product can in fact 
e developed in such a way that development costs are minimized using a product 
platform, and by doing so that production quantities are increased beyond the traditional 
low rate concept of a CoPS product. 
 
For example the cockpit structure between all generations of the B737 has hardly 
changed. In fact it has lineage dating back to the Dash 80, B707, and B727 days. Hence 
that particular component design has enjoyed a much larger production rate than even the 
B737 itself. 
 
It is difficult to get an accurate cost of development of each aircraft model and variant. 
However an idea can be gained by looking at the flight test part of the development 
program of each aircraft model before certification and entry into service. 
The First Generation (B737-100 & B737-200) and Next Generation (B737-600, B737-
700, and B737-800) models we ltaneous programs so it is not 




re all flight tested in simu
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easy to allocate testing efforts to each model. The Classic Generation models however 
(Days) Aircraft 
were tested separately as they were developed in sequence. 
 
Model First Flight Certification Duration Number of 
B737-300 24 Feb 1984 14 Nov 1984 264 3 
B737-400 19 Feb 1988 02 Sep 1988 196 2 




B737 Certification Flight Testing Record 
(Derived with data from Nicholls, 2003; Shaw, 1999; Sharpe and Shaw, 2001) 
 as each variant was developed, less and less 
any tests that would have been needed on a first model would not have to be 
ts if the design and function had not changed significantly. 
each generation as each time previous designs were adopted from either previous 
 
 
As per the above chart, it can be seen that
flight testing was required by a factor of roughly 20-30% simply by looking at the 
number of aircraft. 
 
Obviously m
repeated in subsequent varian
In fact while the B737-400 required 500 hours of flight testing, the B737-500 which 
followed later required only 375 hours, some 25% less (Nicholls, 2003; Shaw, 1999; 
Sharpe and Shaw, 2001). 
 
This gives an indication of how much less investment Boeing had to make compared to 
developing an all new aircraft with new designs. Boeing in fact saved even more with 
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generations of B737, or other aircraft types in Boeing such as the B727, B757/B767 (e.g. 
Flight Management Systems), or B777 (e.g. cockpit displays). Even the Pratt & Whitney 
8D engine used in the first B737s were similar to those used on the B727 hence Boeing 
already had familiarity o acter lla ement
 
It is  if t ona veloping the first B737, Boeing was 
 committed on B747 developm t. Hence adopting existing designs and 
technologies such as the cockpit and wing high lift devices from the B727 would seem a 
natural way to save on developm
onality. Commonality of spare parts, operating practices, 
e family are operated in the same fleet to meet different 
arket segments. For this reason many low cost operators such as Southwest Airlines and 
resher courses. A pilot can be trained to fly multiple 
ts in the same fleet. This is true of the A320 family as well as the B737NG. In the 
JT
n their char istics and insta tion requir s. 
 not known his was intenti l, but when de
also heavily en
ent and production costs. 
 
A side benefit of course is comm
training requirements, and even having to deal with the same manufacturer was a feature 
first marketed to existing operators of B707s and B727s. The benefit compounds when 
different variants of the sam
m
Westjet choose to fly the same aircraft (often between the B737 and A320) family in their 
fleets. 
 
This becomes quite evident in the expensive business of training pilots where regulations 
require constant re-training and ref
varian
figure below, we see that pilot training requirements are also much less for pilots 
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transitioning from different generations of B737s. For a large operator this can mean 














Pilot Training Duration Requirements for 737NG 
(Adamson, 2010) 
 
Remembering that Boeing fitted an easily reconfigurable Common Display System 
(CDS) on the B737NG that could be switched to show Classic (EFIS/MAP) or Next 
Generation (PFD/ND) cockpit displays, this was a feature that provided great flexibility 
for operators. Since the system came from the B777 which is now used on other Boeing 
aircraft such as the B747-8, the transition training commonality advantages expand 
further into those types of aircraft. 
 
While physical parts commonality is an obvious inventory cost saving, a less visible 
advantage is that of multiple thrust ratings using the same physical engine and 
accessories (such as the gearboxes). Similar to the easily re-configurable cockpit, the 
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CFM56-7 engine can be electronically configured to provide different maximum thrust 
settings. Higher thrust settings offer greater take-off performance but with the trade-off of 
wer overhaul shop visit intervals and higher maintenance costs. Hence an operator not 
quiring high thrust levels can use a lower maximum thrust setting to achieve engine 
maintenance cost savings. On the B737NG, maximum sea level thrust settings can be set 
between 18,000 lbs to 27,000 lbs for various models as in the figure below (The middle 





737-600 737-700 737-800 737-900ER
-7B26E-7B24E-7B22EB20E-7-7B18E
One engin t ratings  e—multiple thrus
 
Figure 5.4 
B737 Engine Ratings by Model 
 (Adamson, 2010) 
ngines on hand can be used to support a new model 
ntry. Outstation support where airlines may keep or have agreements to share spares 
 
In terms of inventory, this offers great flexibility for example for an operator that might 
be operating B737-700s but is thinking of adding another model such as the B737-600 or 
B737-900ER. The existing spare e
e
with other operators is also greatly simplified. 
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Furthermore distribution channels and production channels are simplified with a product 
family approach (Meyer and Utterback, 1993). Even when shifting to a new generation of 
product family, it is much easier to use existing support networks than to create 
altogether new ones for a completely different type of product. 
 
The involvement of customer input in all three generations of the B737 is also positive. 
“High levels of customer recognition are the cumulative effect of a robust product 
mily” (Meyer and Utterback, 1993). This seems to be a cornerstone of many successful 
Boeing commercial jet programs including the B707, B747, B757, B767, and B777 
(Gardiner and Rothwell, 1985; Sabbagh, 1996). 
 
The family concept was to prove instrumental in winning sales for Boeing where the 
customer needed capacity flexibility in the face of uncertain future passenger loads as
as the case in October of 1988 when Boeing won an order for twenty four B737s in the 
face of stiff competition from ct that British Airways had 
just absorbed British Caledonian 0s on order. The reason for the 




 Airbus. This was despite the fa
which had ten A32
B
The Series 400 has 141 seats. The Series 500 has 106 seats. BA does not have to specify 
how many it wants of each until relatively late in the acquisition process. If there is an 
upsurge in air travel, they can go for more 400s. If growth tails off, then the 500 will be 
the answer. Flexibility. Commonality. The elimination of risk.” (McIntyre, 1992). 
 
 205
This flexibility can also be an attractive feature for leasing companies. Many airliners 
now operate leased aircraft where such aircraft can be a large percentage of their fleets 
(Newhouse, 1997).  Since aircraft orders have along lead time but leasing companies 
have to secure delivery slots, the ability to switch between smaller and larger members of 
 product family can be extremely helpful in reducing demand risk. This in turn improves a





Boeing B747 Design Family 
(Rothwell and Gardiner 1989) 
 
Unsurprisingly even the largest member of Boeing’s commercial jet family has a similar 
family background as shown below. Hence the innovation culture seems to run though 
milarly in all programs. Missing in the figure are later models, the B747-400, B747-




 Yet this is despite CoPS having a characteristic feature that heavy customer input can 
hamper development. It may be that it depends how the customer input was taken. 
Boeing was always careful to absorb input from a variety of customers taking special 
account of major customers such as Southwest Airlines. Development of British 
commercial jet aircraft such as the Hawker Siddeley Trident and BAC 1-11 on the other 
and were constantly hampered by British Government demands that the aircraft be 




5.2. Reflections on “The Nature of Technology” 
 
These findings of this thesis echo many of the features that Brian Arthur writes about in 
his 2009 book “The Nature of Technology”.  In this book Arthur notes that new 
technology is often constructed from components of existing technologies. 
 
This reflection is significant as we considered the idea of a concept when developing the 
“platform” method of building a CoPS product family. As we see in the Boeing 737, 
many variants and derivatives were developed over successive generations, but the 
overall concept was maintained. For example despite growing in size and engine thrust in 
later models, the Boeing engineers maintained a low ground to cargo door height by 
adjusting the engine mounts and engine inlet design. 
 
The easy option would have been to simply increase the landing gear height. Although 
this has wing dimensional and structural implications, it was a high possibility when they 
re-designed the wing for the Next Generation series of B737. 
 
But the two parts of the concept Boeing maintained even with a new generation, was the 
idea of easy access to the cargo doors without a mechanic to waste time positioning 




“Strut mounting the engines beneath the wings would also require the 737 to sit 
high off the ground on long landing-gear struts to give the engine nacelles 
sufficient ground clearance. 
 
I frowned. The airlines wouldn’t like that. From my fact-finding discussions with 
them, I knew how important this issue of airplane height is to short-haul flight 
operations. Small jets typically make short flights on routes a few hundred miles 
long or less. They can log up to six or seven of these per day. The less time they 
spend on the ground between flights, the more time they can be in the air 
generating revenue for their operators. 
 
If I kept the design of the 737 low to the ground, it would turn around more 
quickly and be back in the air sooner. Why? Because no time would be wasted 
retrieving, positioning, and removing ladders and maintenance stands. Airline 
mechanics could walk right up and perform line maintenance on the engines and 
other systems from ground level. And when late-arriving passengers showed up at 
the gate, airline employees could simply take those last-minute bags out to the jet, 
pop open its cargo hold, and toss them in.” – Joe Sutter, Head of Design, Boeing 
(Sutter & Spenser, 2006) 
 
The above quote was from when Joe Sutter developed the first B737, but it has followed 




forward cargo door sill height from ground is less than 5 feet whether it is the original 






did not h other. Each of these parts may be sub-








Genera e B777 cockpit was used as the basis for the design of 
e B737 Next Generation cockpit, but modified so that it could be electronically 
ing the Airplane Characteristics Airport Planning Document of the B737, the 
he same exercise with the Airbus A320, the same dimension is over 6 feet, well 
he height of most airline ground staff (See dimension B in Figure 5.7). 
important then to note that while a typical product platform consists of a major 
ly of already designed parts that have been proven to work well, that these parts 
 necessarily have to be attached to eac
li
ncept. 
egral folding airstairs option for example on the B737 was an idea and design 
from the B727 to provide greater operability into remote airfields. The main deck 
oor was also transplanted from the B727 into the B737, and eventually further 
nted into the B757PF Package Freighter. The Flight Management System, Inertial 
ce System (IRS), and cabin interior were adopted from the B757 for the Classic 
tion of B737. Similarly th
th






Ground Clearances Boeing 737-800 & 737-900ER 
(737 Airplane Characteristics Airport Planning, D6-58325-6, Boeing Commercial 






Ground Clearances Airbus A320-200 




This concept was also important when developing the idea of a product platform. This 
phenomenon of “borrowing was observed by Jones (2003) who wrote “. . . empirical and 
conceptual analysis in the broader literature on the performance of individual 
development projects have been dominated by the assumption that projects are 
independent or nearly so. However, during the often prolonged period of incremental 
change following radical technological change, the potential for one design project to 
depend upon another, through borrowed parts for example, is much enhanced because 
technological continuity is greater. Therefore, in general firms may benefit from planned 
and coordinated family relationships among products - platform strategies - that 
incrementally renew or extend their product lines.” 
 
Cockpit/FuselageWing Trailing Edge Main Cargo Door
























B737 Shared Designs 
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This ties into several of Arthur’s comments. One is that technologies tend to be built from 
tes. Simpson (2004) even describes a 
bottom-up (reactive redesign) approach, wherein a company redesigns or consolidates a 
group of distinct products to standardize components to improve economies of scale”. 
Combining this with Arthur’s theory, this would powerfully indicate that a CoPS product 
that suffers high development and production costs and low production rates may mean a 
poor strategic approach to the initial design rather than it being a natural feature that all 
CoPS type products should suffer the same disadvantages. 
 
A main deck cargo door design that is used on four different product lines obviously 
enjoys higher production rates than if it were to be installed only on one product line. The 
development cost on the last product line is probably minimal and would enjoy 
refinements from the installation on the earlier product lines. 
 
components of prior existing technologies or designs. This is blatantly obvious when 
looking at the history of the B737 per Figure 5.8. Not only do successive models take 
advantage of previous B737 designs, but Boeing has also taken advantage of designs and 
technologies from other models or families outside the B737 product line. Starting from 
the use of the B707 fuselage into the B727, this liberality has enabled Boeing to take full 
advantage of spreading development programs and hence development costs, across 
several product lines. 
 
This obviously breaks the mould of CoPS where new programs are considered expensive 
and difficult to lower costs due to low production ra
“
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As a result the concept of a product “family” is more complex than as first glance. The 
B737-300, B737-400, and B737-500 could be considered as one family, the “Classic” 
B737 family. However if we consider say the nose and cockpit structure and the fuselage, 
the “family” could in fact be extended to the B707, the B727 and other B737 generations. 
Sub-components hence have the possibility of belonging to their own sub-component 
families. 
 
It can thus be deduced that a product that has a large number of these sub-component 
pe families interwoven in would enjoy considerable lower development costs as well as 
ent work already done and in-
rvice experience from the B777 program. 
ircraft Corporation (later 
ecoming part of British Aerospace) and Aerospatiale who have grouped together to 
ty
a much more net longer development history than the complete product assembly 
development program would imply. More importantly it can be seen as an accelerator of 
evolution time for design refinement which a competitor without such advantages could 
simply not replicate on an all-new product design. 
 
For example when incorporating in the B777 cockpit into the B737 Next Generation, 
Boeing would already have the confidence that the system would have high reliability 
and have few entry-into-service issues due to the developm
se
 
In fact the best an all-new competitor could do is to buy or partner with sub-system 
manufacturers. This is in fact what happened with Airbus as Airbus is in fact a 
conglomeration of different companies such as British A
b
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share designs, capabilities and experience to develop products to compete with Boeing 
and at the time, McDonnell Douglas. The wing origin of the A320 comes from prior 
studies done by British Aircraft Corporation on a proposed BAC 3-11 aircraft, a growth 
version of the then existing BAC 1-11 airplane (Laming and Hewson, 2000). 
 
Arthur (2009) describes also the combination effect. Not unlike the Lego designs where 
y bricks of different shapes and functions can be combined in endless possibilities, 
ony did just this to develop the Sony Walkman when it happened to match development 
n the two projects (Sanderson and Uzumeri, 
995). 
to
technologies can similarly be combined to create new products. Not all combinations put 
together at random would make sense, but when opportunities arise to combine to 
provide functionality to the central concept, then obviously this is simpler to incorporate 




of a high fidelity portable cassette player with an otherwise separate development of 
lightweight headphones. The two development teams were unaware of each other’s 
product development until the then Sony's Honorary Chairman Masaru Ibuka happened 





5.3. Reverse Disruptive Innovation 
 
While Disruptive Innovation (Christensen, 1997; Christensen and Raynor, 2003) 
typically refer to incumbents being attacked by new entrants with products of lower 
performance but which meet customer expectations of sufficient performance at lower 
cost and/or with an attribute that existing products do not have, what is less obvious in 
this oft spoken theory is that while the theory is not disputed, the mechanics of the theory 
can in fact be applied in reverse. One could be forgiven that this scenario typically works 
in an environment of new products and new entrants. This aspect is actually 
unnecessarily important. 
 
What is in fact more critical is the use of having adequate performance capability to meet 
customers’ needs. With this, the superior product can be the new entrant, and the 
defending lesser performing product can be the existing one. Schmidt (2004), Utterback 
and Acee (2005), Schmidt and Druehl (2008), Sood and Tellis (2011), describe such 
disruptive scenarios but with the difference that the new superior is the disruptor and 
eventually achieves dominance over the older product. Reverse Disruptive Innovation 
uses more of one of Charitou and Markides’ (2003) defense strategies which is to 
“develop a third game, attacking the innovators by emphasizing still different product 
attributes”. This strategy can thus be considered in an environment where a company 




Significantly it can be used to buy valuable time against threats from more 
chnologically advanced competitors and save cash flow on new product investments. In 
parallel what might be expected to become obsolete products with time may actually 
have longer product lives with the application of this type of strategy. 
 
The key point is to consider what the end customer considers as value attributes of the 
product. Even if a new product is more technologically advanced it may be more than 
what the customer needs and is willing to pay for. In fact the converse may be true since 
operating a familiar product is usually easier. For complex products training and 
equipment set-up costs are reduced as opposed to introducing an all new design. 
 
In the aircraft manufacturing industry, aircraft cost billions of dollars to develop and are 
inherently complex machines with many features upon which customers have to make 
multi-disciplinary decisions when purchasing amongst the various options available at the 
time. Due to the cost and complexity, new aircraft models typically have a long time lag 
measured in tens of years before manufacturers will invest in developing a completely 
new model. 
 
If competing products are close enough in technological genres, the competitors can take 
on a battle of incremental improvements to stay somewhat competitive. But what if for 
example an incumbent company is faced with a competitor that comes along with a new 
product that is twenty years ahead of its latest product? This case is not dissimilar to 
when Airbus introduced the Airbus A320 that would challenge the Boeing B737. 
te
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 The A320 featured many new technologies such as fly-by-wire or FBW flight controls 
which were highly publicized. FBW eliminated the pilot’s control wheel and instead 
featured a joystick for the pilot to use. The joystick inputs were filtered by computers to 
anipulate flight control surfaces to manoeuvre the aircraft. With the computer in the 
petitive 
anding with the A320. These features were those that would provide the highest values 




loop the inputs could be programmed to prevent incorrect pilot input such as over-
controlling the aircraft when the limits of the flight envelope were reached, such as stalls. 
 
Whether intentionally it did so or not, the study shows that Boeing focused primarily on 
improving only the features of the B737 that needed to be developed to attain com
st
to the customer in terms of the customers’ businesses. 
 
Initially on the Classic Generation, Boeing simply stretched the fuselage to provide more 
capacity in the form of the B737-400. However in the Next Generation, the B737’s 




Traditional Disruptive Innovation theory states that good businesses naturally try to 
improve their products in a continuous fashion to further this goal. These improvements 
to feed the same market and product purpose are deemed as “sustaining”. By doing so the 
improvements often surpass the level or performance which customers actually wa
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argument is that customers’ demand for improved product performance is often on a 
othing. As the product improves, the firm eventually develops sufficient product 
ically lower margin and by going 
pscale their profit margins only improve. This gives an illusion of all is well until the 
slower rate than that which the industry can offer. New entrants can then enter as lower 
cost alternative providers with less developed products that are not as good as incumbent 
firms, but which meet the customer’s needs and levels of performance that they are 
willing to pay for. New entrants can come in via a completely different market to serve 
different customers but for a different type of application where again the product 
performance is not as good, but viewed in the absence of anything else, is better than 
n
performance to eventually step into the mainstream market. 
 
The interesting part is that for both low end and new market entrants, incumbent firms 
often choose to flee up-market as the lower end is typ
u
new entrants improve yet again and move higher and higher until the incumbents have 
nowhere to go (Christensen and Raynor, 2003). It would seem however that the word 
“disruptive” is a relative term. Christensen (1997) typically uses examples where large 
corporations have a significant market and are “disrupted” by new less capable or less 
mature firms.  
 
Oddly enough in the case of the B737, the disruptive part of the story comes from within 
Boeing itself with a stimulus from Airbus. At the lower end of the market of the 1990s, 
Boeing had in its product line up the Boeing B737 and B757 while Airbus had the A319, 
A320 and A330 in respectively bigger sizes and range. The jump from A320 and A330 
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was huge however (150 to 300 seats) and Airbus did not have an intermediate aircraft 
like a 200 seat B757. 
 
What Airbus did was to stretch the A320 fuselage and increase the thrust rating of the 
engines to produce the 180-seat A321. While this heavier model had poor performance 
on demanding airports and missions (customers often buy this model with an additional 
fuel tank), it was sufficient for many European operators that had short hop operations of 
typically 1-2 hour flights. 
 
For these operations, the lighter A321 was in fact cheaper than the B757 to operate. With 
he B757 still had the best take-off performance for hot and high airports where the 
additional fuel tanks, the aircraft has increased range and can do most intercontinental 
flights of 4-5 hours. Boeing’s response was to extend the performance of the B737 to the 
Next Generation with more engine upgrades and a matching family of fuselage stretches 
and shrinks to match. However the improved economics and capability of both the B737-
800/-900 and A321 suddenly made the B757 uneconomical in comparison. Notably 




lower air density reduces the engine thrust and subsequently the corresponding payloads, 
but second hand B757s were available in sufficient numbers to fill this almost niche 
market. The B757 customer base dried up and Boeing stopped producing the B757 a few 
years ago. Here, we see that incremental innovations actually caused a disruptive change 
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where the price and performance of the B757 was more than what customers wanted once 
the smaller offerings became available (Christensen and Raynor, 2003). 
 the roles are reversed in a Reverse Disruptive Innovation way. 
irbus, made up of a conglomeration of experienced aircraft manufacturers, 
troduced the A320, the product did not enter the market as a poor performance aircraft 
 
A pattern hence emerges beyond Christensen’s staple theory. While Disruptive 
Innovation theory does work to an extent, it does not fully explain how some incumbents 
can compete and successfully stay ahead of potential new competitors. In the case of the 
B737 versus the A320, it is simpler to think of the B737 as the new entrant and the A320 
as the incumbent. In effect
 
Interestingly this is similar to what Christensen et al (2004) said if Boeing were to decide 
to compete in the lower end of the regional jet market against companies such as Embraer 
and Bombardier. Embraer and Bombardier would be the incumbents while Boeing would 
be the entrant (Christensen et al, 2004). However Boeing as an established aircraft 
manufacturer would have the resources to make an up-to-date aircraft with any 




with low but just good enough technology as in a classic Disruptive Innovation case. The 
A320 came with a larger passenger capacity than the then latest B737 model and could 
fly faster, higher and with better fuel efficiency than the B737. Hence it was not a low 
priced low performance new entrant. 
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The performance attribute or measure is the key. If a firm can change the customer’s 
performance measures significantly, it is being innovative in a disruptive way. This 
ifferent performance measure can be viewed in the context of the customer’s operating 
asily reconfigured with a new or old display format. This greatly simplified training 
sus control wheel). Boeing on the other hand simply had to 
nsure future cockpits had similar configurations. Even the much newer B777 has fly-by-
improve an existing older product, component 
chnologies come into play. These component item or items can be combined with other 
d
environment, and significantly it can be cause by just one or more components of the 
product that has changed. 
 
For example, to keep major existing customers of the 737 such as Southwest Airlines, 
Boeing offered with the New Generation B737s an electronic glass cockpit that could be 
e
needs for airlines transitioning between new and old generation aircraft and was an 
advantage that Airbus could not emulate despite its new technology cockpit. 
 
In the case of Airbus this could only be done if they could offer cockpit commonality 
with a competitor’s proprietary cockpit, but even then it would clash in mechanical 
configuration (e.g. joystick ver
e
wire technology but has retained a control wheel so flight crew operating procedures to 
older aircraft are similar despite the more advanced electronics beneath the mechanical 
interface. 
 
Hence companies can use Reverse Disruptive Innovation as a defensive strategy against 
new entrants. As the trick is to 
te
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product features to make a new environment for the customer where performance 
measures are valued differently from before. 
 
Christensen et al (1998) noted that companies with new architectural innovations tend to 
enter new markets. In the B737 case Boeing developed several modifications, such as the 
ravel kit to allow the aircraft to fly into unprepared airstrips, integrated airstairs for 
oncentrate development effort is governed by the link between technological 
hange and competitive advantage. A firm should concentrate on those technologies that 
g
operations at remote airfields, main deck cargo doors for freight or quick-change 
passenger/cargo conversions, and short field aerodynamic kits to improve take-off 
performance at short runways. All these modifications created markets that otherwise 
were not accessible to a conventional jet at the time. Notably the A320 does not have as 
wide a range of modifications as options. 
 
When improving the measures of cruise speed, maximum cruising altitude, and fuel burn, 
Boeing only developed minimal performance margins to be just ahead of the competing 
Airbus products. This is in keeping with the “just good enough performance” theme of 
Disruptive Innovation. 
 
Michael Porter notes that “the selection of specific technologies in the value chain on 
which to c
c
have the greatest sustainable impact on cost or differentiation…” He also notes that 
“Technologies seem to go through a life cycle in which early major improvements give 
way to later incremental ones” and “a technology can only be assumed to be mature with 
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great caution”. Most importantly “most products and value activities embody not one 
technology but several technologies or sub-technologies. It is only a particular 
ombination of sub-technologies that can be assumed to be mature, not individual 
age against another aircraft that does not, all 
ther things being equal. But that situation could be easily reversed should the competing 
fusion is that in disruptive innovation, examples are often given 
here the incumbent firm concentrates on just improving their existing technologies and 
c
technologies themselves. Significant changes in any one of the sub-technologies going 
into a product or process may create new possibilities for combining them that produce 
dramatic improvements …” (Porter, 1985). 
 
Hence any framework such as the Disruptive Innovation cycle has to be viewed in this 
manner, particularly for complex products such as an aircraft type and its operating 
environment. For example an aircraft that uses a new technologically fuel efficient engine 
may have significant competitive advant
o
aircraft be fitted with an equivalent or better engine, or the price of fuel drops 
significantly. 
 
A potential point of con
w
give up their lower end of the market to new entrants with different technologies that 
eventually catch up and supersede the incumbent’s technologies (Bower and Christensen, 
1996). This is not the case here, where Boeing was continuously and deliberately 
ensuring price-performance parity or even superiority against the competition by 
modifying the “old” model in critical areas of the design. 
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With the B737, Boeing was very careful in each generation to improve only the parts that 
required upgrading such as the wings and engines. Parts that had little impact on the 
performance of the product were left alone and even whole sub-assemblies (such as the 
main deck cargo door from the B727) were imported as modules from other product 
lines. 
 
Notably it did not incorporate fly-by-wire or FBW despite its competitor the A320 having 
d (through variants, families, derivatives, and other existing technologies) 
and adapted to create a better product. Although some technology change is inevitably 
stomer needs determine which 
erformance dimensions form relevant bases of competition - i.e., differentiate 
such a feature, although it was fully capable of doing so having done so on its B777 
aircraft. The FBW feature could be seen as one where the performance was more than 
what the customer wanted – as Southwest Airlines asked to maintain the older flight 
control cable system for simplicity. 
 
It can be seen that in the case of the Boeing 737, existing products and technology were 
simply adjuste
involved, the redefining of an existing product and how it was provided to the customer 
was the emphasis. 
 
Danneels (2004) says “A disruptive technology is a technology that changes the bases of 
competition by changing the performance metrics along which firms compete. Customer 
needs drive customers to seek certain benefits in the products they use and form the basis 
for customer choices between competing products. . . Cu
p
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meaningfully between competing offerings. At any given time, a particular technology 
has performance constraints, which limit the current product attribute set.” 
 
Bower and Christensen (1995) note that companies often play a strategy of “second to 
invent” by letting other companies do the initial pioneering into uncharted territory. Then 
ith the valuable lessons learnt they develop a more “mature” product faster. Certainly w
without the A320, Boeing would not have had a yardstick to measure how much more 
performance to put into the next generation of the B737. In a CoPS environment this can 





 remarkable aspect of aircraft design complexity is that a modification of one feature 
 to 
inimize operating costs, the reduced fuel burn can also mean that the operator can carry 
ore passengers or cargo, or fly longer range missions and hence open up new markets 
previously out of reach. 
 
What is discussed are in effect product attributes (e.g., speed, price, reliability, capacity) 
that can be used as vectors to measure a product’s performance (Krishnan and Ulrich, 
2001). While these type of attributes may be difficult to use in terms such as aesthetics 
(beautiful, ugly, colours), they are certainly useful in terms of CoPS type products that 
have to deliver a high degree of functionality and ultimately profit to the end user. 
 
For commercial jet aircraft, the four obvious attributes would be payload 
(passenger/freight or cargo) capacity, range (distance the airplane can fly with a full 
payload), speed (which is the main point of using airplanes rather than other forms of 
 
A
will often impact the performance of other features. For example installing a new in-
flight entertainment system to attract more customers may add weight which in turn 
drives fuel consumption up and for long range missions could also restrict the number of 
passengers to be boarded, which in turn can defeat the purpose of the original objective. 
 




transportation), and operating cost. In recent years the latter is driven largely by fuel burn 
specially with the ever increasing costs of oil. 
t 
annot support the larger aircraft which have until recently been the only alternatives 
 carry around 95 passengers over 4,000 nautical miles (7,408 
ilometers) in two-class configuration.” 
of the 
novative impetus at Boeing. “Making highly differential products with strong cost 
customers, cost saving through commonality and familiarity with the existing product 
e
 
Holloway (1998a) quotes “Whilst range is likely to be an important battleground fought 
over by the B777, A330 and A340 (all large wide body aircraft) in particular, it is 
certainly not irrelevant as regards much smaller types. The transcontinental capability of 
the 737-600/-700/-800 family is opening thin US domestic point-to-point markets tha
c
possessing this type of range at full payloads. Possible demand for aircraft capable of 
exploiting niche transatlantic and intra-Asian hub-bypass markets was behind the 
consideration Boeing began giving in the mid-90s to an “ER” (Extended Range) version 
of the B737-700, able to
k
 
A new version of the aircraft always had what could be called a strong Customer Value 
Proposition or CVP as illustrated by Johnson, Christensen and Kagermann (2008). By 
doing so the value of the improved aircraft model could easily be quantified irrespective 
of the aircraft’s original configuration age. This in turn drove the flavour 
in
advantages is a license to print money, and lots of it” (Christensen and Raynor, 2003). 
 
For example with a large number of B737s already in service with a large number of 
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would be given an important decision factor for customers of a continuously improving 
B737. 
 
As we have seen, Boeing in the Next Generation B737s provided glass cockpits that 
could be electronically configured to show latest or former digital cockpit display formats 
to allow easy integration with the older models. Combined with other features such as 
new interior cabins and improved aerodynamics, Boeing’s product improvements had the 
ability to constantly change the impact on the customers’ business models. 
 
With Reverse Disruptive Innovation, the older product can be improved incrementally to 
better the features that have the most value to the customer, and in doing so place the new 
entrant with the product that has performance that can then be seen as overshooting the 
customer’s needs. Better still by using a Customer Value Proposition, the older player 
espite having spent less on improving an existing product, can price equivalently to a 
es, 
ockpit and nose, empennage and tail, and landing gear have typically high commonality 
d
newer product by showing value satisfaction and hence reap higher margins, or be able to 
discount more in a price war. 
 
As we have seen on the B737 series of aircraft, one of the easiest ways to differentiate an 
aircraft is to stretch or shrink the fuselage which is mostly of constant cross-section 
dimensions, while keeping the rest of the aircraft the same. Hence the wings and engin
c
between different models of an aircraft family. High commonality means lower 
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developments costs but also easier operability for the operator in terms of training and 
spare parts inventory. 
owever a larger than necessary wing and engines means the shrunk and lighter aircraft 
as validated as these charts were sourced from Boeing. 
ndoubtedly a similar chart from Airbus could show the converse. 
carrier, whereas the two-class is for a traditional type carrier. 
 
The trade off is that the performance contributing parts such as the wings and engines 
may be de-optimized for the shrunk or stretched models. For example the wings and 
engines would be larger and heavier than necessary for a shrunk model and vice versa for 
a stretched model. 
 
H
would have better performance in terms of range and this can be a marketing advantage. 
For the larger aircraft, the converse in performance will occur as range drops off with a 
heavier aircraft, but the increased capacity fuselage in turn becomes the positive 
marketing tool for operators seeking high capacity for short range missions. 
 
The figure below illustrates this, though the comparisons between Boeing and Airbus 
aircraft should not be taken 
U
 
The smallest aircraft models (B737-600/A318) ranges are artificially lowered due to 
artificially lowered certificated maximum take-off weights to save on airport charges. 
However the next three larger models for both Airbus and Boeing illustrate the reducing 
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• 30-in pitch
• 737-700/-800/-900ER with optional winglets With Winglets



























• 737-700/800/900ER with optional winglets
(4) (5) (6) (7)
Range, 1,000 nmi (1,000 km)
With Winglets
Without Winglets  
 
Figure 5.9 
B737 Range Capability 
(Adamson 2010) 
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Note that the charts become complex when we consider that the use of auxiliary fuel 
tanks becomes more common with the larger models (B737-900ER or A321) due to the 
drop-off in performance with the increased operating weights. However in the older 
Classic Generation, the B737-400, B737-300, and B737-500 models show a direct 
transverse correlation between capacity size and range. 
 
Significantly we also see that the capacities of the larger B737-900ER and A321 are quite 
close to the B757, albeit with less range capability. However if the operator does not 
require the range capability of the B757, then the smaller B737-900ERs and A321s 
become very attractive options with the corresponding lower operating costs. 
 
One thing that may occur is that if an incumbent is focused on competing with an entrant 
but the improved product develops a higher performance able to displace the next product 
line, this also means the product will be more and more optimized for that next product 
line’s market segment. In retrospect, that also means the product becomes less optimized 
for its original market segment. This then makes it vulnerable to competition from new 
entrants in that segment and a classic Disruptive Innovation cycle can occur. 
 
We see this in the figure below where the successive generations have tended to get 
larger and larger physically in dimensions (including wingspan) as well as operating 
weights. If we recall the original B737-200 continued selling well for many years despite
737-300 with new CFM56 engines until noise regulations 
curtailed its sales. 
 
the availability of the B
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The original B737-200 had an operating empty weight of about 60,000 lbs. Its subsequent 
replacements, the B737-500 and B737-600 had operating empty weights in the order of 
about 69,000 lbs and 80,000 lbs respectively (737 Airplane Characteristics Airport 
Planning, Boeing 2005). Hence if the operator did not need the range of a B737-600, it 
was stuck with an increase of approximately some 10,000 to 20,000 lbs of unnecessary 



















In-service date  
 
Figure 5.10 




The costs of these trade-offs in weight and performance are best shown on a “fan” chart 
as shown below. Again this data is sourced from Boeing so comparisons against the 
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Airbus products are not necessarily validated. However it is sufficient to illustrate the 



























Relative trip cost, %
Lower cost
Lower risk
• Cash airplane-related operating cost
• 500 nmi trip
• 2009 dollars








• ( ) Number of seats
• Typical two-class seating
• 737-900ER and A321 include two optional auxiliary fuel tanks




Relative Seat-Mile Costs versus Relative Trip Mile Costs 
(Adamson, 2010) 
 
To read this chart, the B737-300 is used as the reference point. Relative to this reference 
oint hence, the B737-400 is about 10% better in terms of seat-mile costs, as it carries 
more passengers, but it is say 6% worse in trip costs as it burns more fuel for the same 
mission. The B737-500 on the other hand has higher seat mile costs as a result of 
carrying fewer passengers, but has 4% less trip costs as it burns less fuel for the mission. 
p
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The mission in this case is a 500 nautical mile (926 kilometers) trip so it is just one chart 
of many that could be developed for any individual operator’s unique network. 
ence we can see that it depends on the operator’s network as to which aircraft model is 
optimal. A route requiring less capacity and more range would favour the smaller aircraft 
and vice versa. 
 
As both B737 and A320 families offer a range of capabilities, both manufacturers thus 
offer differentiated products to meet different market segments, but with essentially the 
same product platform offering the benefits of commonality. A large operator with 
varying route networks could select more than one model to fit but enjoy the ease of 
using the same operating flight and cabin crew as well as common maintenance 
requirements. 
 
While it may be unfair to compare the Airbus product line here, it becomes obvious tha
the two generations of B737s shown (B737-300/-400/-500 & B737-600/-700/-800/-
900ER) show d banana shapes 
move towards the bottom left with ion having improved efficiency in 




istinct banana-like patterns for each family, and these 
 the newer generat
both seat-m
the centre-of-banana models (B737-300 or B737-700/-800) in terms of design efficiency. 
For the Airbus the optimally designed models would be the A319/A320. 
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With the B737 and A320, the latest versions smallest size models in the family product 
line are the B737-600 and A318 respectively. As a consequence of being heavy, both 
ese models have sold poorly and are now subject to encroachment by the top line 
 in the original B737-100/-200 one-hundred plus seat passenger airplane 
arket. 
5.5. Product Platform 
 
Notably the B737 series of aircraft did not start as a product platform of its own, being 
instead just a part of the B707 and B727 aircraft “family” which were also quite different 
in configuration despite having common parts. The original B737-100 and B737-200 
models were developed concurrently due to customer demands but never really marketed 
as a family. 
 
It was only in the Classic Generation where Boeing really began making the B737 a 
product platform, but only because it was nudged to by competition (to stretch the B737-
300 into the B737-400 to compete against the Airbus A320) and later to find a 
replacement for the obsolete B737-200 (by shrinking the B737-300 into the B737-500). 
The Next Generation B737 family of models was just the first time that Boeing actually 
th
smaller manufacturers such as Bombardier and Embraer. In fact Bombardier’s current 







intentionally developed as a product family, where all the initial three models (B737-600, 
B737-700, and B737-800) were test flown and certificated together. 
 
Hence should a company developing, particularly a CoPS type product, straightaway 
establish a product platform and develop simultaneously different variants of the basic 
model? Simultaneous development is common nowadays being a feature of the Embraer 
E-jet family of E170, E175, E190, and E195; the Bombardier C-Series family of CS100 
and CS130; and even lately the Chinese Comac C919 being developed in three sizes to 
compete directly against the B737 and A320 families with entry into service planned for 
2016. The C919 is designed as a product platform with three more versions to follow for 
nd military emulating the B737 family history (Ostrower, 
010). 
e and improve. 
 
use as executive jet, freighter, a
2
 
One could argue that while it is a noble intention, a missing factor is the timescale for 
evolution. Simply speaking while it would be great for multiple variants to be using a 
common product platform, simultaneous development means the platform itself has no 
time to iterat
 
For example the first glass cockpits featuring electronic displays to appear in the Classic 
Generation of B737s did not appear on the first model (B737-300). They first appeared in 
the later B737-400 and were later optioned on the other variants. The Boeing Business Jet 
(BBJ) and P-8 Poseidon variants mixed the fuselages of smaller models with stronger 
wings of larger models. 
 238
While it is fortunate for Boeing that many later improvements such as carbon brakes and 
winglets could be retrofitted on earlier models prior to their introductions, it can be seen 
at Boeing was constantly improving the products and developing new variants based on 
new knowledge and experience from across its entire product line. 
 
Hence this is a potential disadvantage of simultaneous variant family development. Even 
on the first B737-100 and B737-200 generation, the latest B737-200 Advanced model 
had so much significant changes from the earlier B737-100, such that Boeing no longer 
produced the B737-100. This is not unlike the Bombardier series of CRJ passenger 
regional jets that spanned from the CRJ100, through the CRJ200, CRJ700, CRJ900, and 
lately the CRJ1000. The CRJ700 and later models of the CRJ900 in particular 
incorporated many performance improvements that were not available on the earlier 
CRJ100s or CRJ200s. 
 
Hence a strategy could be to space out the time between developments of different 
variants to allow time for improvements that come in time. Boeing has done this in fact 
on the B787 in deliberation, spacing years between developments of different variants, 
particularly because the B787 incorporates considerable new technologies such as a 
composite material airframe. 
 
An evolving type product platform and architecture would appear the preferred way to 
go, particularly for a CoPS type product which can be complex in nature. Incremental 
changes to the platform as we saw on the B737 evolve the product and keep it up to date. 
th
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When significant changes are required such as improved cruising speed and altitude for 
the B737, changes are deliberately made to major components such as the B737 wings. 
 
The B737 wings are components that would be labeled as ‘‘carry over-modified’’ by Suh 
t al (2007). These are components that are similar to previous design existing 
. However this was not intended by Boeing when it built the first 
737. The more appropriate description would be evolving product architecture. By 
2001), the low end variants in a product platform family  
ay be disadvantaged by having parts common to the product platform that are 
e
components, but not exactly the same. However the development of the new design is 
based on the prior design. In both the Classic and the Next Generation B737 families, the 
wing was a modification of the earlier design. In the Classic it was mostly just an 
increase of wingspan to increase wing area for more lift. In the Next Generation mainly 
just the rear wing spar and associated high lift devices (spoilers, flaps) were retained. 
 
It might be convenient to think of the wing itself as a sub-product with the rear wing spar 
as the product platform
B
modifying the wing thus for the Next Generation B737, Boeing kept the wing design, and 
correspondingly the product platform, up to date in terms of cruise speed and altitude yet 
maintaining the advantages of the proven high lift devices. 
 
As per Krishnan and Gupta (
m
overdesigned for the high end. Notably the smallest models of both Boeing and Airbus in 
the B737-600 and the A318 tend to be heavier than desired due to their heritage of being 
a variant of a larger basic model. The temptation during development would be to 
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minimize cost by using the same components as in the larger variants and instead just 
market the advantages of commonality to the customer. 
 
On the B737, even interchangeable components exist such as the landing gears where 
operators have the choice to fit a standard but heavier landing gear able to meet the 
requirements of different models to maximize commonality, or optimized landing gears 
for each model to maximize performance where commonality is less of a requirement. 
 
The B737 case is complex enough to cater for different type market and performance 
segments since its markets are spread across a spectrum of “standard” commercial 
assenger jets, somewhat sub-standard freighter (cargo) jets, and specifically customized 
 
p
executive business jets or military applications. And as we have seen, Boeing liberally 
transposed sub-systems across not just the B737 family but also from outside that product 
line. Hence the complexity of CoPS can be taken advantage of in a strategy to maintain a 




6. Discussion & Strategy Formulation 
 
6.1. An Emergent Strategy 
he 
utset. However from the outset even the first models of the B737 were borrowing 
e almost as a culture (as can be 
en in much of the marketing material). In the case of the B737, many of the 
evelopments were spurred by competition especially after the A320 and its subsequent 
variants entered the market. The interesting part is that after the first round of 
developments (the B737-300), Boeing continued in a similar pattern of model 
improvements for later versions and generations of the B737. Albeit perhaps the actions 
by Boeing were reactionary, but the repeated patterns seem to suggest an emergent 




It can be observed that a pattern of utilizing the platform concept and developing the 
B737 to maintain competitiveness seems to emerge. The analysis indicates that this 
pattern may not actually have been deliberate nor was it a long term strategy from t
o
component designs such as the fuselage cross-section from other existing models in the 
Boeing product family with the intention to save on research and development costs. 
 
Many of these “restrictions” in the long term in fact became advantages for the product in 
the long term as the commonality and platform benefits to the customer were realized. 
These benefits both in research and development costs as well as to the customer were 




6.2. Negative Considerations 
efore formulating a CoPS innovation strategy for commercial product success and 
l negative aspects should be understood. This is 
particularly so if the organization is weighing up a decision between developing an all 
new product or following a strategy for development of an existing product in a similar 
way to Boeing. 
 
 Firstly while the successive B737 generations of families can be considered a 
success, at best it only maintains parity with its competitor the A320 family. Prior 
to this it was a market leader. Airbus’s aggressiveness to establish itself could mean 
that this might have been a deliberate strategy by Boeing which could have simply 
accepted it was sufficient to maintain just a significant portion of market sales 
instead of putting too much design effort and resources to gain full product 
superiority. 
 
 Secondly a product platform strategy can mean somewhat of a design lock-down 
and rigidity in the bandwidth of that product family, and accepting some degree of 
optimization loss in extreme ends of the family, particularly at the low end. The 
B737 story might be deemed ultimately successful but what if for example Boeing 
had continued with the use of the B727 as a product platform by not recognizing 
the limitations and disadvantages of that design? With hindsight it is easy to see but 





longevity, some of the potentia
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McDonnell Douglas had limited success by stretching a rear engine mounted 5-
abreast fuselage design from the DC9 to the MD80/90 series and then the B717. It 
too enjoyed a loyal customer following but ultimately lost the battle to Boeing and 
Airbus as the MD90 re-engine was not commercially successful. The B717 which 
was quite a lower end capacity model also lost sales to regional jets such as the 
Embraer and Bombardier products which were optimized for that end of the 
market. 
 
(Jones, 1993). This type of judgment is not easy to define clearly and could perhaps 
 On the B737 Boeing enjoyed the ability of adopting technologies and designs from 
odified” parts. Hence in 
Knowing when to switch product architecture would depend on the experience and 
ability of the company to forecast obsolescence towards making the right judgment. 
Too high or low a rate of change in product platform with correspondingly low or 
high numbers of derivative products developed can also impact firm performance 
be the subject of further study. 
 
its other newer product lines such as adopting the Main Deck Cargo Door from the 
B727 or the Flight Management System from the B757. These components in turn 
enjoyed longer production runs than had they been on only one product line. 
However not all companies have multiple product lines. 
 
Such innovations could be sourced from the outside but it would be probably more 
difficult to perform tasks such as adapting “carry over-m
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the absence of this kind of facility, the strategy may not be appropriate, or the 
company may wish to reconsider if it should even be taking on such a challenge. 
 
A rejuvenated product may still suffer the stigma of being an “old” product. With 
aircraft, travelling public may not be aware that the model they have bought a ticket 
may be the latest and greatest derivative ever developed and could still think that it 
is an ou
 
tdated (and perhaps less modern and safe) product simply by the model 
esignation. 
 
d production B717 which was actually the MD-95, 
re-named as Boeing merged with McDonnell Douglas. 
rtue of having a common 
platform, the entire product family would suffer the same flaw discovery 
d
 
Related to the above point, there is also an inherent danger of either losing the 
advantage of commonality or attain such a perception. The DC-
9/MD80/MD90/B717 series all shared a somewhat common platform but 
discontinuity by the model numbers occurred (DC-9 to MD80/90, and MD80/90 to 
B717) particularly on the limite
 
 The robustness of a product platform has been mentioned several times. But high 
dependency on a singular platform can also be a risk. What if after several variants 
have been developed a significant flaw is discovered in the product platform which 
affects safety, operation, and/or ultimately sales? By vi




ndesirable by the customers. Again it would help to be like Boeing which enjoys 
ould mean an encroachment up-market that could endanger the 
conomic viability of other product lines in the upper end (such as the B737 versus 
 
 
The flaw might not even be a technical but one that is suddenly perceived to 
u
the sales of various differentiated product lines but for a new market entrant with 
perhaps just one product family as its investment bet, the risk is very real. 
 







6.3. Review of Research Questions 
 
 
In light of the prior sections a review of the key research questions posed at the beginning 
of the study is as follows. 
 




It is not possible to consider all potential scenarios but undoubtedly the many 
advantages of such a strategy would mean at least some parts if not all could be 
considered seriously by other companies. The case histories of the Ford Model T 
and Sony Walkmans are proof that it can be done in other scenarios. The Sony 
Walkman had a successful generation upgrade when it went from magnetic tape 
cassette technology to compact disc technology. The strategy described in section 
5.1 is derived from the findings of the B737 study and is proposed as a generic one 
that could be employed. The big obvious advantage is that companies would not 
have to always re-invent a new product and new variants or derivatives can be 
marketed as somewhat new products but at a faster rate. Brought over components 





 Did Boeing employ a strategy to improve the B737s longevity in terms of 
competition and if so how did it do it? Was it by developing a family or families of 




Significantly the strategy as such was not deliberate in the Classic B737 generation 
but more as a reaction to defer product replacement (the 7J7 product that never 
materialized) and the entrance of the Airbus A320 competitor. Hence what 
followed in essence created an emergent strategy that Boeing appeared to follow up 
until present day. The answer to the second question is obviously yes to all. 
 
 
 Was the competitive edge of the B737 maintained by radical or incremental 
innovations to its design? 
 
Answer: 
It would seem that most of the innovations were somewhat incremental. The B737 
enjoyed and continues to enjoy continuous improvement by Boeing. Variant 
development design changes were mostly sustaining in nature such as varying the 
fuselage lengths. Perhaps the most radical part of the histories involve the 
evolutions of the product platforms, particularly the use of “carry over-modified” 
parts adapted from previous designs (such as the wing) to update the design’s 
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performance. The overall product architecture however was maintained throughout 




 e the downsides if any of its strategy? For example in its quest to maintain What wer
competitiveness and improve product performance, did it lose efficiency in certain 




The potential negative sides of such a strategy are listed in the previous section. But 
yes, Boeing did lose efficiency at the low end of the market as its Basic Model 
ult the smallest variants (B737-500, B737-600) of later 
enerations were significantly overweight compared to the original model (B737-
 were supposed to replace. Ironically the improved efficiency in the higher 
 
sweet spots were pushed further and further up-market to carry more payload over 
greater distances. As a res
g
200) they
end of the market made models in that market such as the B757 comparatively and 
competitively less efficient. 
 
 
Was the lineage of the B737 an advantage or disadvantage? It may for example be 
that the infrastructure required to support the aircraft was common to successive 
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generations and hence the user would save on training, tooling, and spare parts 
costs on a somewhat familiar product. Technology implications however could 




ut mainly because of existing large fleets of prior models with 
xisting customers. By deliberate engineering (such as to incorporate the CFM56 
to the B737-300 without affecting the wing or landing gear significantly) 
nerations of the B737. In facing eventual obsolescence 
irbus has since decided to re-engine the A320 (Reals, 2010), and Boeing in turn is 
lso doing a re-engine design of the B737 (Ostrower, 2011).  
One can only guess what would have happened if Boeing had developed an all-new 
design versus upgrading the B737 product line continuously. But with the decision 




to maintain high commonality of the concept as well as spare parts and operating 
practices, Boeing made the lineage a marketing advantage against the new 
competition that could not compete similarly without an existing customer base. 
 
However that advantage has a time factor once the competition achieves significant 
sales as the A320 family also now enjoys similar advantages when sales campaigns 
are made for existing operators of the A320 family. In time, the A320 will have the 






.4. An Innovation Strategy for CoPS 
 
Following the case study analysis, a five step generic strategy
 
 is proposed for managing 
the innovation process of CoPS type products to offer greater commercial success. This 





roposal for a possible starting point and adjustments could be made as necessary. 
Take Advantage of Heritage 
Prior to starting any development, the concept and primary function of the CoPS 
product should be reviewed. What are the intended mechanisms to purport this 
function? It is poignant to consider Brian Arthur’s suggestion that any technology 
tends to have a history behind them or prior technologies or designs. 
 
In reality should a company be tackling a CoPS product, it surely must already have 
 
 
some experience since it would not otherwise get such a contract or attempt such a 
challenge. Hence it should consider existing experience of designs and technologies 
that must surely be present in the company (such as incorporating B727 component 
designs into the B737). Smaller companies or those without other appropriate 
product lines to borrow from can also consider exploiting technological alliances 
with other firms (Rothaermel, 2001). 
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 Employ Product Platforms 
To improve the probability of commercial success, a product platform would be an 
ct. 
Preferably the platform should incorporate proven technology or designs such as 
was ably demonstrated by the Have Blue stealth fighter prototypes, but consider the 
ts it is planned to support with family variants. To do 




obvious path to pursue. The Ford Model “T” example shows how the limited 
production rates of CoPS products can in fact be circumvented. The product 
platform offers a higher degree for high production rates and maximized use of 
design resources to create different variants and derivatives of the produ
bandwidth of market segmen
this suitable and relevant product performance factors need to be carefully selected 
as metrics that are appropriate for the task of measuring performance as variants are 
sized up or down. 
 
T
accordingly the number of related product families that are desired to be launched. 
A limiting bandwidth factor would be the acceptable degree of de-optimization that 
could occur at the low end variant of the family. Acceptability would depend on the 
probability of new entrance competition. 
Plan Family Variants 
Planning the entry of variants should consider the inevitable improvements that 
would come with time. CoPS products by nature are not easy to build projects and 
 252
time lags usually exist. By deliberating spacing out variants, companies also reduce 
ialized military and executive versions). This increases the 
rotection of the product line from new competition as small specialized market 
 
rs a re-visit to the design of the product 
platform though changes would be expected to be incremental in nature. If possible 
such improvements can be retrofitted to previous variant models, in effect 
he product platform. Constant review of other newer 
the risk factor as it would allow design refinement iteration of the first variants. 
 
Preferably service experience should occur before tackling the next variant. This 
allows feedback from customers to enhance the robustness of the product platform 
(noting for example Boeing abandoned the B737-100 fairly quickly although it was 
developed at the same time as the B737-200). 
 
Once a product platform is considered robust, special variants or modification kits 
could be considered for development to simply extend the reach of the product into 
new market segments (such as the B737 cargo versions, gravel kits for unpaved 
runways, or spec
p
segments are probably not attractive enough for new entrants looking to establish 
investment returns with a decent market share but with initially few models to 
offer. 
Each time a variant is developed, it offe
becoming part of t
technologies or design from outside the product family would allow importation 
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 Exploit Commonality 
With variant development, once a significant number of sales or customers are 
achieved, commonalities becomes a higher criterion as the customers become 
miliar with the product line and get locked into spare parts, training, and 
 operating costs. As both Boeing and Airbus now attempt to do, even 
reducing training costs through commonality is a significant marketing advantage. 
successful in beating off newer designs. 
fa
operating procedures. Although it begins to become a constraint to further 
improvements, it also becomes a marketing advantage should competition appear 
with novel but yet unfamiliar designs. 
 
The greater the degree of commonality a new design has with older designs, the 
greater the advantage. Beyond commonality with product variants and derivatives, 
commonality with other product lines is also an advantage for customers looking to 
reduce
 
As seen with the AH-1Z/UH-1Y helicopter upgrade program, Bell is doing this 
actively in the design of the upgrade by designing in common major components 
despite the two helicopters having very different mission objectives. With a 
subsequent reduction in spares, support, and training requirements Bell has been 
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 Decide On The Next Generation  
Particularly with the existence of competition, when customers may want even 
iciencies or performance that is beyond the scope of the 
platform can be adapted with “carry-over 
odified” components, components modified based on existing component 
 
ossible with the previous product generations. 
tain the concept and product architectures, 
significantly better eff
existing product platform, a new derivative or significant change of the product 
platform has to be considered with a corresponding new generation of product 
family or families. 
 
Though the potential here could be an all-new design, serious consideration should 
be given as to whether the existing 
m
designs. The cost savings versus an all-new design could be substantial, while the 
functionality of the original designs could be maintained (such as the rear wing spar 
or low landing gear of the B737). With customer input, care should be taken to 
improve or modify only as far as necessary to achieve the performance 
improvement or characteristics desired, but maintaining commonality as much as
p
 
A new family generation offers greater scope for incorporating new technologies 
than a new variant development. However the original concept for the CoPS 
product should be reviewed. Engineering the changes for incorporation of the 
technologies should be masterly to main
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if still valid, as much as possible (as in the CFM56 engine integration for the B737-
300, or the configurable cockpit displays of the Next Generation B737). 
inal design configuration and its adaptability to evolve. 
 
 
And hence the cycle repeats. The latter points are factors contributing to the 
longevity of the product platform. While the B737 is still in production, one could 
theorize perhaps that not upgrading the product platform enough to a new 
generation could have been what ultimately killed the Ford Model T. But it also 
depends on the orig
Boeing chose not to continue with the B727 because its rear-engine mounted 
configuration was too difficult to re-engineer the incorporation of new high bypass 
turbofan jet engines. A company’s combinative capability hence comes into play. 
Even though the B727 was not carried forward, many parts of it and design 















and to reduce the risk to the company in the case of a product platform flaw. The product 
platforms themselves would enjoy greater production rates than independently developed 
products. Commonality also means customers attain the benefit of lower spare parts 
inventory requirements, and simplification of training and operating procedures. 
 
Incorporation of technologies and designs from other product lines also mean those 
components enjoy production rates higher than if they were deployed on just one product 
line. The ability to do this depends on the combinative capabilities of the company. 
 
Summary of Findings 
ase study of the Boeing 737 story shows that the traditional view of CoPS having 
d innovation and low production rates can be negated by employing a strategy 
 product platforms. The B737 has enjoyed at least three generations of 
fa
ations. 
ing product platforms, variants to create a wider reach of market segments can be 
oped as product families. Development of variants however should be spaced out to 
 time for evolution and refinement of the product platform architecture and 
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These engineering capabilities also determine the company’s expertise in upgrading the 
product platform to engineer “carry over-modified” parts adapted from existing 
component designs to improve product performance when so desired. Care must be taken 
 maximize commonality with previous designs and to 
pgrade only where necessary. Upgrading the product platform offers the ability to create 
sruptive Innovation case. By adapting existing product designs to be just 
ood enough to satisfy the customer, the incumbent can compete against over-
 parts to 
eet higher end segments but which would be over-kill for the lower end market. In this 
ed in 
e B737 case study. These include: 
to upgrade a CoPS type product to
u
new generations of product families to maintain product longevity. 
 
Such a strategy could be used in a Reverse Disruptive Innovation way to defend against a 
new high performance entrant, reversing new entrant and incumbent roles compared to a 
traditional Di
g
performance by the new entrant and save considerable development costs, using the 
already installed customer base as a commonality marketing advantage. 
 
A danger of such a strategy, if successful, is that the product may improve in 
performance towards the up-market segment where it could threaten other product lines 
of the company. Going up-market also means that lower end variants of the product 
family could suffer loss of optimization as the product platform would feature
m
case more than one product platform could be a consideration to reduce de-optimization. 
 
A five step generic CoPS strategy is proposed employing similar features as observ
th
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o Take Advantage of Heritage 
o Employ Product Platforms 
o Plan Family Variants 
o Exploit Commonality 
o Decide On The Next Generation 
 
The strategy is further supported by arguments but notably proven in prior historical case 
d visual display 
stems can be interchanged or upgraded. 
 
onsidered as CoPS would have been categorized as CoPS in the past. The strategies 
t least components of it can be commoditized. In 
examples of other successful products such as the Ford Model T car, Have Blue aircraft 
prototypes, and the Bell AH-1/UH-1 helicopters. To maintain product longevity, evolving 
product architecture would be a healthy option. Interestingly some of these findings 
appear to be being employed by the flight simulator community (where CoPS was 
originally conceived) where common software platforms are being utilized to simulate 
different aircraft types and electro-mechanical positioning devices an
sy
 
Perhaps the most important issue is that the findings and arguments contribute a new 
view of CoPS theory where we go from an observatory status in the literature to one 
where a product manager can feel empowered to improve innovation and production 
rates, reduce costs, and improve the potential to increase commercialization CoPS 
products. With the consideration of time, many mass consumer items today which are not
c
proposed simply help to advance the rate of innovation to achieve a faster product life 
cycle where the CoPS product or a
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Despite arguments in Chapter 3 that a single case study offers richness in context and 
narrative to build theory, a limitation of this case study is that it is just one case study. 
However to attempt increased validation if say the study was made of say three 
completely different types of CoPS products or systems in different type scenarios and 
the generic strategy tested on all three is perhaps not so simple as CoPS by definition is 
complex. Even when researching for other cases such as the Ford Model T, there is a 
longitudinal time-shift in those cases that may have unknown effects. By being complex 
scenarios, it is virtually impossible to cover every potential possibility that could affect 
the case study results such as Governmental interference or corruption in sales. 
 
For example, deploying a strategy of product platforms means requiring a prior 
agreement to invest in more than one variant model of product. This may not be easily 
done if the project is for example a nuclear powerplant and financiers are only willing to 
support one construction example. This leads us back to the CoPS definition and 
probably the best that could be done is to deploy just parts of the generic strategy such as 
using pre-designed sub-assemblies to reduce uncertainties and risk. 
 
dition Reverse Disruption Innovation is a 
fensive strategy. 
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An aeronautical vehicle such as the B737 airplane lends itself nicely to “performance” 
factors and variation design methods to meet market segments are already quite 
stablished using fuselage stretches or shrinks and/or engine changes. However with 
ther CoPS products appropriate performance parameters may be more difficult to 
determine and vary using unknown design components. Almost a subject matter expert is 
needed to select the appropriate parameters if the subject is overly complex in nature. 
 
 




7.3. Potential for Further Research 
 
The generic strategy proposed assumes a strategy from start. However knowing when to 
finally cease developing yet another generation and start an all-new product line such as 
Boeing did by replacing the B757 with the B727 would be a difficult multi-disciplinary 
decision that is not unlike a chess game in the face of competition. Clarifying how these 
decisions should be made would be a rich study field for further research. 
 
The use of “carry over-modified” parts to upgrade product platforms also offers an area 
to be further studied. In hindsight Boeing’s decision to modify the B737 Next Generation 
wing but maintain use of the existing rear wing spar and associated high lift devices 
appears to be genius. A simple component could be easily justified but whole sub-
assemblies offer complexity and risk, particularly if they have interdependencies with 
other sub-systems (such as hydraulic systems) or performan
a
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 Determining performance factors and measuring the degree of sub-optimization in lower 
market segment ends of CoPS systems would be interesting to further study. Instead of 
simply accepting sub-optimization, perhaps strategies could be employed to mitigate 
those effects, such as offering lower end modular components (such as the B737 landing 
gear) as options. 
 
The B787 aircraft for example comes with a revolutionary designed engine pylon on 
which either a choice of General Electric or Rolls Royce manufactured engines can be 
mounted. While in this case both engines are of comparable size and thrust rating, why 
not use the interchangeable pylon to offer a completely smaller or larger engine to match 
the market segment’s performance requirement? 
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Appendix C – Payload Range Charts 
 
 
The following Payload Range charts are derived from the “737 Airplane Characteristics 
for Airport Planning” document D6-58325-6 by the Boeing Commercial Airplane 























The following Payload Range charts are derived from the “757-200/300 Airplane 
Characteristics for Airport Planning” document D6-58327, by the Boeing Commercial 
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